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ABSTRACT
Between 1928 and 19 30 Nazi electoral support rose
from 2.6 to 18.3 percent.

This expansion of the NSDAP

constituted a political breakthrough of unprecedented pro
portions.

The Nazis alone of the totalitarian parties of

the twentieth-century were able to attract a mass following
before they came to power.

The Nazi electoral victory was

the result of the conjunction of a series of fortuitous
events and the skillful exploitation of these opportunities.
The Young Plan, the great depression, and the German consti
tutional crisis of 1930 all served to discredit the Weimar
Republic and to heighten Nazi appeal.

Nevertheless, these

opportunities were only useful to the party because the
NSDAP was able to exploit them.

The means utilized by the

Nazis to transform discontent into votes was a continuous
propaganda campaign of truly gigantic proportions covering
all of Germany.

This dissertation examines the development

and character of the political machine which enabled the
party to stage this campaign.
The basic principles of Nazi propaganda were formu
lated by Hitler in Mein Kampf and worked out in practice
in the party's rally system.

The Nazis emphasized emotional

appeals and the development of a series of concretely
*

*

in

*

iv
objectified impressions that conjured up images of a
mythical world of the future.

The NSDAP also consistently

shunned efforts to "educate" the public in National Social
ist ideology.

The task of the party after 1928 was to

devise methods for creating similar impressions on a mass
audience as those already presented at the party’s major
rallies.
The Nazi techniques to do this consisted of a number
of programs either started or eventually adopted by the
Munich Reichsleitung.

Deputy propaganda leader Heinrich

Himmler initiated the first such device in late 1928.
Utilizing the principle of concentration, he developed the
Nazi saturation campaign which involved the presentation of
up to two hundred speeches, marches and meetings in a short
span of time within the confines of a single region.

These

campaigns were designed to leave an impression of the
party's strength and dedication in areas previously lightly
canvassed.

Such campaigns could not be implemented every

where at once or sustained for long periods because of the
dearth of trained Nazi agitators.

This problem of quantity

was first dealt with by Gauleiter Fritz Reinhardt, who de
veloped a way of cheaply training numerous Nazi orators
through his correspondence school for speakers.

By the

1930 election Reinhardt's school had produced over fifteen
hundred new speakers.

Street work was also re-organized

during these years with the founding of the Muchow street

V

cell organization.

This organization mobilized ordinary

party members in small groups for everyday propaganda
activities.

Such programs made it possible for the Nazis

to blanket Germany with propaganda activities.

Based upon

the willingness of party members to volunteer their services
for the cause, the new Nazi political machine was virtually
financially self-sufficient.

Its participatory character

also heightened party morale and helped the Nazis create the
impression that they were a militant political order of con
siderable strength.
The Nazis also sought to create the impression that
they were a blood order of specially dedicated men who were
destined to bring about a rebirth of Germany.

The theme

of blood sacrifice was emphasized in such quasi-religious
ceremonies as the festival at Caub and the Reichsparteitag
of 1929.

In this scheme of things, the SA fulfilled the

dual role of martyrs and angels of death, the specially con
secrated embodiment of the purification of Germany.

By

creating this series of impressions the NSDAP was able to
persuade millions of frustrated and desperate voters that
the party offered a viable alternative to the crumbling
Weimar Republic.

CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL
BACKGROUND
On September 14, 1930, Germans went to the polls
to select a new Reichstag to lead their country through
the ever worsening great depression.

The results of this

election came as a rude shock to the leaders of Germany's
first democracy, the Weimar Republic.

Everyone had

expected the extremist parties to do well, but the magni
tude of their success was astonishing.

The Communists

gained over a million votes and elected seventy-seven
deputies.

This represented an increase of 40 percent

in their strength.^

The Communist success, however, pales

to insignificance when compared with the extraordinary
expansion of the radical rightist Nazi party
(Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei or NSDAP).
In May, 1928, the NSDAP and its leader Adolf Hitler had
only been able to attract 810,00 votes2 or 2.6 percent
^S. William Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy:
A Political History of the Reich from 1918 to 1933 (New
York: W. W. Norton, 196l>) p~ 446.
2Alan Bullock, Hitler:
York: Bantam, 1961) p. 112.

A Study in Tyranny (New

2
of the total^ in a national election.

On September 14,

1930, 6,409,600 votes were cast for the Nazis,
cent of the total.^

4

18.3 per

The NSDAP delegation to the

Reichstag increased from twelve deputies to one hundred
and seven.

As Karl Dietrich Bracher observed, "Probably

never before had a party registered such gains within a
two-year period.
significance.”^

It was a development of truly historic
The size of Nazi gains startled contem

poraries and has left historians with a very difficult
problem.

How were the Nazis able to perform this polit

ical miracle in a mere twenty-seven months?
One of the reasons that the Nazis did so well
in 1930 was the fact that the Weimar Republic was suffer
ing from a series of complex problems which made voters
receptive to Nazi appeals.

In the late 1920*s the

Republic underwent economic, foreign policy, political
3
Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler's Rise to Power: The
Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933 (New York: Harper and
Row, 1973) pT T ? 2 .
^Bullock, Hitler, p. 128.
^Pridham, Hitler*s Rise, p. 322.
6Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship:
The Origins, Structure and Effects of National Socialism
trans. Jean Steinberg (New York and Washington: Praeger,
1970) p. 182.
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and constitutional crises7 all of which served to dis
credit democratic government.

These crises were short

term manifestations of long-range seemingly insoluble
problems that had plagued Germany since the end of World
War I.

In the first eleven years of its existence, the

Weimar Republic had been unable to find any permanent
solutions to these problems.

This failure convinced many

voters that no answers could be found within existing
political institutions and increased the attractiveness
of the extremist, anti-republican parties.
The most serious crisis facing the government in
7

The best discussion of the crisis of German
democracy from the late twenties to the advent of Hitler
can be found in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auf losung der
Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart: Ring Verlag, 1957). As
the title implies this book deals with the dissolution
of the Weimar Republic.
It concentrates upon discussions
of the social, political, constitutional, economic and
international weaknesses of the Republic and only inci
dentally deals with the rise of the NSDAP.
Bracher attempts
to draw lessons from the past to instruct contemporary
Germans on the dangers to democratic institutions.
He
tends to be somewhat deterministic in his argument con
tending that a number of serious defects in the structure
of German society and republican institutions led almost
inevitably to the collapse of German democracy.
This
deterministic aspect of Bracher's study has been criti
cized, especially by Waldemar Besson in his Wurttemberg
und die deutsche Staatkrise, 1928-1933 (Stuttgart:
Tubingen Verlag, 1959). However, Bracher's work remains
the most complete and perceptive analytical treatment
of the collapse of Germany's first democracy.
For a
general treatment of the political history of the Republic
see either Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy or Erich
Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic (2 vols.; Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard U . P .“ r962-1964) .

4
1930 was the severe weakening of the economy.

o

The

German economy was never very healthy in the twenties,
but major problems began to appear in the agricultural
g
sector starting in 1926.
From that time on, the price
of produce and stock declined.

At the same time, in

terest rates on farm loans and taxes remained high.

The

farmers were caught between the economic scissors of
rising costs and shrinking income.

The agricultural de

pression hit farmers expecially hard because they had
experienced little prosperity at any time since 1919.
The Weimar governments had tended to follow policies
favorable to consumers and had slighted the interest of
the farmers.*®

By 1930 farmers were thoroughly disen

chanted with the Republic and ready to support its
extremist enemies.
The urban segment of the German economy enjoyed
a fleeting period of prosperity from 1925 to 1929.

These

good times were based primarily upon a continuous influx
of foreign short-term loans, especially from America.
p
For a discussion of the German economy see
Gustav Stolper, The German Economy, 1870-1940: Issues
and Trends (New York: Raynal & Hitchcock, 1940).
9
Rudolf Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism: A
Regional Case Study on Political Parties-In Germany
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State U . P ~ 1945)
p. 112.
Heberle states that the agricultural depression
developed in three phases.
In 1926-27 there were two
severe slumps in hog prices.
This slump was repeated in
1929-30.
In 1930-31 similar slumps occurred in cattle
prices, and from 1929 credit became difficult to obtain.
10Ibid., p. 42.

5
The foreign loans financed many German businesses and
municipal projects.

With the collapse of the New York

stock market in October, 1929, this period of prosperity
came to an end.

The short-term loans were recalled, and

many businesses and local governments, unable to find new
sources of ready cash, faced bankruptcy.
The effects of the great depression were felt
almost at once.

The construction industry began laying

off large numbers of workers as civic building projects
were cancelled for lack of funds.

The business sector

responded to the emergency by cutting its expenses.
usually took the form of discharging employees.

This

Thus,

the great depression led immediately to a rapid rise in
the number of unemployed workers, a problem exacerbated
by the fact that a relatively high level of unemployment
was endemic even during the years of prosperity.^
There was little direct connection between the
rising number of unemployed workers and the growth in
Nazi strength.

The growing army of the jobless came

largely from the lower class and tended to gravitate to
ward either the Communists or the more moderate Social
Democrats.

Nazi gains, on the other hand, came largely

from the middle class and farming populace.

The effects

of the great depression on these groups were significant
^ F o r a description of unemployment during the
years of prosperity see Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern
Germany 1840-1945, Vol. Ill (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1969)
pp. 639-40.
Unemployment rose from 1,320,00 in September,
1929 to 3,000,00 in September, 1930, Bullock, Hitler, p. 119.

6
though less dramatic than the widespread unemployment of
the working class.

Both the middle class and independent

farmers saw their profits dwindle.

They were forced to

cut back on their operations in a variety of ways, often
including the dismissal of a few employees.

These pro

cedures were painful and meant a declining standard of
living for small employers, but they did not entail
immediate economic ruin, loss of status or unemployment.
It was not so much the economic consequences of the de
pression as concern for the future that turned the middle
class toward Nazism.

As William Sheridan Allen, in his

book describing the rise of Nazism in a small town, put
it, "It was the depression, or more accurately, the fear
of its continued effects, that contributed most heavily
to the radicalization of Thalburg's p e o p l e . T h e

middle

class and landowners saw the growing army of unemployed
12

William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of
Power; The Experience of a Single German Town, 1930-1935
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965) pp^ JT5-2TI The Alien
book provides the best picture of the political effects
of the great depression on the German middle class, pp. 3138 passim. His book is based primarily upon interviews
with people who lived through the period.
It presents a
vivid and personalized portrayal of the impact of the
great depression and the rise of Nazism in the context of
a single town.
For a discussion of the middle class basis
of Nazi support see Alfred Milatz, Wahler und Wahlen in
der Weimarer Republik (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fttr politTsche
Bildung, 1965} pp. 62, 113, 135.
The term middle class is
rather vague especially for this period.
During the
Weimar Republic persons tended to consider themselves to
be part of the middle-class if they were businessmen,
shopkeepers, white collar workers, skilled artisans, or
university educated.
The designation often had little to
do with income.

7
workers as an active threat to their continued existence
and status.

The growth in Communist support and the in

creasingly militant stance of the Social Democrats only
tended to reenforce this idea.

The German middle class

believed that any successful Marxist seizure of power was
certain to end in the destruction of both their status
and few remaining advantages.

The Nazis exploited this

fear by portraying themselves as vigorous enemies of
Marxism ready to defend the middle class against expropria
tion.

As long as the NSDAP could convince middle-class

Germans that it would and could defend them against the
Marxists, it was able to count on heavy support from this
segment of German society.
Almost purely by coincidence, the Republic faced
a crisis in foreign policy at the same time as the advent
of the great depression.

In June, 1929, the Allies pre

sented the German government with a new scheme for making
reparation payments.

This proposal was called the Young

Plan after the American banker Owen Young, who was instru
mental in working out the final r e p o r t . ^

The plan itself

made a number of concessions to Germany, the most important
of which was the evacuation of the Rhineland.
the Young Plan improved Germany's position.

Objectively,
Yet it also

l^For a discussion of the struggle over the Young
Plan see Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, pp. 388-402 and
Holborn, Modern Germany, pp~ 642-51, 667-83.
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revived the bitter debate over reparations and provided the
right with a useful issue with which to attack the govern
ment.
On July 9, 1929, a committee was formed to oppose
the Young Plan including Hitler, Alfred Hugenberg-the leader
of the conservative-monarchist Deutschnationale Volkspartei
14
(DNVP)-the Stahlhelm, and the Pan-German League.
Using
a provision of the Weimar constitution, this committee
initiated a campaign to defeat the new reparations settle
ment through a referendum.
were obtained on petitions,
December, 1929.

Over four million signatures
and an election was held in

The referendum failed, getting less than

six million v o t e s , ^ but the issue of continued reparations
was very much in the public eye at the same time that the
economic situation was deteriorating.
The reparations issue and the Versailles Treaty
were painful long-term problems of the Republic.
l^Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy

In the

p. 393.

1^Ibid., p. 395.
16Ibid., p. 399.
For the "Law against the enslave
ment of the German people” to have been enacted into law
more than twenty-one million votes were required.
The
referendum failed largely bacause the Young Plan was an im
provement over the previous reparation agreement, the Dawes
Plan.
A yes vote on the referendum was a vote to reject
the Young Plan.
However, if the "Law against the enslave
ment of the German people" had been adopted, the older
Dawes agreement would have remained in force.
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eyes of many Germans, the Weimar regime was discredited
from its beginning because it had signed the Versailles
Treaty.

The treaty cost Germany land, power, and prestige.

These losses were severe enough, but what continued to en
rage Germans a decade after the end of World War I was the
war guilt clause and the resulting reparation payments.
The Allies in 1919 decided that Germany should pay for all
the damage resulting from the war.

In order to justify

this legally, a clause was inserted into the peace treaty
stating that Germany was guilty of having caused World
War I and thus was liable for all damages resulting from
her criminal conduct.
German opinion.

This legalistic nicety outraged

Most Germans thought that the war guilt

clause was nothing more than a hypocritical lie that the
victors had forced the vanquished to a c c e p t . T h e

pay

ment of reparations was a continuing reminder of national
humiliation and national weakness.
The rightist parties, especially the Nazis, ex
ploited the righteous indignation aroused by the war guilt
and reparation issues.

The Nazis argued that the war

guilt clause was a malicious falsehood and cited works by
prominent contemporary historians to support their conten
tion.

They described reparations as a form of tribute money

unjustly extorted from the German people by naked threats
17Theodore Abel, The Nazi Movement: Why Hitler
Came to Power (New York: Atherton Press, 1966) pp. 30-34.

10
of force.

Finally, the Nazis contended that most of their

opponents were collaborators and besmirchers of German honor
because of their pragmatic acceptance of the Versailles
Treaty and subsequent reparation settlements.
the Nazis

were

In debate

able to appear to be virtuous defenders of

simple justice, while their opponents, who were trying
gradually to improve Germany's position, seemed to be
opportunists and knaves.

By its very existence the Young

Plan rekindled old animosities and allowed the Nazis

to

exploit deep-seated bitterness over the Versailles Treaty
and reparations at a time when many Germans were becoming
thoroughly dissatisfied with the Republic due to the
economic crisis.
The most effective Nazi argument against the
Young Plan had nothing to do with moral or historial con
siderations.

The NSDAP from its earliest years contended

that reparation payments led to economic disaster.

In 1929

the Nazis attacked the Young Plan as leading to the enslave
ment of the German people by a clique of Jewish Wall Street
financiers.

For the NSDAP the advent of the great depres

sion was a fortunate occurrence.

It appeared to validate

their statements made in the campaign against the Young
Plan.

For many Germans in 1930, the Nazi contentions of
1929 seemed to have been prophetic. 18 The great depression,

after all, began with the collapse of the New York stock
18Bracher, German Dictatorship, pp. 162-64.
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market.

Was

not this proof that German prosperity was in

the hands of a few Wall Street bankers?
As the depression continued to worsen, resentment
against reparations increased.

The government continued to

pay, even though its budget was badly strained by the in
creasing demands of those living on unemployemnt insurance
and welfare.

Under these circumstances the

hard-pressed

miudle class

could expect no tax relief and

was forced to

support the unemployed and pay reparations through their
taxes.

After June 30, 1929, this burden became even more

unpalatable.

On thac day the last Allied troops evacuated
19
the Rhineland.
Thus, the most obvious advantage of the

Young Plan was an accomplished fact before the September
Reichstag election, and only the liabilities of that plan,
fifty-eight more years of reparation payments, remained.
With the last occupation troops off German soil and with
increasing economic want, Nazi arguments against further
indemnities to the Allies became even more appealing.
The Nazi success in linking economic disaster with
foreign policy was not merely a result of good timing.
Such an hypothesis seemed plausible to Germans given the
history of the Weimar Republic.

On two separate occasions

since the birth of the Republic, economic disaster had been
caused by foreign policy failures.
1Q

The first of these

Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, p. 427.

12
instances occurred in 1919.

In the immediate aftermath

of the German military and political collapse of 1918, the
economy went through a period of severe depression.

War

industries were rendered instantly obsolete, and they were
unable to convert to civilian production because of the
continuing British blockade, which made it impossible for
Germany to export manufactured goods.

The blockade, which

was not lifted until after the signing of the Versailles
Treaty, also precluded the possibility of importing muchneeded agricultural goods and led to widespread food short
ages, malnutrition, and even cases of starvation.
veterans swelled the ranks of the unemployed.

Returning

Faced with

the disastrous consequences of military defeat, the new
republican government was virtually powerless to do anything
about the growing economic crisis.
The second example of a foreign policy failure
leading directly to economic catastrophe occurred in 1923.
German recovery in the early twenties had been slow and
painful.

Under these straitened conditions reparations

served to retard recovery and were difficult to pay.

In

late 1922 Germany had failed to deliver a shipment of tele
graph poles to France.

The militant French government of

Raymond Poincare denied German requests for more time and
dispatched troops to occupy the highly industrialized Ruhr.
The

German government was then curtly ordered to comply

with all future demands or suffer continued military

13
occupation of this vital region.

The German government

was in no position to dislodge the French militarily due
to a provision of the Versailles Treaty that limited the
German army to a mere 100,000 men.

Under these circum

stances the government responded to French incursions in
the only practicable way by calling a general strike in
20

the Ruhr.

The decision to employ a strategy of passive re
sistance to French aggression by means of the general strike
led to economic disaster.

The workers in the Ruhr dutifully

abided by the government's decision and stopped working.
The rich industries of the area ceased to function almost
at once.

This meant that the already hard-pressed govern

ment lost the income that it normally would have received
from the Ruhr, but what made the situation intolerable was
that the Weimar government now had to support the striking
workers through unemployment payments.

The German govern

ment had been unable to comply with reparation demands
before 1923.

Now, stripped of all income from the Ruhr,

it simply did not have the money to support striking workers.
Unwilling to capitulate to naked force, the government tried
to save its policy of passive resistance by printing un
supported paper money to pay strikers.

This expedient pro

gram led to a disastrous period of hyper-inflation which
wiped out the cash savings of the middle class and reduced
20Ibid., pp. 247-50.
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the economy virtually to the level of barter.

In the end,

the government was forced to admit defeat and openly accept
the continuation of the French occupation.
In 1929-30 when the Nazis linked reparations and
foreign policy failure with economic collapse, Germans were
prepared to believe them.

The entire history of the Weimar

Republic seemed to support this contention.

In reality

the Young Plan had little to do with the advent of the
great depression, but voters were easily persuaded that
such a connection existed.
The economic and foreign policy crises of the late
twenties severely damaged the Republic; but if Germany had
enjoyed a stable political system, it is probable that the
spectacular Nazi gains of 1930 would not have occurred.
Voters turned to the NSDAP primarily because they were con
vinced that the traditional parties of the Weimar Republic
were impotent to deal with the worsening situation.

It was

the political and constitutional crisis of the late twenties
that finally discredited the Republic.
Political disunity had existed in Germany for cen
turies.

The country was divided on religious lines between

Catholics and Protestants.

The old conflict between farmers

and city dwellers continued unabated.

With the growth of

industrialization in the nineteenth century, a new division
appeared in German society between factory workers and
employers.

The situation was further exacerbated by the

15
existence of a number of differing political traditions
that were only superficially overcome by the establishment
of a unified German state in 1871.

Strong local identifi

cation was especially prevalent in Bavaria and Hanover.
Under the second Empire little had been done to overcome
these internal rifts.

The authoritarian Imperial regime

favored one group and then another.

Occasionally,

it sup

ported legislation that was much desired by one or more of
Germany's factions, but no real attempt was made to draw
the various elements of German society together and to find
a political consensus.

The relative weakness of the

Reichstag under the Imperial constitution enabled the
Kaiser and his government to avoid coming to grips with the
problem of disunity.

Under the best circumstances the

Weimar Republic faced a difficult task in attempting to
bring together Germany's disparate elements in the context
of a democratic republic.

Unfortunately, the Weimar system

tended to make a bad situation worse.
One of the greatest problems facing the Weimar
Republic was the proliferation of small parties representing
special interest groups.

Industrial and some agricultrual

laborers were represented by either the moderate Socialists
(SPD) or the Communists (KPD).

Catholics were represented

by the Center party (Z) or in Bavaria by the Bavarian
Peoples' Party (BVP).

Middle-class support was divided

among a multitude of parties including the Democratic Party
(DDP), the Economic Party (W), and the German Peoples'

16
Party (DVP).

The DVP also tended to represent the interests

of industrial employers. 21

Finally, the old aristocracy and

some of the farming populace were represented by the German
National Peoples* Party (DNVP).

This multiparty system was

based upon a provision of the Weimar constitution which
stated that members of the Reichstag would be elected by
proportional representation.

For electoral purposes,

Germany was divided into large districts.

Voters did not

elect individual candidates but instead voted for the party
of their choice.

Each party was then awarded representation

roughly proportional to the vote it attracted.

Even if a

party received only a minute percentage of the total vote,
it could expect to elect some deputies.
1928 the Nazis received only 2.6 percent
vote.

22

For example, in
of the national

Nonetheless, the NSDAP elected twelve deputies to

the Reichstag. 23

In practice, proportional representation

21

The literature on the various political parties
during the Weimar Republic is quite extensive.
For the
Social Democrats see Richard N. Hunt, Social Democracy 19181933 (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1964). The Communist party has
been dealt with in Eric Waldmann, The Spartacist Uprising of
1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement (Mil
waukee, Wisconsin: Marquette U.P., 1958) and in Werner
Angress, Stillborn Revolution: The Communist Bid for Power
in Germany, 1921-?3 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U.P.,
T563)^
For a discussion of the DVP the reader would be well
advised to consult Henry A. Turner, Stresemann and the
Politics of the Weimar Republic (Princeton: Princeton U.P.,
1965).
Finally Bracher1s Auflffsung does an admirable job of
discussing the activities of t h eseparties in the critical
last years of the Republic.
22Pridham, Hitler1s R ise, p. 322.
2^Bullock, Hitler, p. 112.
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meant that every sizable special interest group could hope
to win seats in the Reichstag.
The German electoral system created a number of
problems for the Weimar Republic.

At election time this

system produced a high degree of divisiveness.

Each party

tried to maintain the support of its followers by empha
sizing the differences between its supporters and other
Germans.

In this manner, social, economic and religious

divisions were accentuated.

This was bad enough, but the

problem with proportional representation was that no one
narrowly based party could ever hope to gain a majority in
the Reichstag.

Thus, at the conclusion of an election cam

paign some of the parties were forced to unite to form a
coalition government.

In the Weimar Republic all govern

ments were by coalition.

This situation led to such strange

marriages of convenience as the inclusion of both the SPD,
representing workers, and the DVP, representing employers,
in the same government.

In practice such combinations meant

that the most treasured schemes of all parties were doomed
never to be enacted.

Under this system decisive leadership

was virtually impossible, since coalition members could
never support the full program of another party without
alienating their own backers.

This situation was especially

hard to accept in a country like Germany where a tradition
of parliamentary government and a willingness to compromise
with political foes was almost completely lacking.

For the

immature parties of the Weimar Republic participation in
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coalition governments was a frustrating experience.
The Weimar system of government by perpetual dead
lock exacerbated yet another problem of the Republic.

Two

important traditional Weimar parties, the DNVP and the SPD,
not only represented major special interest groups, but also
espoused principles which made it very difficult for them to
play an active role in coalition republican governments.
The DNVP was the major spokesman of the interests of
Germany's Protestant farmers.

It was also the principal

advocate of reactionary, monarchist politics in the Republic.
In order to retain its rural base, the party was forced to
compromise with the various republican governments, and for
a short time in the mid-twenties, the DNVP actually entered
ministries.

However, as a monarchist party dedicated to the

restoration of the old Imperial form of government, the DNVP
was theoretically unable to cooperate with the Republic.
This conflict between principles and the DNVP's obligation
to represent its supporters' interests was very hard to re
solve.

In practice, the DNVP could only justify partici

pating in republican government if it was able to make real
gains for its rural backers.

Unfortunately, the Weimar

system of government by broad coalitions made it difficult
for the DNVP to enact legislation useful to its constituents.
Given this situation, the monarchists turned away from co
operation and embraced a policy of strident opposition to
the Republic from 1928 on.

The Republic could expect no
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help from the DNVP in dealing with the great depression.^
Within the DNVP the consequences of this policy of
irreconcilable opposition to the Republic were considerable.
The party's anti-republican faction, led by Hugenberg, sys
tematically forced out other, more moderate elements which
did not support its policy.

In July, 1930, internal dis

sension in the DNVP finally led to the resignation of
Hugenberg*s predecessor as party leader, Count Kuno von
25
Westarp.
For the elections in September, therefore, the
forces of German conservatism were divided into no less than
four separate parties:

The DNVP promising continued vocal

and bitter opposition to the Republic; the more moderate
Konservative Volkspartei under Westarp; the Landvolkpartei
supported by the powerful white collar union, the Deutscher
Handlungsgehilfenverband; and the Christliche Volksdienst,
The crisis of the DNVP from 1928 to 1930 has not
been dealt with directly.
However, several studies covering
earlier years or on tangential subjects cast much light on
the problems facing German conservatives in the twenties.
Lewis Hertzmann's DNVP:
Right-Wing Opposition in the Weimar
Republic, 1918-1924 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of
Nebraska Press, 1963) is best for this purpose.
Other works
that should be consulted include Werner Liebe, Die
Deutschnationale Volkspartei, 1918-1924 (Dlisseldorf: Droste
Verlag, 19 56), Walter Kaufmann, Monarchism in the Weimar
Republic (New York: Brookman Associates, 195^), Kurt Sonntheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik:
Die politlschen ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen
l9i8 und 1933 (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlag, 1962), and
Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in
the Rise of the Germanic ideology (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1965).
25Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, pp. 432-33.
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a reactionary Protestant party.

2fi

The political consequences of the break-up of the
DNVP were considerable Nazi gains in areas previously con
trolled by the conservatives.

Farmers had formerly sup

ported the monarchists largely because they thought the
DNVP would effectively represent their interests.
they left the party by the thousands.

Now,

The three conserva

tive splinter parties were unable to attract significant
followings;

they were new and not taken seriously by voters.

Only Westarp commanded a substantial personal following, and
his party came into existence a mere two months before the
September, 1930 elections.

The DNVP itself was unable to

outdo the Nazis in bitter opposition to the Republic and was
thoroughly discredited by its perpetual infighting.

Further

more, Hugenberg was no match for Hitler either as a leader
or as a charismatic figure.

Only the Nazis benefitted from

the collapse of German conservatism, 27 and this collapse was
a direct result of the inability of the DNVP to make meaning
ful gains for its constituents between 1924 and 1928, when
the moderate Westarp faction pursued a policy of cooperation
with the Republic.

The Weimar coalition system led to

Hugenberg*s victory over Westarp and ultimately to the
26For the impact of the break-up of the DNVP
regionally see Dietrich ThrSnhardt, Wahlen und politische
Strukturen in Bayern, 1848-1958 (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag,
1973) pp. 140-41.
27Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 183.
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disintegration of German conservatism.
The loss of conservative support damaged the
Republic, but the withdrawal of Germany's principal working
class party, the Social Democrats,

from an active role in

Weimar government was little short of catastrophic.

The

SPD always supported the Republic in principle, but like the
DNVP it represented a set of political ideas as well as a
special interest group.

Ideologically the SPD was a Marxist

party and thus theoretically opposed to cooperation with the
bourgeoisie.

This made it difficult for the party to parti

cipate in coalition governments.

Nevertheless, in practice

the SPD, which represented a majority of Germany's workers
through its close association with the Freie Gewerkschaften
or free trade unions, was expected to support laws helpful
to workers.

This left the SPD torn between a revisionist

policy of seeking to ameliorate the lot of Germany's workers
through piecemeal legislation and an ideologically dictated
policy of opposition to all bourgeois elements. 28

In the

2 8The best discussion of the split within SPD ranks
over whether or not to participate in bourgeois governments
are found in Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy,
1905-1917 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U .P ., 1955) and Peter
Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bern
stein 1s Challenge to Marx (New York: Columbia U.P.l 1952).
Both of these books cover an earlier period, and conditions
changed from the Empire to the Republic.
However, the
ideological dilemma of whether or not a Marxist party could
properly cooperate with bourgeois parties remained the
same.
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twenties, the Socialist leadership tended to pursue limited
objectives while paying lip service to such Marxist ideas
as class consciousness, expropriation of the bourgeoisie and
social revolution.

The final acceptance of revisionism as

the party's official policy was not to occur until after
World War II.
Between 1928 and 1930 the SPD led a coalition govern
ment.

The party did well in the May, 1928, elections and

expected to be able to enact a sweeping program of reforms.
The party leaders who favored a policy of active participa
tion in government were in firm control, and the SPD entered
a national government for the first time since the early
days of the Republic.

The experience was far from pleasant.

The SPD Reichstag delegation was sizable, but by no means a
majority.

The Socialists were only able to gain a working

majority by including both the Center party and the DVP in
a ministerial alliance.

These predominately bourgeois

parties opposed most of the more radical and comprehensive
SPD programs.

Since government proposals had to be approved

by all coalition partners, most of the Socialist programs
were not enacted.

In the twenty-two months of the SPD

government of Hermann Miiller next to nothing was accom
plished.
By 1930 the Mtlller ministry was facing the first
stages of the great depression.

At this key moment the

government found itself virtually paralyzed.

Cooperation

between the coalition partners was becoming more difficult
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largely because the Mtiller regime included both the SPD
representing workers, and the DVP representing employers.
Until October 3, 1929, some degree of cooperation had
existed between these two antagonistic parties, but on that
date the DVP leader Gustav Stresemann, Germany's perennial
foreign minister, died.

Stresemann had been able to force

his colleagues in the DVP to participate in various govern
ments and to subordinate their special interests to what
he considered to be overriding national concerns.

With

Stresemann's death the DVP became little more than the
special interest party of Germany's industrialists.

Even

if Stresemann had lived, it is doubtful that he could have
saved the coalition.

The great depression tended to ex

acerbate existing differences between the SPD and the DVP.
The increasing tension within the coalition culminated in a
governmental crisis over the issue of unemployment insurance.
With the number of jobless workers increasing, the unemploy
ment insurance fund began to experience financial diffi
culties.

The SPD favored increased employer contributions

to maintain payments at the 1930 level, while the DVP wanted
benefits to the unemployed reduced.

Attempts at compromise

initiated by the Center party failed, and on March 27, 1930,
29
the Muller cabinet resigned.
For the SPD the Milller ministry was the worst of all
29 For the Milller regime see Halperin, Germany Tried
Democracy, pp. 358-66, 403-406.
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possible worlds.

The party participated in a bourgeois

government and thus tarnished its Marxist purity.

At the

same time the SPD failed to enact any meaningful reforms
benefitting workers.

Even the 1927 conservative-bourgeois

regime had a better record, passing a comprehensive un30
employment insurance bill.
Ironically, the Muller govern
ment fell when the Socialists tried to defend that unemploy
ment insurance program.

The failure of the SPD government

worsened the threat to the party from the left.

The SPD

shared the support of German workers with the extremist
Communists.

Both of these parties were theoretically

Marxist, but the Communists were irreconcilably opposed to
any cooperation with the "bourgeois" Republic.

The Muller

fiasco convinced SPD leaders that any further participation
in government would only serve to aid their rivals.

This

conclusion was reenforced by reports from the free trade
unions of growing worker discontent and of Communist
successes.

Thus, in 1930 the SPD, Germany's largest politi

cal party, withdrew from any role in solving the country’s
problems and concentrated its full attention on dealing with
the Communist threat to its power base.

The continuing

deadlock in government produced by the Weimar system cost
the Republic the active participation in government of this
vital party at a time of increasing misery.
The withdrawal of the SPD from government precipi^ Ibid., p. 355 and Holborn, Modern Germany, p. 640.
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tated a major constitutional crisis.

It became impossible

to form a new coalition with the support of a majority of
the Reichstag.

President Paul von Hindenburg decided to

deal with the problem by appointing a minority government
under the Catholic Center politician Heinrich BrUning.
Hindenburg further determined to pass legislation by means
of emergency decrees.

Hindenburg's decision amounted to

an abrogation of parliamentary rule.

Briining did not have

to command a Reichstag majority to stay in office or to
pass laws; all he had to do was retain the confidence of the
aging President.

On July 16, 1930, the irreconcilable

elements in the Reichstag responded to this form of dicta
torial rule by rejecting a major Presidential decree.

Two

days later Briining ordered the dissolution of the Reichstag
and new elections for September 14. 31 With the DNVP, the
SPD and the two extremist parties, the Nazis and the Com
munists, unwilling to serve in coalition governments and
unwilling to tolerate rule by Presidential decree-German
democracy had reached a point of almost complete paralysis.
Faced with the worsening economic situation and frantic
demands from the public for action, any kind of action, the
Weimar Republic had virtually declared its own bankruptcy
in mid-1930.

Democratic institutions and parties seemed

discredited in the eyes of desperate voters looking for a
way of averting economic ruin.

The scene was set for a vast

^1Halpern, Germany Tried Democracy, pp. 429-32.
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expansion of the strength of the totalitarian parties.
The crises facing the Weimar Republic in the late
twenties "explain why people were impelled to join groups
and support collective efforts toward a change of the
32
existing order."
However, these crises alone are not
enough to explain the Nazi electoral breakthrough.

It is

unwarranted to assume that widespread discontent led
automatically to Nazi victory at the polls.

The problems

facing the Republic in 1930 simply provided a background
which made the NSDAP electoral triumph possible.
The best evidence that Nazi success was not the
automatic result of widespread dissatisfaction with the
Republic or of economic disaster can be found by examining
the political impact of the agricultural depression.

This

depression began in 1926, and by late 1927 and early 1928
the Nazis were trying to take advantage of the situation.
Intensive campaigns took place in north-central Germany and
in other isolated areas to attract rural and middle-class
voters who were suffering from the agricultural depression. 33
Nationally, Hitler published a "clarification" of point 17
of the Nazi party program,which called for "the expropria32Abel, Nazi Movement, p. 171.
33
For discussions of the rural campaign see Jeremy
Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921-1933 (London:
Oxford U .P., T?7l5 pp. T08-l2l, Geoffrey Pridham and Jeremy
Noakes (eds.) Documents on Nazism, 1919-1945 (New York:
Viking Press, 1975) pp. Uo-91, Heberle, From Democracy,
pp. 23-89, Gerhard Stoltenberg, Politische Strfimungen im
schleswig-holsteinischen Landvolk 1918-1^33 (DvtsseldorrT~
Droste Verlag, 1962) pp. 142-66.
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tion without compensation of land needed for national pur
poses, the abolition of ground rents and the prohibiting of
land speculation."3^

In an article in the party newspaper,

the Nazi leader explained that his party planned to
nationalize only land which had fallen into the hands of
Jewish speculators and had no intentions of seizing the
35
property of good German peasants.
This conscious attempt
to exploit agrarian discontent produced mixed results.

In

areas where active programs of intense agitation took place,
the Nazis did reasonably well.

However, in most of rural

Germany where little if any agitation occurred, the NSDAP
36
received few votes in the Reichstag election of 1928.
Discontent and economic distress did not automatically lead
to Nazi electoral successes.

As Joachim Fest observed in

the context of the 1930 election,

it was not possible to

exploit distress "simply by making empty promises to all and
sundry.

There were too many politicians trying that same
37
dodge; it soon ceased to fool anyone."
The task of translating discontent, economic disas
ter and widespread disenchantment with republican parties
■^Bullock, Hitler, p. 50.
O C

Ernst Deuerlein (ed.), Per Aufstieg der NSDAP in
Augenzeuqenberichten (Diisseldorf: Karl Rauch Verlag, 196$y
p. 292.
36Pridham, Hitler1s Rise, pp. 80-84.
37

Winston

Joachim Fest, Hitler trans. Richard and Clara
(New York: Random House, 1975) p. 271.
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and institutions into Nazi votes required an effective long
term propaganda effort.

As one Nazi local leader put it,
O Q

"Propaganda is the only thing that brings us forward."
The NSDAP had to convince voters that it could solve Germany’s
problems*

Moreover, the Nazis had to use unconventional

means to do this.

Statements of party programs and vague

promises were not enough.

This technique had been tried in

1928 with Hitler's revision of point 17 of the party program.
The cynical and disgusted public was in no mood to be swayed
by such simple appeals.

That was one of the lessons of the

1928 Nazi rural campaign, but there had also been another
lesson of that abortive effort.

In districts where the

party had conducted intensive campaigns the Nazis had scored
major victories.

Deeds, open professions of faith, and,

above all, physical proof of a willingness to act impressed
voters facing economic ruin.

Millions of Germans were so

alienated from existing institutions that only the promise
of a complete renewal of Germany could attract them.

This

promise could not be presented simply in words, because
German voters had learned to distrust mere words.

What was

needed was a concrete objectification of the promised reborn
Germany through deeds.

In order to exploit discontent the

Nazis had to create a series of vivid images of the counter
society that they would create once in power.

In order to

do this, the Nazis had to build a political machine embracing
1R

Eitel Wolf Dobert, Convert to Freedom trans. Heinz
and Ruth Norden (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1940) p. 163.
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all of Germany.

Without such a political machine it is very

improbable that the Nazis would have been able to score a
political victory approaching the magnitude of that of
September, 1930.
This dissertation will examine the development and
character of the Nazi political machine primarily between
May, 1928 and September,

1930.

It will examine the general

tenets on propaganda developed by Hitler and then discuss
how these ideas were applied in the Nazi rally system.

Much

emphasis will be placed on the methods that the Nazis uti
lized to create a series of concretely objectified impres
sions and vague images.
lent

coherence

These impressions and vague images

to the disparate elements of Nazi propaganda

and helped the party to paint a vivid picture of the Nazi
world of the future.

The Nazi approach to propaganda was

best exemplified in the party's major rallies, but other
parts of the Nazi political machine attempted to create
similar impressions.

These programs included the Himmler

saturation campaigns, the Reinhardt speakers' school to
train thousand of orators, the NSDAP slide and motion pic
ture services, the Muchow street cell organization for
saturating cities and towns with propaganda announcements,
and the storm troopers' use of violence and development of a
cult of death.

The side issue of how the NSDAP was able to

finance its intense campaigning will also be discussed.

The

development of an effective and omnipresent political
machine was the greatest accomplishment of the NSDAP in the
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late twenties.

As George Mosse observed, "the invention of

a new political style was the chief innovation of National
Socialism; political acts became the dramatization of the
new myths and cults." 39 This dissertation will describe
the development of the Nazi political machine and examine
its character.

It will also attempt to describe the role

of this propaganda apparatus in bringing about the Nazi
political breakthrough of 1930.

^George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses:
Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from~tEe
NapoleonicWars Through t h e T h i r d Reich (New Y o r k : Howard
Fertig, 1975) p. 1.

CHAPTER 2
THE NAZI PARTY TO 1928
The Nazi party was largely a product of World War I.
Its founder, Anton Drexler, was a patriotic Munich mechanic
who sought to win workers to nationalist ideas.

Drexler’s

activities were viewed with favor by the Imperial govern
ment, which encouraged him in his work during the closing
days of the War.

His activities continued after the German

defeat, and he attracted a small following of men who shared
his goal of weaning workers away from internationalist
Marxism.^-

It was in these days that the basic characteris

tics of the Nazi party were established.

The party was

based upon a community of accepted ideas and ideals.

It was

not the special representative of any group, class or insti
tution of the German power structure.

Finally, the NSDAP

was led from the beginning by new men with little previous
The early history of the Nazi party is exceptionally
well documented.
It has been dealt with in a number of
studies.
The best recent account of the party’s early
history are Georg Franz-Willing, Die Hitler - Bewegung 1^
Per Ursprung 1919-1922 (Hamburg: r9^2) and Werner Maser, Die
Frtthgeschichte der NSDAP (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag Anstalt,
1965).
The earITer studies of this period by Konrad Heiden,
Per Fiihrer: Hitler1s Rise to Power (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin & Co.7 1944) and A History of National Socialism
(New York: Alfred Knopf, T935) are still valuable for the
early period of Nazi development because Heiden was a percep
tive eyewitness of Nazi activities in the early twenties.
31
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leadership experience and no real opportunities to gain such
positions

within

established organizations.

The early

NSDAP was just one of a number of "National Socialist"
parties and clubs that sprang up in Germany, Austria and
Czechoslovakia between 1900 and 1920.

It was in no way

distinguished from these other lilliputian parties.
Drexler's "party" in 1919 was little more than an
3
impotent debating club.
It survived and prospered only be
cause Hitler decided to join it and took over responsibility
for party propaganda.

Hitler’s skill as a speaker was the

only real asset of the early NSDAP.

Ernst

(Putzi)

Hanfstaengl, an early party member, provides an excellent
description of Hitler's unique speaking style.

Hitler's

choice of words managed to catch:
"the casual camaraderie of the trenches, and
without stooping to slang, except for special
effect, the] managed to talk like a neighbor
of his audience.
In describing the difficulties
of the housewife without enough money to buy
the food her family needed . . . he would pro
duce just the phrases she would have used her
self to describe her difficulities, if she had
been able to formulate them.
Where other
2
M. W. Fodor, "The Austrian Roots of Hitlerism,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. XIV, 1935-1936.
3
The Nazi party was so insignificant before Hitler
joined it that there are very few contemporary eyewitness
reports on it.
Ironically, Hitler, in his capacity as an
intelligence agent for the army, was sent to gather informa
tion on the group.
Hitler was hardly an unbiased witness,
but in this case his description of the early NSDAP seems to
be accurate.
He described a meeting of the early NSDAP exec
utive committee in the following terms.
"Terrible, terrible!
This was club life of the worst manner and sort." Adolf
Hitler, Mein Kampf trans. Ralph Mannheim (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin and Company, 1943) p. 222.
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national orators gave the painful impression
of talking down to their audiences, he had
the priceless gift of expressing exactly their
thoughts.
As Ernst Nolte stated, Hitler 11was the medium who communi5
cated to the masses their own, deeply buried spirit.”
All
of Hitler's speeches followed a pattern designed to impress
his audience.
blems.

He never dealt merely with contemporary pro

Instead, he insisted upon discussing the past,

present and future of every issue.

Each speech ”appeared to

be a complete historical survey of the situation.

In

order not to bore his audience, Hitler broke up his speeches
with timely impersonations of imaginary opponents and then
proceeded to demolish the arguments presented by these hypo
thetical foes.
of thought."

He would then return "to his original line
Hanfstaengl concludes by describing the last

eight to ten minutes of a Hitler speech as "an orgasm of
words.
Hitler’s speaking abilities kept the NSDAP together
during the early twenties, but the party remained a small
movement.

Its ideological doctrines were formulated in the

party program of 1920, the twenty-five points.

Years

This program

^Ernst (Putzi) Hanfstaengl, Hitler: The Missing
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957) pp. 67-68.

5Ernst Nolte, The Three Faces of Fascism trans.
Leila Vennewitz (New York: Mentor^ T565T p. 373.
6Hanfstaengl, Hitler, p. 68
Ibid., pp. 68-69.
For another account of a Hitler
speech see Dobert, Convert, pp. 165-67.
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contained "with sufficient clarity the three basic trends of
subsequent National Socialist rule:

national restitution,
g
conquest of living space, and world salvation.”
In addi
tion to a common ideological commitment,

the early Nazi

party now began to be increasingly identified with personal
loyalty to Hitler and with a belief in his special mission
9
to bring about a rebirth of Germany.
Both Nazi ideology
and the charismatic quality of Hitler's leadership were
established in these years.

The ideology was later elab

orated in Hitler's book Mein Kampf, but at no time did it
drastically change.

The Nazi party was always anti-Semitic,

nationalistic and anti-democratic.

Some of Hitler's earliest

speeches centered upon denunciations of the Versailles Treaty
and the Weimar Republic, which he always linked to the treaty.
The party also consistently supported the idea of a greater
Germany including all Germans, and a policy of eastward ex
pansion of the Reich.

As early as 1919 Hitler was actively

defending the expansionistic Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
Finally, as a positive counterpoint to the party's antiSemitism, the Nazis favored the establishment of a racially
based community of all Germans, where class and religious
o
Nolte, Three Faces, p. 403.
q

The Hitler cult began in earnest m 1921.
It was
first developed by Dietrich Eckart, Hermann Esser and Rudolf
Hess.
Fest, Hitler, p. 142.
^Bullock, Hitler, p. 41. For a description of one
of these speeches see" Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 463-68.
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differences would be submerged by the rekindling of the
spirit of racial unity .^

The idea of the Volksgemeinschaft

or racial community dates back in Nazi history to the period
before Hitler joined the party.

Drexler was talking about

just such an end to class antagonisms in early 1919.
The Nazi party of the early twenties can best be
described as a small, geographically limited, political
splinter movement.

In the beginning the NSDAP scarcely

existed outside of Munich.

It was able to expand into other

parts of Bavaria mainly because Hitler succeeded in per
suading several other major racist orators to join the Nazis.
The two most important of these speakers were Julius
Streicher and Hermann Esser.

The support of Streicher was

especially crucial; with his help, the NSDAP was able to
establish itself in his home town of Nttrnberg. Hermann Esser,
the party's other major early speaker, entered the NSDAP in
the early twenties and was able to take some of the speaking
burden off Hitler in Munich.

However, the party did not

have the human or material resources to expand greatly.
remained a local movement with only modest support.

It

Even

its designation as a political party was mainly a matter of
legal convenience,for the early NSDAP had little in common
with traditional Weimar political parties.
The contrast between the NSDAP and its traditional
^ F o r a discussion of the Volksgemeinschaft see
Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 284-329, 442-51T
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opponents was very great in the early twenties.

The major

parties in the Weimar Republic tended to be identified with
important special interest groups.
identification were considerable.

The advantages of such
The Catholic Center's

political apparatus was largely an extension of church
activities.

Thus, the party was present wherever there was

a Catholic church.

The Social Democrats existed wherever

a free trade union was established.

Again the party's

political organization functioned locally as an adjunct of
the union.

The Nazis, on the other hand, were associated

with no omnipresent organization.

The NSDAP only existed

in areas where it had an active and effective political
organization.

In the early twenties this meant that the

party was really confined to Munich and to a few other
Bavarian cities and towns.

The early party's alienation

from major special interest groups also meant that the
NSDAP suffered from a perennial shortage of funds.
income until 1930 was extremely small.

Party

Membership dues and

occasional gifts were the primary sources of money.
contributors were almost completely lacking,

12

Major

and the Nazis

were incapable of financing major campaigns along expensive
traditional lines.
Realizing that the NSDAP was in no position to com
pete successfully with the established Weimar parties. Hitler
12Henry A. Turner, Jr. (ed.) Nazism and the Third
Reich (New York: Quadrangle, 1972) "Big Business and the
Rise of Hitler" by Henry A. Turner, Jr., pp. 89-108.
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forced an international congress of National Socialists at
Salzburg in 1922 to adopt a resolution opposing participa
tion in elections.

The early Nazi party sought to gain

power outside existing institutions by means of a quasi
military uprising.

Until November 9, 1923, Hitler's efforts

were directed toward building up support, so that his party
could play an important part in an eventual violent seizure
of power.

He allied his new party with other dissident

elements in Bavaria including the monarchist state commis
sioner, Gustav von Kahr, and the regional Reichswehr
commander.

On November 8, 1923, Hitler announced the over

throw of the Weimar Republic and the establishment of a new
"national" government at a public meeting addressed by von
Kahr in the BdrgerbrSukeller, a large Munich beer-hall.

The

next day the "beer-hall Putsch" ended in disaster when the
Bavarian green police fired on a mob of marching Nazis
13
"celebrating" their victory of the previous night.
The beer-hall fiasco marked the end of the first
phase of Nazi history.

The party as constituted in 1923 was

at a dead end in any case.

It was incapable of much further

growth because of its limited human and material resources.
It was not surprising that the Nazis resorted to the gamble
of trying to seize power by violence.

They had few other

13 For the Nazi uprising of 1923 the best source is
Harold J. Gordon, J r . , Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U.P.7 1572). An enter
taining and clever description of these events and of Hitler's
early career can be found in Richard Hanser, Putsch: How
Hitler Made Revolution (New York: Pyramid, 1971).
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options in 1923.
The failure of the Putsch, however, taught the party
a number of lessons and altered its goals.

The beer-hall

revolt failed miserably at least in part because Hitler
precipitated the uprising without previously consulting his
allies.

He assumed that after the first overt act of re

bellion the various leaders of the Bavarian state government
and the Reichswehr commanders involved in this conspiracy
would automatically follow his lead.

When none of his allies

supported him on November 9, Hitler was furious.

He accused

his co-conspirators of failing to live up to their "obliga
tions" and of betraying the national cause.

The experience

of the Putsch convinced Hitler that the established extreme
rightist leadership was too timid and untrustworthy to lead
a National uprising.

This was a departure from Hitler's

outlook before the Putsch.

Originally he viewed himself as

a drummer or salesman of the national movement.

He was to

recruit followers who were organized in the paramilitary
Sturm Abteilung, or SA.

The SA, which at the time was

closely tied to the Reichswehr, was to carry out the actual
revolt, but after its successful conclusion, Hitler, the
NSDAP and the SA were to play only a subordinate role in the
new "national” government.

Better known personages such as

Erich Ludendorff were to assume the key positions in the new
regime.

With the failure of the Putsch, Hitler became thor

oughly disillusioned with the men to whom he had previously
been willing to subordinate himself.

After November 9, 1923,
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Hitler refused to play a secondary role to the more estab
lished rightist leaders.

He would later form alliances of

convenience with these men, but he always insisted upon
maintaining his own independence and usually dictated the
terms of such agreements.

Ironically, it was the Putsch and

Hitler's subsequent trial for treason that made it possible
for Hitler to assert his independence.

Before November 9,

Hitler was an obscure demagogue virtually unknown outside of
Bavaria.

The myth of Hitler's heroic actions during the

Putsch plus his dramatic conduct during his trial made the
Nazi leader into a national figure, around whom German
rightists could rally.
The lessons of 1923 altered the outlook of the NSDAP,
but did nothing to overcome its disadvantages or to provide
the party with a viable strategy for attaining power.

Hitler

and some other leading Nazis were jailed for their participa
tion in the Putsch.
exile. 14

Others were forced to go into temporary

Hitler was released from prison in December, 1924,

and the party was officially re-established in February,
1925.

The only major decision made by Hitler at this stage

was that he would no longer attempt to seize power by a
quasi-military revolt.

The beer-hall debacle had convinced

him that this was a risky and highly questionable road to
power that should be avoided in the future.

In his first

^ F o r an account of the impact of the failure of the
Putsch on the party see Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 11-32
and Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 41-55.
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public pronouncement after his release from prison, Hitler
stated that the newly refounded NSDAP would follow a policy
15
of strict obedience to the law.
Initially the policy of
legality was little more than a rejection of the previous
strategy of gaining power by a Putsch.

The Nazis were still

too weak to enter into active competition with the traditional Weimar parties.

16

It was still predominantly a movement limited to Munich and other Bavarian cities. 17 Between
1925 and 1928 the party concentrated its attention upon
developing an effective organizational structure and upon
finding a new strategy for achieving political ascendency.
The primary asset of the refounded NSDAP was Hitler's
reputation as an heroic leader and inspired orator, but his
actual role as a speaker tended to decline.

On March 9,

1925, Hitler was forbidden to speak in Bavaria on the grounds
that his oratorical performances incited audiences to vio
lence and might be the prelude to yet another uprising.

All

other German states-except Thuringia, Mecklenburg and
Brunswick-joined Bavaria in banning Hitler from speaking.
These prohibitions were not lifted until 1927 in most states
18
and not until September, 1928, in Prussia.
The restrictions
^•5Bullock, Hitler, pp. 98-104.
^®Pridham, Hitler1s Rise, pp. 27-28.
^7 Ibid., p. 56.
18z. A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, 2nd ed.
U.P., 1973} pp. 6-7.

(London:
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tended to add to Hitler's prestige as a leader.

Nazi propa

ganda of the period emphasized Hitler's unique qualities by
making much of the fact that of all the people on the face
of the earth only he was forbidden to speak in Germany.
This interval completed Hitler's transformation from the
role of a skillful orator to that of the charismatic leader
of a movement.

19

The speaking prohibition meant that Hitler was able
to spend more time "organizing the Nazi party into a pliable
20
instrument for his tactical aims."
Until 1923 Nazi organi
zation was loose and incomplete below the highest levels.
As long as the party concentrated upon seizing power by a
quasi-military revolt in Munich, the development of Nazi
organizations in other parts of Germany was only of peripheral
1Q

The best description of charismatic leadership can
be found in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. trans. and
intro.) From Max W e ber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Ox
ford U.P., 1946) pp. 295-96. Weber describes charismatic
leadership in the following terms:
" . . . the term 'charis
ma' shall be understood to refer to an extraordinary quality
of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual,
alleged, or presumed.
'Charismatic authority', hence, shall
refer to a rule over men . . . to which the governed submit
because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the
specific person . . . .
The legitimacy of charismatic rule
thus rests upon the belief in magical powers, revelation and
hero worship." Hitler's appeal was consciously charismatic.
In discussing how to overcome emotional resistance to the
NSDAP he recommended an appeal to "mysterious powers" as the
most effective method; Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 471.
For a
discussion of charismatic authority see Gerth and Mills
(eds.) From Max Weber, pp. 52-54, 246-52, 295-96 and Reinhard
Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, 1960) pp. 299-307.
20F est, Hitler, p. 228.
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interest.

21

In 1926 efforts were made to formalize party

institutions in a circular letter issued by Hitler.

22

The basic unit of the Nazi party was the Ortsgruppe,
the local or village group.

The Ortsgruppe was described as

"the propaganda cell of the movement and the germ cell for
23
the expansion of the party."
In 1926 its organizational
structure was regularized.
Each Ortsgruppe had to have a
24
minimum of six members.
The chairman of the Ortsgruppe
25
was elected by the membership.
He appointed a deputy, a
chief writer and a treasurer.

In large local groups the

chairman could appoint Vertrauensleute

to supervise the

activities of part of the Ortsgruppe.

The Vertrauensleute

21

Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 37-38.

22

For the 1926 reorganization of the party see
Albrecht Tyrell (ed.) FUhrer Befiehl . . . : Selbstzeugnisse
aus der
Kampfzeit
der NSpAP=Dokumentation und Analyse
(D t f s s e l d o D r o s t e Verlag^
pp. 230-^1 for the docu
ment entitled "Aufgaben und Gliederung der NSDAP im Juli
1926. "

24 Ibid., p. 230.
In 1928 the minimum number of mem
bers necessary to form an Ortsgruppe was increased to fifteen.
See Ibid., p. 245 document "Richtllnien fttr die
Untergliederungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutscher
Arbeiter - Partei, 15 September 1928.’’
25
On September 9, 1929, the last vestige of demo
cracy within the NSDAP was eliminated.
From that date the
Gauleiters appointed all Ortsgruppenftlhrer. In practice
this action had little impact on the party since the Reich
leadership prior to 1929 had consistently supported the
Gauleiters in any dispute with a local leader.
See Ibid.,
p. 264 and Wolfgang Dorn, Fflhrerideoloqie und
Farteiorqanisation in der NSDAP, 1919-1933 (Dtlsseldorf:
Droste Verlag, 1972) pp. 278-67.
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usually existed only in cities where the party had over one
hundred members.

Internal disputes were handled by a party

court, which was made up of the three oldest members in good
standing.

The Ortsgruppen recruited new members for the

party and carried on campaigns in their cities, towns or
villages.

Their principal duty was to make sure that the

party became known in their localities.

In places where

Ortsgruppen existed and were active, the NSDAP ceased to be
an alien Bavarian party and became part of the local politi
cal scene.
Above the Ortsgruppen regional party offices known
as the Gauleitung developed.

The Gauleiters or regional

leaders coordinated the activities of the local groups.

They

communicated directly with the Munich leadership, and worked
to establish new Ortsgruppen.

The various Gauleiters were

appointed by Hitler and served at his pleasure.

They

appointed subordinate Gau officials including a deputy, a
chief writer and a treasurer.

The Gauleiters supervised all

propaganda activity in their regions and were often major
speakers in their own right.

This division of the party

freed the leadership in Munich from much time-consuming paper
work, and insured the presence of a reliable party leader in
each region of Germany to make necessary decisions.

The

Gauleiter was likely to be far better informed on regional
peculiarities than national headquaters in Munich, and thus
he was less prone to make decisions that would upset local
sensibilities.

If blunders were made, it was a simple
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matter for Hitler to remove an incompetent Gauleiter*

26

With the slow but steady growth of the NSDAP a new
position intermediate between the Ortsgruppen and the
Gauleitung was created.

This official was known as the

Bezirksfiihrer, or district leader.

In 1927 Fritz Sauckel,

deputy Gauleiter of Thuringia, issued a series of directives
clarifying the duties of the Bezirksftlhrer.

These district

chieftains were responsible for following all orders issued
by the Reich leadership or the Gauleitung.

They regulated

and planned activities for the local groups under their
supervision and directed campaigns in previously unworked
areas.

District leaders also supervised the distribution of

propaganda material to local groups and made sure that the
press covered Nazi activities thoroughly and fairly.

Finally,

they acted as human links tying together all the party mem
bers in their districts.

The Bezirksftlhrer did this by fre

quently visiting each Ortsgruppe and being familiar with
every party member in their districts.

This close personal

contact with the membership enabled the district leaders to
promote unity within the party and to suppress any internal
quarrels promptly and effectively.

The Bezirksftlhrer became

more important as the party expanded.

He freed the

Gauleitung from much commonplace labor making it possible
for the Gauleiter to spend more time on overall coordination
and planning.

The Bezirksftlhrer were appointed by the

26Tyrell, Ftlhrer Befiehl, pp. 230-31.
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Gauleiters and were subject to removal if their work was
27
unsatisfactory.
The final elements of Nazi organization developed be 
tween 1925 and 1928 were the various party auxiliary organi
zations.

The Sturm Abteilung, or SA, was the party's para

military organization.

It existed before the Putsch, but

was reconstituted in 1925 along somewhat different lines.
The early SA was subsidized by the Reichswehr and was a true
paramilitary organization, complete with weapons supplied by
the army.

After 1925 the SA was forbidden arms by Hitler in

his directive refounding the organization.

The principal

duties of the new SA were propagandistic in nature.
storm troopers guarded party rallies
up opposition meetings.

and

The

occasionally broke

They participated in marches and

distributed propaganda literature.

Finally, the brown shirt

uniform of the SA created the illusion in the minds of both
storm troopers and the public that the NSDAP was a quasi
military movement embodying all the old and often treasured
qualities of German militarism.

28

The Schutzstaffel, or SS,

was an elitist off-shoot of the SA and, at this time, little
different from its parent organization.

In the late twenties

SS units were under the command of the SA leadership and
little more than special units of the SA.
27

Ibid., pp. 237-38 document entitled "Instruktionen
fiir die Bezirksfiihrer, 9 June 1927, Weimar."
28por the SA see Heinrich Bennecke, Hitler und die
SA (Munich: G. Olzog Verlag, 1962).
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Other auxiliary organizations also developed after
1925.

The Hitler Youth (HJ) and the National Socialist Ger

man Students' League (NSDStB) were formed for youth and
student activities.

The NSDStB was active in promoting

Nazism on university campuses and in demanding a quota on
the admission of Jewish students.

However, both of these

organizations were primarily clubs for party members or
supporters from a special segment of the population, in this
case the young.

The other auxiliary organizations, the

Women's Order (Roten Hakenkreuzin), the Lawyers' League, and
29
and Doctors' League, were also mainly clubs.
They served
the

twofold

purposes of isolating party members from out

side organizations and of developing the beginnings of a
dual society.

These clubs were extremely useful in the years

after 1933 in the establishment of a totalitarian regime by
coordinating all activities into Nazi organizations.

How

ever, in the late twenties they played little part in the
expansion of the party, but mainly served the internal func
tion of providing members with professional and group activi
ties, so that these members would not be tainted by contact
with non-Nazi organizations.
The organizational developments of the period 1925
to 1928 were of vital importance for understanding later
Nazi expansion.

The Ortsgruppen, Gauleitung, Bezirksfiihrer

^®For a discussion of these "front organizations"
see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism {New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich", 19737” pp^ 364-75 passim.
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and SA all played key roles in the transformation of the
party into a mass movement.

Furthermore, this organizational

structure remained intact from its inception until 1945.

At

the time, however, these reforms were considered to be of
only secondary importance.

The major problem facing the

NSDAP in 1925 was how to gain power.

The party desperately

needed to develop a new strategy.
In 1925, when Hitler refounded the NSDAP, little had
changed from the period before the Putsch.

The party was

still small (considerably smaller than it had been in 1923).
It was still without financial resources, and it still was
not associated with any major German special interest group.30
The party remained primarily a Bavarian movement and was
little known elsewhere.

In 1925, any attempt to seek power

within the existing democratic context by electoral victories
seemed destined to fail.

Between 1925 and 1928 a new strat

egy was devised which Hitler hoped would bring the party to
power.
This strategy was first developed by a group of
radical Nazis under the leadership of Gregor Strasser.

Since

the days of Anton Drexler, the NSDAP had claimed to be a
movement to wean workers away from international Marxism.
Strasser*s group, geographically concentrated in the indus
trial Ruhr, took this idea seriously.

From 1925 to 1928 the

faction conducted a strenuous campaign to attract industrial
30pridham, Hitler* s Rise, pp. 56, 63.
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workers to the party.

They emphasized the socialist aspects

of National Socialism and devoted virtually all their politi
cal efforts to addressing working class audiences.

The

Strasser group included such major orators as Strasser him
self , Joseph Goebbels, Erich Koch, Karl Kaufmann and Robert
Ley.

Other than Hitler, these were the best speakers that

the party possessed.

31

The ultimate purpose of this cam

paign was to gain control of workers in a dozen or so key
cities and then to stage mass strikes that would force the
32
government to capitulate to the Nazis.
This plan had a number of merits.

It was modeled

after the tactics that Mussolini used to achieve power.
Hitler, an admirer of Mussolini, especially appreciated this
characteristic of the plan. 33

Furthermore, it seemed to

conform admirably to the party's capacity for campaigning;
in the period from 1925 to 1928, the NSDAP had adequate
resources to canvass a dozen cities.

Finally, the plan

31

For firsth&nd accounts of this campaign see
Albert Krebs, Tendenzen und Gestalten der NSDAP: Erinnerungen
an die FrUhzeit der Partei (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag
Anstalt^ 1959), Werner Jochmann (ed.), Nationalsozialismus
und Revolution: Ursprung und Geschichte der NSDAP in Ham
burg : Dokumente (Frankfurt am Main: EuropSische
Verlagsanstalt, 1963) and Joseph Goebbels, The Early Goebbels
Diaries: The Journal of Joseph Goebbels from 1925-1926 trans.
Oliver Watson, ed. Helmut Heiber (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1962).
32Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party: I,
1919-1933 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 196?)
pp. 90, 105.
•^Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 141.
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reflected existing Nazi strength, which was almost entirely
urban.

This syndicalist scheme seemed to be the ideal

strategy for the newly refounded party.

It did not involve

the risks of another Putsch, and it did not force the party
to develop the broad political machine necessary to achieve
power through electoral success.
The urban plan, so attractive in theory, failed in
practice.
the NSDAP.

The first problem with it was the composition of
Prom 1925 to 1928, the Nazi party was a pre

dominantly urban movement, but it was not made up primarily
of industrial workers.

In Bavaria, where most party members

resided, the NSDAP was mainly a middle-class movement.
This situation forced Hitler to be somewhat less than whole
hearted in his support of the Strasser group's "socialism"
for fear of losing the party's Bavarian base.

In northern

Germany, on the other hand, the situation was entirely
different.

Here, the party was much smaller and had a much

higher percentage of workers as members.

Furthermore, in

this region the Nazis had competition from another racialist
party, the Deutschvolkische Freiheitsbewegung, which drew
most of its support from rural areas.

In the North, the

"socialist" strategy seemed to be a necessity.

The party

was in no position to compete with its rightist rival in
rural areas, and it seemed that the NSDAP could expand
only in the cities.

Indeed, one advantage of the "socialist"

^ P r idham, Hitler1s Rise, pp. 47-48.
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approach was that it served to differentiate the NSDAP from
its reactionary, rural, racialist rival.

Since the Nazis in

1925 were weaker in northern Germany than the Deutschvftlkische
Freiheitsbewegung, it was important for the NSDAP to estab35
lish its own identity.
Again the situation was quite
different in Bavaria, where the absence of any other extreme
rightist party made it unnecessary to pursue a radical
socialist policy.
In late 1925 a crisis occurred within the party
pitting the radical northerners against the Munich leader
ship.

The issue that precipitated this struggle was a

referendum to expropriate the property of the former German
princes.

The "socialists" favored the referendum and wanted

to join the Marxist parties in supporting it.

The issue was

considered to be crucial, if the Nazis were to establish
their credentials as a workers' party opposed to all reac
tionaries.

Hitler, on the other hand, thought it equally

essential to support the right of private property even in
this context.
this issue.

His Bavarian middle-class support hingSd on
The northerners openly opposed Hitler's position

and came close to breaking off relations with Munich.

Hitler

interpreted this as a threat of internal revolt against his
leadership and responded by calling a conference at Bamberg
on February 14, 1926.
35

At this meeting he reaffirmed his

For a discussion of the development of the NSDAP
in northern Germany and its struggle with the DeutschvPlkische
Freiheitsbewegung see Noakes, Lower Saxony, pp. 56-101.
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position on the referendum in such positive terms that the
northerners were forced to choose between abandoning their
stand or leaving the party.

The conference, which was

dominated by Bavarian delegates, overwhelmingly supported
Hitler.

The Strasser faction, realizing that Hitler was

indispensable to the movement, capitulated on the issue of
the referendum.^

The two major leaders of the "socialist"

faction were courted by Hitler and brought back into the
fold.

Gregor Strasser was eventually transferred to Munich,

where he headed the party's national organization section.
Goebbels was made Gauleiter of Berlin.

"Thereafter, and

until the end, there were no longer any battles over princi
ples, no longer any ideological disputes; what remained was
^There is a good deal of controversy over the
motives of the Strasser group and the extent of their oppo
sition to Hitler.
Even the events themselves are not clear.
There are two published contemporary accounts of the con
flict: Goebbels, Early Diaries, pp. 45-67 and Otto Strasser,
Hitler and I trans. Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher (Boston:
Houghton, MXfflin and Co., 1940).
Unfortunately, Otto
Strasser*s grasp of the truth was limited, and he tended to
lie or misremember as often as he accurately reported events.
Otto Strasser*s entire interpretation of the "socialist"
program is open to question.
He is not even reliable in
matters of detail.
His book is full of errors in factual
reporting.
He gives the wrong dates for meetings, and often
describes discussions that never took place.
Goebbels'
account is more trustworthy, but he discussed the controversy
with Hitler only incidentally.
Other documentary evidence on
the northern faction is equally sketchy.
For a discussion
and valuable interpretation of the struggle between Hitler
and the Strasser group, the reader should first consult
Joseph Nyomarkay's brilliant Charisma and Factionalism in
the Nazi Party (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
19^71 pp. 71-109.
Other useful studies include Orlow, Nazi
Party, pp. 46-127 passim and Jeremy Noakes, "Conflict an3
Development in the NSDAP, 1924-1927" Journal of Contemporary
History, October, 1966.
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only the struggle for office and favoritism.M
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The conflict over the referendum to expropriate
princely property damaged the "socialist" campaign, but it
did not put an end to the urban strategy.

Until late 1927

almost all Nazi activities were concentrated in the cities.
Even in Bavaria the urban campaign was wholeheartedly pur
sued, though without the "socialist" emphasis.

The urban

strategy was not abandoned because of internal party differ
ences, but because it failed.

From 1925 to May, 1928, some

of the party's best orators spent the bulk of their time
trying to attract working class supporters for the NSDAP.
By late 1927, it was becoming clear that the party was making
little headway in proletarian districts.

One indication of

the failure of the urban plan was the effort of the Nazis to
exploit rural discontent in 1927 and 1928.

The Nazi rural

campaign of those years represented a tentative attempt to
find an alternative to the abortive "socialist" strategy.
On May 20, 1928, the syndicalist scheme of gaining power by
mass strikes was dealt a fatal blow.

In the Reichstag

election on that day, it became clear that the NSDAP had
failed to attract any broad proletarian support.
"socialist" campaign was a complete failure.

The

Mass strikes

need strikers, and since the NSDAP was unable to attract
any sizable working class following, the syndicalist strat
egy had to be abandoned.
^Fest,

Hitler, p. 241.
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The failure of the urban strategy forced the NSDAP
to develop a new means of gaining political ascendency.

A

Putsch had failed; a policy of seizing power by means of
mass strikes was impossible.

Virtually the only untried

strategy available to the party was to gain power legally by
winning elections.

This strategy had been rejected pre

viously on the grounds that it was impractical and inappro
priate for a totalitarian, anti-democratic party to operate
within the hated democratic context of the Weimar Republic.
Hitler opposed participation in elections in 1922 and only
reluctantly accepted it after the Putsch.

Even in 1928,

Hitler agreed to participate in the national elections only
after long hesitation. 38 The decision to follow the elec
toral road to power was made largely for want of any other
option and without much enthusiasm.
The NSDAP in 1928 had few assets with which to pur
sue an electoral strategy.

To be sure, there were some

factors in the party's favor.

Hitler's reputation as a

leader and major German figure still remained paramount; the
National Socialist ideology, especially its negativism to
ward the Republic, placed the Nazis in a position to exploit
discontent, and the political organization developed be
tween 1925 and 1927 was easily adapted to an electoral strat
egy and quite useful for that purpose.

Nevertheless, the

key to any electoral victory was lacking.

The party had to

■*®Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 141.
Hitler, p. 255.

Fest,
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overcome its image of being merely an impotent splinter
group.

Only through a major propaganda drive could the Nazis

hope to dispel that impression, to exploit discontent and to
transform themselves into a nationally prominent party.

In

1928 the means for staging such a massive campaign did not
exist.

39

The subsequent chapters of this dissertation will

examine the development of these means and the resulting
Nazi political machine, but some theories about the nature
of propaganda and even some tactical approaches to converting
a mass audience were developed before 1928.

These general

ideas and tactics were later applied by the Nazi political
machine and deserve some consideration here.
In his polemical autobiography, Mein Kampf, Hitler
provides the clearest picture of Nazi attitudes toward pro
paganda.

For Hitler "the function of propaganda is to
40
attract supporters."
Since Hitler sought to appeal to

people in mass audiences, his attitude toward the masses is
crucial for understanding his view of proper propaganda
techniques.
tempt.

Hitler generally regarded the masses with con

"The people in their overwhelming majority are so

feminine by nature and attitude that sober reasoning deter
mines their thoughts and actions far less than emotion and
feeling."

41

Accordingly, effective propaganda must be

^^Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 92.
40
Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 581.
41Ibid., p. 183.
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adjusted "to the most limited intelligence among those it is
addressed to"

and

"the greater the mass it is intended

to reach the lower its purely intellectual level will have
to be.”4 2

Hitler summarized his opinions on propaganda in

the following statements.
"The receptivity of the great mass is very
limited, their intelligence is small, but
their power of forgetting is enormous.
In
consequence of these facts, all effective
propaganda must be limited to a very few
points and must harp on these in slogans
until the last member of the public under
stands what you want him to understand by
your slogan.4 ^
propaganda . . . consists in attracting
the attention of the crowd, and not in
educating . . . [it] must be aimed at
the emotions and only to a very limited
degree at the so-called intellect."44
Hitler's interest in propaganda was primarily tech
nical.

He was not "much concerned with the actual content
of propaganda." 45 Instead he viewed the whole matter as ”a
problem of political salesmanship." 46

His contempt for the

masses meant that Nazi appeals were consistently designed
to arouse popular emotions and equally consistently dis
dainful of any attempts to persuade audiences of the correct
ness of Nazi doctrines by rational argument.
4^Ibid., p. 180.
43Ibid., pp. 180-181.
44Ibid,, p. 180.
4^Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. xv.
46Ibid.

The party's
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emphasis on emotional appeals was a persistent element of
Nazi propaganda from its earliest days.
National Socialist propaganda was always dogmatic
and aggressive in character.

Hitler consistently refused to

alter the party's program, the twenty-five points.

Indeed,

Hitler attacked the "socialist” wing of the party at Bamberg
in 1926 partly because they had discussed plans for a new
platform.

When the twenty-five points hindered the expansion

of the movement, as in the case of point seventeen on agri
culture, Hitler simply "clarified" the program in a public
announcement.

Officially approved Nazi programs and posi

tions were never repudiated.

Instead, they were "clarified,"

ignored or vigorously defended depending upon the immediate
circumstances.

This unchanging doctrine consisted primarily

of the twenty-five points, Hitler's statements in Mein Kampf
and his published speeches.

Official party position papers

were often revised in detail, but the general principles,
upon which these papers were based, always remained sacro
sanct.

The Nazi treatment of agricultural problems exempli

fies the common procedure.

Vague general statements were

made on this issue in 1928, and subsequently in 1930 a detailed position paper was issued 47 incorporating the general
propositions.

Nazi contentions were always presented in an

aggressive tone with "no mincing of words, no politeness,
^ F o r Hitler’s manifesto on agriculture see Norman H.
Baynes (ed. & trans.) The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April,
1922-August, 1939, Vol. I (New York, London, Toronto: Oxford
U.P.,1942) pp. T9-37.
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and little concern with the facts and logic."

48

Nazi

ideology was to be either accepted or rejected, but never to
be debated.
This extreme dogmatism tended to set the NSDAP apart
from other parties.

George Mosse has described this char

acteristic of the party perceptively:
"National Socialist thought cannot be judged
in terms of traditional political theory.
It
has little in common with rational, logically
constructed systems such as those of Hegel or
Marx . . . . it was, in fact, a theology which
provided the framework for national worship."49
The doctrinaire, quasi-religious character of the NSDAP50
enabled it to present to the world an image of monolithic
determination and helps explain how the party was able to
maintain and expand its following after 1925.

Acceptance of

the NSDAP and Hitler was presented to the public as an act
of faith, not as a conscious, pragmatic decision.

Once

conversion had taken place, the convert was submerged in a
movement replete with a well developed ideology and an ex
tensive set of rituals.

Leaving the party was tantamount to

a religious crisis of faith and left the former member iso
lated in an atomized and seemingly incomprehensible universe.
Another major element of Nazi propaganda was its
emphasis on violence.

"To stimulate emotion and violence,

48Abel, The Nazi Movement, p. 61.
49

Mosse, Nationalization, p. 9-10.

^°Arendt, Totalitarianism, pp. 349-50, 377-78.
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benefit by their interaction" was a primary aim of

and to

National Socialist activity.

From the

earliest days of the

party in Munich Hitler initiated violent confrontations with
his opponents in order to attract much needed publicity.

As

Hitler commented,
"It makes no difference whatever whether
they Ithe newspapers and public} laugh at
us or revile us, whether they represent us
as clowns or criminals; the main thing is
that they mention us, that they concern
themselves with us again and again, and
that we gradually . . . appear to be the
only power that anyone reckons with at
the moment."52
Violence also helped in maintaining the militancy of the
movement.

It emphasized the need for unity by providing

vivid examples of the existence of a real external enemy.
In addition, the escalation of violence between the Nazis
and the Marxist parties in the late Weimar Republic was
instrumental in forcing many Germans into a position which
impelled them to choose either one group or the other.

This

tactic was especially effective after the advent of the
great depression when class antagonisms deepened.
Two examples are helpful in illustrating the Nazi's
provocative methods.

In October, 19 22, Hitler decided to

hold a rally in the city of Coburg, knowing that the Marxist
parties had dominated the streets of that city since the
close of World War I.
51

Previous bourgeois or nationalist

Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 18.

^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 485.
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rallies had been broken up by the "reds.”

Hitler's inten

tion was either to cow the Marxists into allowing him to
speak or to drive them from the streets.

SA men from all

parts of Bavaria were dispatched to Coburg, and on the day
of the rally the Nazis were able to rout their opponents.
As Hitler put it, "coercion is broken only by coercion, and
terror only by terror."

53

Coburg later became a Nazi

stronghold giving the party an absolute majority on the city
council as early as 1929. 54

The impression of strength and

determination displayed by the party in 1922 seems to have
been received favorably by the c ity’s bourgeois residents.
Another example of the use of violence occurred in
Berlin in 1927.

Gauleiter Goebbels decided to follow

Hitler’s example and hold a rally in the Communist section
of town in the Pharus Saale, a hall usually reserved
for Communist meetings.

All Goebbels1 posters were in

bright red in order to enrage the Communists further.
Goebbels1 intentions were clearly to incite Berlin’s
Marxists to violence.

The c i t y ’s SA contingent assembled

at the Pharus Saale on the night of February 11, ready for
action.

A large Communist crowd greeted Goebbels with jeers

and profanity.

Before the Gauleiter could speak, the crowd

tried to attack him.

A full-fledged battle ensued in which

53Ibid., pp. 454-55.
^ F o r a description of the electoral history of
Coburg see ThrSnhardt, Wahlen, p. 162.
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many combatants on both sides were injured.

Finally, the

police cleared the hall of Communists, and Goebbels
apparently delivered his oration from a speaker's stand
covered with wounded and bleeding SA men.

Goebbels claimed

that in the days after the rally a record number of men
. . .
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inquired about joining the SA.
The tone and style of Nazi propaganda were estab
lished long before the electoral breakthrough of 1930.

Nazi

propaganda was dogmatic; it emphasized emotional appeals,
and it employed violence as a standard tactic.

The problem

facing the party in 1928 was not how to campaign, but how
to reach and impress a massive public.

Nazi propaganda was

effective only in dealing with a large audience from a
position of some strength.

The Coburg rally worked because

Hitler was able to concentrate most of the Bavarian SA in
the city.

Goebbels followed Hitler's example and had the

entire SA of Berlin at the Pharus Saale.

In small towns and

villages, especially in areas where there were few if any
party members, these techniques were inapplicable.

Simi

larly, the number of speakers available to the party was far
too limited to allow the Nazis to stage rallies in every
city and town in Germany.

These limitations were the major

reasons that the party initially rejected the idea of seeking
■^For a discussion of the Pharus hall incident see
Ernst K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propa
ganda (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State U.P., 1965)
pp. 20-22, Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 16, and Helmut Heiber,
Joseph Goebbels (Berlin: Colloquim Verlag, 1962) pp. 63-64.
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power by democratic means.

Hitler always realized the

necessity of concentrating the party’s few resources for
effective agitation.

He initially favored the concentration
Munich." 5 6

"of all activity in a single place:

After 1925

most party work took place in the various German cities in
accordance with Strasser's syndicalist scheme.

In 1928,

however, the party finally determined to seek power through
electoral victories.

This decision forced the NSDAP to

develop tactics and programs that would enable it to appeal
to a geographically diverse, mass audience.
The model for the propaganda apparatus was, perhaps,
the highly developed Nazi rally system.

The mass meeting

brought together all of the various elements of Nazi pro
paganda.

Hitler regarded such gatherings as a means for

party supporters to overcome feelings of loneliness and
fear of isolation by experiencing "a large community, which
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in most people has a strengthening effect."
One of the
high points of any major Nazi rally was the use of music to
play on the emotions of the crowd.

This music "underscored

the irrational element of the movement.

The shouted primi

tive tune, the shabby lyricism of the text, the total lack
of humour, the insistent beat of drums and the thin reedy
sound of pipes provided the answer to Hitler's followers:
^Hi t l e r , Mein Kampf, p. 348.
^ Ibid., p. 478.
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no questions had to be asked."

5S

Party members later often

admitted that "they were roused to a fever pitch by martial
music, stirring songs, displays of banners, and other
C Q

customary paraphernalia of mass meetings.

^

The mass

meeting with its emphasis on emotional appeals both in the
speeches and non-verbal means of persuasion was a major form
of Nazi propaganda.

These rallies provide excellent exam

ples of the themes and methods used by the NSDAP to impress
larqe audiences.

The Nazi political machine of the late

twenties tried in a variety of ways to create the same im
pressions on a geographically diverse audience that were
so effectively developed at mass meetings.

The next chapter

will examine some of the major Nazi rallies of the late
twenties.

CQ

Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 10.
5^Abel, The Nazi Movement, p. 117.

CHAPTER 3
THE NAZI RALLY SYSTEM AND THE HOLISTIC
NATURE OF NAZI PROPAGANDA
In 1928 the Nazis already had an effective rally
system that was capable of presenting most of the party's
major propaganda themes as a unified whole.

Rallies helped

the party to develop a new style in politics.

George Mosse

has described this new politics as an attempt "to draw the
people into active participation in the national mystique
through rites and festivals, myths and symbols which gave a
concrete expression to the general will."^

This feature

of National Socialist propaganda remained basically un
changed in the late twenties.

The series of impressions

and images that were presented and acted out at these
rallies formed the basis of Nazi appeal.

Other campaigning

techniques that were developed after 1928 tried in differ
ent ways to project the same impressions and images that
were produced by the major Nazi rallies.
The mass meetings of the late twenties tried to
create a concretely objectified picture of the Nazi
^Mosse, Nationalization, p. 2
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"fictional world."

2

Hannah Arendt's fictional world "con

sists in using and at the same time" transcending, the elements
of reality, of verifiable experience,

in the chosen fiction,

and in generalizing them into regions which then are de
finitely removed from all possible control by individual
experience.

With such generalizations, totalitarian propa

ganda established a world fit to compete with the real one,
whose main handicap is that it is not logical, consistent,
and organized."^

The Nazi major rallies created such a

"fictional world" for a brief period of time and helped the
NSDAP present itself to the public as a movement rather than
a simple political party.

At these meetings the party was

depicted as the embodiment of an alternative society-not as
just a collection of programs and policies.

National

Socialist propaganda tended to emphasize the holistic nature
of the party rather than its stands on individual issues;
Nazism was to be accepted as an organic whole on the basis
of faith without petty squabbling over minor points.

The

principal appeal of the NSDAP was its claim that it would
renew Germany; the details of how the party would bring
about this rebirth were only of secondary importance.

The

goal of Nazi propaganda was to convince the public that the
NSDAP would bring about this renewal; and the major rallies
were effective ways to present images designed to persuade
^Arendt, Totalitarianism, pp. 341-88 passim.
3Ibid., p. 362.
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the general populace that the National Socialist ”fictional
world” was a viable alternative to the reality of the Weimar
Republic.
This chapter will examine the party's regional
rallies and attempt to analyze the propaganda content of
these meetings.

It will then discuss two major national

rallies of the late twenties that furnish useful examples of
the ritualistic and quasi-religious underpinnings of Nazi
appeals.

These rallies provide insight into why so many

Germans turned to the NSDAP when faced with the crises of
the late twenties.

As Walter Laqueur observed,

"Choosing

Hitler was not an act of political decision, not the choice
of a known programme or ideology; it was simply joining a
quasi-religious mass movement as an act of faith."

4

Mass

meetings provide a coherent picture of various elements of
Nazi appeal— elements which, though seemingly unconnected,
were woven together to form a unified whole that the public
could accept on faith.
Major Nazi regional rallies tended to be carbon
copies of each other, even though they were organized by the
various Gauleiters apparently with no unifying direction
from the Reichsleitung.

The similarity of these rallies

indicates that they followed a previously accepted pattern;
but the weight of evidence seems to suggest that the various
elements of that pattern were adopted piecemeal over a period
4Walter Z. Laqueur, Young Germany; A History of the
German Youth Movement (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,- T962T
pp. 196-97.
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of years.

In any case by 1928 all the key ingredients of

Nazi propaganda were incorporated in these meetings.

The

following is a typical schedule of one of these rallies:
Saturday afternoon:
Saturday evening:
Sunday:

6:00 A.M.
8:30 A.M.
9:00 A.M.

10:30 A.M.
12:00-1:00 P.M.
1:00-4:00 P.M.
4:00-6:00 P.M.
6:00 P.M. on

Arrival of members and SA men
from other towns.
German festive evening, torch
light parade or mass meeting.
Reveille.
Field religious services.
Muster and speech at the war
memorial followed occasionally
by a visit to the local cemetary
to decorate the graves of the
war dead.
Bandstand music and SA drive
through neighboring villages.
Mass feeding.
March through the streets by
SA led by an SA band, sporting
events, bandstand music.
Speeches.
Out-of-town members and SA men
depart, German dance.5

^This is a composite sketch of a large number of
rallies. Almost all of these rallies included the abovementioned activities though occasionally at different times.
In some cases one event would be omitted, but most rallies
included all of the above.
Some examples of this type of
rally can be found in the VSlkischer Beobachter (henceforth
abbreviated VB), July 19, 1928, p. 3. "Parteitag der
Pfalzischen Nationalsozialisten"r
VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3,
"Grosse nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in Herrsching”;
VB, July 25, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Kundegebung
in Steppach"; VB, August 7, 1928, p. 3, "Grossdeutscher Tag
in Dingolfing"; VB, August 18, 1929, p. 3, "Freiheitstag in
Gera"; VB, September 16/17, 1928, p. 3, "Gau=Parteitag des
Gaues WUrttemberg"; VB, October 20, 1928, p. 3, "Gauparteitag
des Gaues Schlesien"; VB, November 3, 1928, p. 3, "Gautag
Hessen-Nassau-Sud"; VB, March 15, 1929, p. 3, "Freiheitstag
in Koblenz"; VB, April 10, 1929, p. 3, "Parteitag des Gaues
Westfalen in Bochum"; VB, May 26/27, 1929, p. 3, "Gauparteitag
Oberfranken"; VB, August 24, 1929, p. 3, "Gautag Oberbayern”;
VB, October 1, 1929, p. 3, "Unser OstermMrkertag in Sorau";
VB, April 16, 1930, p. 3, "Oberfranken Gauparteitag"; VB,
May 17, 1930, p. 3, "Gautag des Gaues Sachsen"; VB, July 13/
14, 1930, p. 3, "Ein Tag der Thttringer Nationalsozialisten";
NSDAP Hauptarchiv (henceforth shortened to H.A.) Reel 5,
Folder 137, "Programm zum oberfrSnkischen Gau-Parteitag der
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The first major feature

of the Nazi "fictional

world" brought out at regional rallies was the party's
social ideal of establishing a Volksgemeinschaft or racial
community.

At these meetings the racial community took on

concrete form.

Party members and SA men from an entire re

gion assembled on Saturday night to meet and to socialize
at the "so-called" German festive evenings.

These affairs

were primarily intra-party functions, re-enforcing party
unity; but they also provided a picture of the National
Socialist future in which men and women of different social
and economic backgrounds, but united in their dedication to
the party, would be able to meet and greet on the basis of
(continued) NSDAP am 3/4 Mai in Bayreuth"; H.A.
Reel 70, Folder 1516, "Gautag in Ingolstadt 11 Mai 1930";
H.A. Reel 9, Folder 18 8, "Ortsgruppe Dingolfing 8 Juli
1928"; H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 10." These are
just a few examples of this type of rally.
On the average
two or three of these rallies were held in various parts of
Germany every two weeks.
The Nazis did not originate the
nationalistic rally.
Rather the NSDAP drew upon a long
tradition of mass meetings dating back to the early nine
teenth-century.
Nevertheless, National Socialist regional
rallies were not copied from any of their precursors since
the party's mass meetings fulfilled a "liturgical function"
peculiarly designed for presenting Nazi ideas. Mosse,
Nationalization, p. 10. For a discussion of nineteenth
century nationalistic rallies and their connection with the
rise of National Socialism see Mosse, Nationalization,
passim.
**The Nazis rarely presented the more esoteric parts
of their ideology to the public.
In these rallies no at
tempt was made to distinguish between Germans and Hitler's
ideal type Aryan supermen of the distant future. The racial
community described at these rallies was to include all
Germans, and the fact that the party viewed contemporary
Germans as inferior to the purified Aryans of the future
was not even mentioned.
Such knowledge was only for those
interested in the "deeper" meanings of Nazi ideology,
meaning at this time the party elite.
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racial equality.

The German festive evening was an inte

gral part of the Nazi regional rally.

Even in cases in

which other events such as a mass meeting or a torchlight
parade were scheduled, a social affair would invariably end
the night's activities.

The German dance on Sunday evening

represented a return to the same type of event as the
"Festive evening."

In effect the Nazi rally followed a

circular pattern beginning with an activity designed to em
body the party's social ideal and ending with another
gathering that emphasized the NSDAP's desire to found a true
Volksgemeinschaft.
Other items on the agenda of party rallies also
helped to lend concrete form to the Volksgemeinschaft.
variably party members arose together at 6:00 A.M.
often ate lunch together out of a common mess.

In

They

Occasionally,

this took the form of a mass feeding from several locations.
At times a large soup kitchen would be established to feed
8
several hundred at once.
In any case considerable emphasis
was placed on the shared meal, which heightened party soli
darity and provided a clear example of egalitarianism within
the movement.

Even sports were used to evoke the image of

the Volksgemeinschaft.

Competition between SA men in such

events as swimming and relay races underscored the party's
promise of physical rebirth.

The competition of strong,

7H.A. Reel 5, Folder 137, "Programm zur
oberfrankischen Gau-Parteitag."
®H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel "So
kaempften wir."

7
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young SA men was designed to show the public that Germany
had the sound physical raw material from which to build a
g
healthy racial community.
Yet, this aspect of Nazi propa
ganda was not presented in a verbal form.

Participants were

not asked to subscribe to the ideal of the Volksgemeinschaft
before they were allowed to dance, eat, swim or run.

For

many people who took part in these events their propaganda
content probably went almost unnoticed.

After such activi

ties, however, Nazi speeches about founding a racial com
munity based upon the brotherhood of all Germans must have
seemed more practical and desirable than if these same
speeches had been given without any preliminaries.
The first task of Nazi propaganda on this issue was
the creation of a series of concrete examples of the
Volksgemeinschaft; then an articulation of the goal in ver
bal form came later.

It is not surprising that the party's

opponents denounced Nazi social ideals as a fraud.

They

were only listening to what party speakers said about the
Volksgemeinschaft.
Nazi propaganda.

They dealt with the oral expression of

Unfortunately, their denunciations failed

to come to grips with the fact that the party systematically
inculcated a belief in the racial community through its
g

For a description of the sports events at these
rallies see H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 10.” This
type of activity may have been copied from Father Jahn, a
nationalist and founder of gymnastic clubs at the time of
the war of liberation against Napoleon.
Jahn believed that
"the ancient Germans had . . . competed in sports in order
to show their manly nature and virility." Mosse,
Nationalization, p. 83.
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social events.

Theoretical refutations of the

Volksgemeinschaft were unlikely to be persuasive when large
numbers of observers and participants at party rallies had
seen it being formed before their very eyes.
Another persistent element of Nazi propaganda was
the attempt to identify the party with traditional German
values.

Nazi regional rallies did this in a number of ways.

Perhaps, the clearest example of this type of appeal was
attendance by party members at religious services to begin
a rally day.

Often members marched together to a common

church, especially in regions where one sect predominated.^"®
In other cases members would disperse to attend the churches
of their ch o i c e . ^

Occasionally, a local minister or priest

would actively collaborate with the party as in Bayreuth at
a Gau rally held during May, 1930.

Here, a local priest

named Hannemann opened the city church for the Nazis and
delivered a fifteen-minute speech emphasizing the religious
orthodoxy of the party.

Later in the day this priest intro12
duced the speeches with an "admonition to all Christians."
^®VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Grosse
nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in Herrsching"; VB, July
28, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in
Steppach"; VB, August 7, 1928, p. 3, "Grossdeutscher Tag in
Dingolfing."
^ H . A . Reel 70, Folder 1516, "Gautag in Ingolstadt."
12

H.A. Reel 5, Folder 137, "Prograram zum
oberfrSnkischen Gau-Parteitag der NSDAP am 3/4 Mai in
Bayreuth." This technique was employed extensively by the
party after 1930; see Allen, Nazi Seizure of Power, pp. 33,
81, 109, 125, 128, 134-35, 14^T~l50, 199,
222-23, 242.
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The situation in Bayreuth was ideal for the Nazis.

Their

relationship to traditional religion was affirmed in the
city's church by a local priest, but even when such an im
pressive affirmation of the party's religious orthodoxy was
not possible, the Nazis still tried to demonstrate their tie
to organized religion by marching to services in unison.
This link with organized religion was taken very
seriously by the party.

In 1928 Gauleiter Artur Dinter was

expelled from the NSDAP for his attempt to found a "German
13
religion."
The Nazis consistently contended that they in
no way threatened established faiths.

Indeed, the party

sought to portray itself as the defender of German spiritual
values against the assault of liberal and Marxist material
ism.

The fact that this pose was insincere did not diminish

its effectiveness in attracting pious, middle-class Germans.
As long as the party refrained from directly attacking reli
gion, consciously sought to identify itself with orthodoxy,
and talked of spiritual values, it was safe from charges of
being anti-Christian.

In this manner the National Socialist

attitude was carefully hidden from the public only to be
revealed after the party came to power.

For its anti-

Christian zealots, the ceremonial affirmation of organized
religion was rationalized as a political necessity, and for
the general public the open support of orthodoxy was taken
as partial proof that the NSDAP was not a revolutionary
1

-a

Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 14 3.
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movement inimical to traditional German values.
Other features of Nazi rallies that emphasized tra
dition were the quasi-military garb of the SA and the use of
band music.
cussed later.

The propaganda effect of the SA will be dis
Music represented both a familiar form of

entertainment and an effective way of introducing other
elements of rally propaganda.

Band stand performances were

used to divide morning and afternoon activities; they pro
vided a necessary lull, allowing party members to relax and
act as tourists after the initial church services and cere
monies at the war memorial.

At the same time Nazi band

music set the stage for what was to come; it consisted
primarily of patriotic pieces that helped to get party mem
bers in the proper mood for the inevitable SA march through
town.
bands.

In turn these SA processions were usually led by
All of this was designed to bring back memories of

World War I and of Germany's former military might.

The

musical performances prepared the way for the speeches that
brought the rally to a close, and the addresses themselves
were often introduced by a series of selections.

For exam

ple, speeches during the Gau party days in Bayreuth on
May 4, 19 30 were presented immediately after the SA band
played pieces from Wagner's opera Rienzi.

Band music was

both a traditional form of entertainment that attracted
attention and interest in the party and a non-verbal means
of presenting Nazi propaganda.
A third objective of National Socialist rallies was
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the presentation of an image of party strength.

Invariably

all SA men from a region were required to attend Gau rallies.
This concentration of personnel left the impression that
there were hundreds if not thousands of Nazi storm troopers
in the area.

Such displays were used to create a bandwagon

effect and draw in people who would normally be indifferent
to a small, weak political movement.

Lastly, mass marches

helped the Nazis convince many voters that they would and
could do something about Germany's problems.

Orderly,

purposeful columns were conspicuous demonstrations of faith
in a period of growing cynicism, when many people thought
that problems were insoluble.

Voters might not believe that

the Nazis could solve Germany's problems, but such doubters
were often willing to give them a chance for want of any
alternative.
The final function of Nazi re p.onal rallies was the
articulation of ideas.

Speeches at such events rarely con

centrated upon specific problems or remedies.

The whole

thrust of National Socialist campaigning was to present the
impression that the NSDAP would renew Germany.

Such a re

newal was not to be accomplished by a few piecemeal reforms.
Thus, party speeches usually dealt with general themes and
attempted to paint a picture of the Nazi future in words,
just as other elements of the rally tried to do on a non
verbal level.
The first speech at the rallies was usually at the
local war memorial in the morning.

On July 15, 1928 at
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Herrsching, Gauleiter Fritz Reinhardt delivered an oration
which typifies this kind of performance.

Addressing an

audience that included a large number of storm troopers in
formation, Reinhardt asked the crowd to remember the fallen
heroes of World War I.

These men had died for Germany only

to be betrayed in 1918 by the German revolution.
"On their deaths we dedicate ourselves.

He said,

Anyone who does not

so dedicate himself betrays their memory and murders their
souls."

He went on to castigate the Jews and the newspaper,

the Berlin Tageblatt, which, he claimed, had attacked the
very ideal of heroism as the stupidest of all convictions.
Reinhardt concluded by stating,

"We reaffirm our ideals and

belief in Germany.

All of us are united in the same blood
14
no matter what job we might have."
Reinhardt's speech
incorporated most of the key elements of Nazi propaganda.

He stressed the shared historical experience of the First
World War, the racially based Volksgemeinschaft, the cult
of death, and the myth of the betrayal of the army in 1918.
Not one word was said about practical solutions to Germany's
problems.
Afternoon and evening speeches were much the same,
stressing general points.

The orators at the Bayreuth rally

of May, 1930 presented talks on the following topics, "German
education, idealism and National Socialism in contrast to
Marxism and materialism, politics and military thinking, and
*^VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Grosse
nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in Herrsching."
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15
some SA poems.1'

Only rarely on such occasions did party

speakers discuss specific problems and Nazi programs.

The

objective of the Nazi rally system was to present a picture
of a resurrected Germany and not to deal with current issues.
The Nazi "fictional world" presented in both words
and actions at regional rallies was based on four major
elements.

The Volksgemeinschaft was the party’s solution to

the problems of industrial society.

It promised a unified

nation in which class differences would be submerged by a
heightened sense of racial identity.

Identification with

Germany's traditions was accomplished by stressing religion,
militarism and to a lesser extent such customary entertain
ment as band stand music.

This conscious effort to asso

ciate the party with the German past was designed to re
assure voters that the NSDAP was firmly based on accepted
national values.

Marches and concentration of party per

sonnel for rallies aided the Nazis in presenting an image
of unified strength to the public.
i

The purpose here was to

convince Germans that the party would and could solve
Germany’s problems.

Finally, the Nazis articulated their

message in a series of speeches starting on the morning of
a rally and ending either in the late afternoon or evening.
By themselves they were not necessarily impressive, but the
combination of speeches and non-verbal propaganda painted a
15

H.A. Reel 5, Folder 137, "Programm zum
oberfrankischen Gau-Parteitag der NSDAP am 3/4 Mai in
Bayreuth.”
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picture of the National Socialist future that seemed very
real to those who experienced such a rally.
One of the major themes of Nazi propaganda was the
idea that all Germans were mystically bound together
through common blood, tribal heritage, war and blood sacri
fice.

In the late twenties this aspect of Nazi ideology was

best expressed at two of the party's major national rallies.
The summer solstice festival at Caub, a small city over
looking the Rhine, provides a good example of the party's
tribal and neo-pagan appeals, while the Reichsparteitag
rally at Niirnberg shows how the party attempted to exploit
World War I and to foster a cult of death.

Both of these

major meetings help to explain how the Nazis were able to
project a believable image of a resurrected Germany to the
public.

At the same time, these meetings show how the NSDAP

could convince vast numbers of people that it was not a mere
political party like others but a quasi-religious order
capable of transforming Germany.
The summer solstice festival celebrated the arrival
of the sun at the equator, the official beginning of summer.
It was an old pagan festival that the Nazis described as
based "on a belief in a sunny future” and as an effort "to
16
strengthen" that belief.
Party members had been attending
this ceremony from the early days of the NSDAP.

They

16H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der
Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim
11.7.28, Nationalsozialistische Sonnwendfeier."
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climbed a hill, and then spent the night around a large
fire 1 7 talking and listening to speeches.
symbolic meaning for the party.

The fire had a

Reichstag member Wilhelm

Dreher described it in the following terms:
"As the fire purifies the unclean, so shall
National Socialism purify all things rotten.
The NSDAP is competent to lead the renewal
of Germany and to return her to her former
greatness. Without hard struggle this end
will not be attained and the need of sacri
fice will be called on for many comrades
yet to fall. After attaining victory the
summer solstice celebrants will again come
together on the mountain and light a fire
to the very sky."l®
The rally at Caub was like others except that it was by far
the biggest of the summer solstice festivals to date.

It

marked the first attempt by the party to use this quasi
religious holiday as a propaganda tool to impress those out
side the movement.
It began toward nightfall on June 21, 1928 with the
arrival in the town of large numbers of party members and
storm troopers from all of western Germany.

Many of the

celebrants had to pass through territory occupied by French
or English troops.

Nazi flags and banners were waved at the

l^The traditional meaning of the symbolic fire was
the linking of earth and heaven.
It also symbolized the
idea of everlasting rebirth. Mosse, Nationalization, pp. 4142. Summer solstice festivals were celebrated at various
patriotic rallies dating back to the nineteenth century.
It
was also one of the rites celebrated by the German youth
movement.
See Laqueur, Young Germany, p. 29.
1®H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der
Staatspolizei Wiir11emberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim
11.7.28, Nationalsozialistische Sonnwendfeier."
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foreign soldiers as lorry after lorry of storm troopers converged on Caub.

19

By nightfall one Nazi described the

mountains as "blood red with Hakenkreuz banners and flags
from the old Reich."

Column after column of SA and SS men

assembled at the base of the mountain and "snaked up the
hill carrying flaming torches."

The celebrants included

"hundreds and thousands" of visiting Nazis, many townsmen
20
from Caub and peasants from the vicinity.
Upon reaching the peak of the hill,all participants
threw their individual brands on a gigantic central bon
fire.

As one celebrant described it, "The great stack of

wood flamed to life together with enumerable little
torches." 21

Gauleiter Jakob Sprenger of Hessen-Nassau-Stld

then announced to the assembled crowd, "Here we shall first
light the fire of freedom, a flame that shall rise high."

22

His statement was followed with speeches by Goebbels and
other party luminaries on the coming rebirth of Germany.
The next day the celebrants cleansed themselves in
the Rhine and were again told of Germany's coming resurrec
tion, this time at the very site where Bliicher crossed the
^ H . A . Reel 28, Folder 532, Willi Altenbrandt
"Kampferlebnisse," Karlheinz Gritz "Meine Erinnerungen an
die Kampfzeit," and Karl Herz "Meine Kampferlebnisse."
20H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel "So
kaempften w i r ."
21Ibid.
22Ibid.
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Rhine on New Years day 1813/1814 during the war of libera23
tion against Napoleon.
As one participant put it, "it was
24
a profound experience."
This peculiar ceremony seems to have impressed many
party members, who mentioned it in their recollections.

It

was certainly a grandiose example of the ritual of a secret
society in the open, as Hannah Arendt describes this type
25
of activity.
The festival at Caub, however, was more than
simply an intra-party affair.

It was a demonstration on a

grand scale of the quasi-religious nature of the NSDAP and
intended for the public at large.

An ancient pagan holiday

was used to show that the party was dedicated to the renewal
of Germany.

Purification was ritualistically obtained first

in fire, with the flame of each separate racial comrade
being merged in the central unifying symbol of the giant
bonfire on top of the mountain.

In this manner the indivi

dual egos and class identity of the celebrants were sym
bolically consumed in a common purifying conflagration.

The

second purification was by water in the river Rhine at the
23

VB, June 28, 1928, p. 3, "Unsere Feuer lodern am

Rhein."
24H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel "So
kaempften wir." George Mosse has aptly described the impact
of this kind of event in the following.
"For participants,
it was the symbolic content which took priority, the ritual
expression of a shared worship that was so crucial to their
sense of belonging." Mosse, Nationalization, p. 207. This
statement is especially applicable to the festivities at
Caub, but it can also be applied to most of the party's
other major rallies.
25Arendt, Totalitarianism, p. 378.
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very place Germany had begun her purification from the taint
of Napoleonic occupation over a hundred years earlier.

It

was no coincidence that this ceremony took place in front
of the occupying army on the opposite bank.

The Caub festi

val was both an act of defiance and a promise of deliverance.
It presented the NSDAP to the public as a specially chosen
military order cleansed in both fire and water and thus able
to "purify all things rotten." 2 6

Such a ceremony did not

require universal belief to be effective.

It served to re-

dedicate the party's faithful and to convince them that they
were the vanguard of an historically important movement.
It provided other Germans with a vivid promise of renewal.
Whether the general populace consciously believed this pro
mise or not was of only minor importance.

What mattered was

that the NSDAP, by using this type of mummery, successfully
differentiated itself from all other parties.

In a crisis

the quasi-religious character of the NSDAP combined with its
promise of rebirth was enough; for as Hannah Arendt ob
served, "A mixture of gullibility and cynicism" was "an
everyday phenomenon of the masses.

In an ever-changing,

incomprehensible world the masses had reached the point
where they would, at the same time, believe everything and
nothing, think that everything was possible and that nothing
2®H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der
Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim
11.7.28, Nationalsozialistische Sonnwendfeier."
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was true."

27

The promise of

renewal

at Caub might not be

immediately convincing, but it remained attractive, espe
cially for those facing the mounting problems of the late
twenties.

At the very least, this type of ceremony served

to persuade the public that the Nazis were serious about
transforming Germany.
The other major rally to be considered was the
28
Reichsparteitag in NUrnberg from August 1 to 4, 1929.
It was very similar to Nazi regional meetings which often
29
copied previous national rallies.
The distinctive feature
of this rally was its emphasis on World War I and on the
cult of death.

Nazi strategists intended this meeting as a

proving ground for the ritualization of war.

In 1929

fifteen years had elapsed since the start of World War I,
and the Nazis could no longer count on the memories of a
population united through participation in the War.

In

order to keep memories of the War alive and to create a
false memory in the minds of young Germans, the party
27
28

Arendt, Totalitarianism, p. 382.

A book has been written dealing with these
national party rallies, Hamilton T. Burden, The Nuremburq
Party Rallies: 1923-39 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1967;.
Unfortunately, Burden concentrates primarily on
rallies held after the party came to power.
His account of
the 1929 rally is sketchy and is based almost entirely on
accounts taken from the VB for August, 1929.
It provides
little insight into activities and ceremonies at this rally.
29
For an example of this see VB, October 1, 1929,
p. 3, "Unser OstmSrkertag in Sorau 21-22 September," where
the decorations were an exact copy of the NUrnberg rally
of August, 1929.
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developed a series of ritualistic ceremonies to reenact
episodes of this world conflict.

This was the main purpose

of the rally in Niirnberg of 1929.
Hitler himself set the theme for the Reichsparteitag
at a series of staff meetings from March 22 to 25, 1929.
The rally would celebrate the fifteenth anniversary of the
30
"field gray army and the tenth anniversary of the party."
In Hitler's mind the NSDAP and the imperial military forces
were inextricably linked.

The NUrnberg rally was to portray

this mythical union in both speeches and ceremonies.

On the

night of August 3, a giant fireworks display took place
entitled "the Western front."

Twenty thousand storm

troopers carrying torches formed a giant ring in the
NUrnberg Stadion during this event, which culminated in
massive drum fire.

The next day new SA standards were ded

icated at the war memorial.

As a special commemoration of

World War I, three thousand garlands were placed at the base
of this monument.

Every Nazi group was ordered to gather

local flowers to make up these garlands.

"Thus all the

different varieties of flowers and all the districts of
greater Germany will be represented at the memorial to thank
31
our dead heroes who fell for Germany."
These two
^°VB, March 29/30, 1929, p. 3, "Reichsparteitag
Niirnberg 1929."
•^Ibid. There are a number of eyewitness reports of
the Reichsparteitag. They include: H.A. Reel 28, Folder 532
Willi Altenbrandt ^Kampferlebnisse" and Karl Herz "Meine
Kampferlebnisse"; H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel
"So kaempften wir"; H.A. Reel 26, Folder 517, "Reichsparteitag
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ceremonies are indicative of the techniques the Nazis used
to link themselves to the War and at the same time to keep
memories of World War I alive over ten years after its con
clusion.
World War I was a major subject in Nazi propaganda.
The party was largely a product of that war; Hitler himself
had experienced a personal rebirth in the trenches and at
32
Pasewalk hospital in 1918.
The war was the common puri
fying experience upon which National Socialism was built
and the basis of the cult of death.

The fireworks display

at Nurnberg Stadion was a conscious attempt to rekindle
old memories.

It was also a way for young men and women

who had played no part in the War to experience the Western
front on an emotional level.

The collection of flowers

from all parts of Germany was an effort to involve party
members passionately in the blood sacrifice of World War I.
The link to the War tended to permeate Nazi propaganda.
The Volksgemeinschaft grew out of the comradeship of the
trenches.

The party's agricultural program and goal of

eastward expansion were inspired by wartime food shortages.
The very Nazi promise of a rebirth of Germany was in large
part based upon the blood sacrifice of total war.
The Nazi fixation on World War I was a major source
(continued) in Niirnberg des Nationalsozialistischen
Deutschen Arbeiterpartei"; H.A. Reel 57, Folder 1390,
"Polizeidirektion Nilrnberg-Fiirth, August 29, 1929."
32Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 202-206.
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of party strength.

The NSDAP alone of all the post-war

German parties attempted to deal with this monumental
struggle as part of a larger pattern.

The Nazis lent

meaning to the war, while other groups either ignored it or
became bogged down in petty discussions of details.

Only

the Nazis saw World War I as the beginning of a new era
leading from defeat to rebirth.

This view did not make

much sense rationally, but psychologically it was very
appealing, especially after the first effects of the great
depression were felt.

For many it seemed intolerable that

the suffering of total war should be meaningless, especially
when it was followed by economic disaster.

In the Christian

scheme of things pain and self-sacrifice led ultimately to
divine rewards in heaven.

In the secularized world of early

twentieth-century Germany, the old Christian pattern re
mained deeply ingrained.

That suffering should lead only to

more suffering was unthinkable.

That the sacrifice of World

War I should lead to the rebirth of a new Germany, as the
Nazis asserted, seemed only fair.

With the advent of the

great depression this theme of Nazi propaganda took on a
new immediacy.

Only the NSDAP was willing to promise a

return to the proper order of things, while the other
parties seemed lost in an incomprehensible universe.
The Niirnberg rally of 1929 not only reaffirmed the
blood sacrifice of World War I, it also provided the party
with two new martyrs to further the Nazi cult of death.

On

Saturday, August 3, Frau Katherina Grlinewald was shot during
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a melee between SA men and local Communists.

The next day

a young storm trooper named Erich Jost was stabbed to death
in another brawl.

These deaths certainly were not planned

by the Nazis, but the massive NUrnberg rally with the con
centration of almost the whole SA in one place was an open
provocation to violence.

In this case the two deaths at

Ntlrnberg represented concrete examples of the continuation
of the war and of the National Socialist link to the great
blood sacrifice of the early twentieth century.

Nazis

attending the Nurnberg rally could and did feel themselves
to be part of a combat organization tied by continuing per33
sonal loss to the field gray army of 1914.
These deaths
and Nazi ceremonial served to reaffirm the party's sense of
historical continuity.

The meeting at Ntlrnberg in 1929 was

the last national party rally before the seizure of power,
but it did its job well.

After 1929 the association between

the NSDAP and World War I was continuously reaffirmed first
in the campaign against the Young Plan and subsequently by
a long line of Nazi martyrs.

It was no longer absolutely

necessary for the party to evoke the cult of death through
ritualistic ceremonies; the ever-mounting number of real
casualties did this effectively.

The Ntlrnberg rally demon

strated that the NSDAP considered the War, struggle, and
death to be necessary precursors to the idealized Nazi world
^ F o r examples of this type of reaction see H.A.
Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel "So kaempften wir," and
H.A. Reel 28, Folder 532, Willi Altenbrandt
"Kampferlebnisse."
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of the future.
The Nazi regional rallies, the festival at Caub, and
the Reichsparteitag all serve to explain the party's
approach to winning public support.

Nazi propaganda was not

a disjointed series of programs designed simply to get votes.
The party did not emphasize immediate solutions to particular
problems.

Instead, the Nazis always viewed themselves "as

a militant community founded upon charismatic leadership and
34
the discipline of faith.”
As Joachim Fest commented, the
Nazis thought in terms of an apocalypse led by "messianic
35
figures."
It is for this reason that the essence of
Nazism cannot be found in its specific programs or its
ideology that was only partially thought out.

The reality

of the NSDAP can more properly be found in the mysticism of
Caub, the Volksgemeinschaft, and the cult of death asso
ciated with World War I.

It was the vivid impression of the

movement's quasi-religious character that convinced many
Germans that the Nazis were capable of bringing about a re
birth of a cleansed and purified Germany.

The task of

National Socialist propaganda in the years after 1928 was to
devise ways of presenting this message to the general popu
lace.

Rallies were designed to impress outsiders, but they

remained primarily intra-party affairs.

Only those who were

previously attracted to the NSDAP by other means were likely
^Fest,

Hitler, p. 284.

^ I b i d . , p. 207.
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to attend these meetings.

The Nazi political machine had

to develop techniques that would enable the party to present
the propaganda impressions and images developed at rallies
more directly to the public.

The Nazis had to spread the

style of a tiny elite to the masses.

CHAPTER 4
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
In the months following the Reichstag election of
May 20, 19 28, the Nazi party took stock of itself and be
gan to make plans for the future.

The NSDAP had not suc

ceeded in winning broad support anywhere, but the election
was invaluable from the point of view of planning.

It

enabled the party to assess the effectiveness of its various
programs in all parts of Germany using the detailed elec
tion returns as a blueprint for future action.

Discussions

of new strategy continued throughout the summer culminating
in a three-day Reich leadership conference in Munich from
August 31 through September 2.
The Nazis always emphasized their victories and
played down their defeats.

Although the election of 1928

provided little to be optimistic about, the party leadership
was able to point to one striking success.

Throughout its

history, the NSDAP had been only one of many vSlkisch par
ties.

Since 1925, its principal rival on the far right had

been the DeutschvSlkische Freiheitsbewegung, a party that
enjoyed some rural and conservative support in northern
Germany.

This rival had entered a period of decline begin

ning in 1926.

It did little campaigning during the middle
88
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twenties and lost many of its most effective leaders to the
Nazis including Count Reventlow and Wilhelm Kube.^

However,

the very existence of a competing racialist party was
troublesome to the NSDAP.

The elections of 1928 dealt this

Nazi opponent a crushing defeat.

On June 5, the Nazi party

newspaper triumphantly proclaimed that "the vfilkisch block
2
has been reduced to Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP."
This
statement proved to be entirely accurate.

From 192 8 the

NSDAP monopolized far-right politics.
The demise of the Deutschvdlkische Freiheitsbewegung
greatly simplified planning for the Nazis, for the rival
party had influenced their policy in northern Germany by its
presence; the earlier "socialist" and

urban

campaign was,

in part, forced upon the party by the rural strength of this
opponent.

The liquidation of this unsuccessful policy was

far easier now that the Nazis stood alone on the extreme
right.

A new strategy of seeking supporters in rural areas

and among middle-class small town and city dwellers became
far more attractive after the collapse of the
DeutschvSlk ische Freiheitsbewegung.

Aside from establishing

National Socialist supremacy on the extreme right, this
event had also created a political vacuum which the NSDAP
would enthusiastically try to fill.

The DeutschvSlklsche

^For the struggle between the NSDAP and the
Deutschvdlkische Freiheitsbewegung see Noakes, Lower Saxony,
pp. 56-101 passim.
2VB; June 5, 1928, p. 3, "Das Erwachen in den
vSlkischen Reihen.”
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Freiheitsbewegung had once attracted a not inconsiderable
constituency in small cities and rural areas.

The Nazis

believed that they were now in a favorable position to ac
quire the support of these voters.
Other less decisive considerations turned the party
toward a strategy aimed at attracting rural and middle-class
Germans.

In Gau Ruhr the election results led the local

leadership to conclude that "the party enjoyed some success
in the cities, but much more in rural areas."

3

This state

ment was especially significant coming from the Ruhr, the
very heartland of the urban, socialist campaign.
this area

the

results of the 1928 election were suffi

ciently clear to overcome any
old policy.

Even in

remaining

attachment to the

The Gauleitung of the Ruhr promptly ordered

its district leaders to found new local groups in rural
areas where none existed.

The already well developed city

Ortsgruppen were used to spearhead the effort to consolidate
4
the party's rural gains.
Other Gauleiters were drawing the same conclusions.
Hinrich Lohse of Schleswig-Holstein observed that the agri
cultural Dithmarschen area

was "fruitful ground"^ for

3H.A. Reel 5, Folder 136 "Rundschreiben Nr. 79,"
June 6, 1928, Gau Ruhr.
^Ibid. For a report indicating that this program
was carried out see VB, September 23/24, 1928, p. 3, "Die
Verankerung des Nationalsozialismus im Rheinland."
3VB, June 12, 1928, p. 3, "Machtvolle
nationalsozialistische Kundegebung in Burg."

g

further growth.

Gauleiter Fritz Reinhardt of Oberbayern-

Schwaben, an area consisting mainly of small towns and
villages, also concluded that the party could win in his
region with "a couple of years work like that of the last
7
weeks of the election campaign."
The regional Nazi leader
ship everywhere read the election results the same way.
The party could attract rural and middle class voters as
long as it was able to stage effective programs of intense
agitation.
The new strategy was tentatively endorsed by the
party’s national leadership on May 31, 1928, in an open
letter to members.

"Clearly, our electoral success in rural

areas has proven that with the expenditure of a little work
money and time greater success can be expected here than
8
in the big cities."
The letter went on to comment that
Nazi meetings held in small cities and market towns with
good speakers were able to draw audiences of three and four
thousand.

It concluded by recommending that small cities

and rural areas be methodically canvassed down to the
®Nazi gains in some parts of Schleswig-Holstein in
1928 were very impressive.
The "party received 18.1%,
17.7%, 10.4% and 8.6% of the vote, respectively, in the
counties of Nordendithmarschen, Siiderdithmarschen, Steinburg and Rundsburg," Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 129.
^VB, August 3, 1928, p. 3, "VorwSrts in OberbayernSchwaben."
Q

VB, May 31, 1928, p. 3, "Aus der Bewegung:
der W a h l ."

Nach
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smallest village.

g

By the end of the summer of 1928, the new National
Socialist strategy had been adopted everywhere.

Gregor

Strasser applied the official seal of approval at the Reich
leadership conference.

In his oration to the assembled

delegates, he wholeheartedly endorsed the rural, middleclass campaign.

10

This speech carried considerable weight

both because of Strasser*s position as chief of the party's
organization section and because of his previous association
with the abortive urban, proletarian strategy.

The new

Nazi plan meant that the party would place greater emphasis
on recruiting followers in non-urban areas, but not that it
was abandoning Germany's big cities altogether.

Under the

new strategy the party would no longer devote most of its
attention to recruiting working class supporters, but in
stead, would direct its propaganda efforts toward attracting
small businessmen, shopkeepers, white collar workers and
skilled artisans.
In the wake of the leadership conference, the first
major institutional changes were made to implement the new
policy.

On September 3, Hitler ordered a sweeping re

organization of the existing Gau structure.

Until these

reforms the Nazi Gaus had developed in a rather haphazard
fashion.

New Gaus were usually created as needed in order
^ Ibid.

■^®VB, September 2/3, 1928, p. 1, "Die
Generalmitgleidversammlung der NSDAP."
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to supervise a number of already active Ortsgruppen.

One

of the results of such development was that as late as 1928
such huge regional units as Gau Ruhr and Gau BerlinBrandenburg still existed.
all the Rhineland to Baden.

Gau Ruhr controlled virtually
Gau Berlin-Brandenburg con

trolled not only the capital, but also the agricultural
districts for a hundred miles around.

Furthermore, these

regional divisions bore little if any similarity to the
election districts of the Republic.

Hitler’s organizational

reforms were aimed principally at correcting the most
serious of these disparities.^

Several new Gaus were

created, and the three largest north German Gaus, Hannover,
Ruhr and Berlin-Brandenburg, were each broken up into more
manageable units.

Even Bavaria— where Hitler himself served

as Gauleiter— was divided into a series of Untergaue
to conform with existing electoral divisions.

12

This organ

izational change represented the beginning of the Nazi pro
gram of seeking power by democratic means.

From September,

1928, the Nazis would concentrate all of their efforts on
transforming themselves into a mass movement able to win
. .
13
preeminence within the existing political system.
In September, 1928, the Nazi party did not seem
capable of attaining power by democratic means.
^Ty r e l l

There were

(ed.), Fdhrer Befiehl, p. 246.

^ V B , September 5, 1928, p. 3, "Die organisatorischen
Ergebnisse der Ftihrertag."
13

^ Or low, Nazi Party, pp. 139-41.
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fewer than 100,000 party members
groups in all of Germany.

14

and only 1,124 Nazi local

The NSDAP did not have sufficient

income to mount impressive campaigns along traditional lines.
During the fiscal year ending in September, the party re
ported that its income totalled only 254,996.33 R M ^ or well
under $100,000.

The most significant indication of Nazi

financial weakness was the Reich leadership conference.

In

1926 and 1927 the NSDAP had staged large national rallies
in Weimar and Nilrnberg.

One of these massive gatherings

was scheduled for 1928, but the party had to cancel it due
16
to lack of funds.
The leadership conference was held only
because of the party's straitened financial condition.
Finally, the Nazis had very few professional agitators.

In

all of 1928, the NSDAP was able to hold only 20,000 meetings.
One of the major reasons for this relative lack of activity
^ A t their leadership conference of September, 1928,
the Nazis claimed almost 100,000 members.
See VB, Septem
ber 2/3 "Die Generalmitgleidversammlung der NSDAP" and H.A.
Reel 70, Folder 1516, the police report "Generalmitgleid
versammlung der NSDAP am 31 August, 1928 im Burgerbraukeller."
Alan Bullock, on the other hand, estimated party membership
at 60,000 by the end of 1928.
See Bullock, Hitler, p. 109.
It is not at all clear how many people were actually members
at this time, but 100,000 seems to be the highest possible
estimate.
In any case, the actual number is not very im
portant.
Whether the Bullock or Nazi estimates are accepted,
the fact remains that in 1928 the number of party members in
Germany was pathetically small.
*5VB, September 2/3, p. 1, "Die Generalmitgleid
versammlung der NSDAP" and H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1516, police
report "Generalmitgleidversammlung der NSDAP am 31 August,
1928 im BiirgerbrSukeller."
*6VB, July 26, 1928, p. 3, "Kein Reichsparteitag
1928."
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was the fact that the party had only 300 regular orators.
A mere 113 of these 300 speakers made 7,194 of the party's
speeches that y e a r . ^

Simply in terms of manpower, it was

difficult to see how the Nazis would be able to make an
impression on the general public.
The problems involved in launching a full-scale and
continuous campaign to convert millions of Germans with such
a small, weak and poor organization were staggering.

The

fact that the Nazis had decided to seek their new legions
of recruits primarily from rural areas and small cities only
exacerbated the situation.

One of the most appealing as

pects of the old urban, proletarian campaign was that it had
allowed the party to concentrate its meager resources in
geographically small areas.

In big cities the party could

hope to reach hundreds of thousands of people in a few
square miles.

Leaflets and posters obtained a large audi

ence automatically.

Even if the Nazis were able to attract

only a minute percentage of the population in a big city,
they could still count on hundreds of supporters at their
activities.

None of these advantages existed in a campaign

based upon gaining adherents from the countryside and small
cities.

The decision to follow the newly formulated strat

egy was both bold and desperate.

Considering the party's

assets in 1928, the whole venture seemed quixotic.
17VB, January 26, 1928, p. 3, ”20,000 Versammlungen
im Jahre 1928” and VB, February 3/4, 1929, p. 3, "Unsere
Redner Arbeit im Jahre 1928.” For a list of these speakers
and the number of speeches they delivered in 1928 see
Appendix A.
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There was never any doubt that the new strategy
could work only when coupled with an active program of agi
tation.

The overall rural campaign of 1927 and 1928 failed

because the Nazis were only able to mount an effective cam
paign in a few districts.

In areas where little canvassing

took place the NSDAP attracted few votes.

This part of the

lesson of the 1928 election was not overlooked by the party’s
leadership.

The men who lauded the possibilities of a suc

cessful rural, middle-class campaign also made it clear that
such a strategy could work only where the party was able to
stage sustained drives to gain new followers.

Hinrich

Lohse, in the same speech in which he extolled the
Dithmarschen area as "fruitful ground" for further expansion,
decried the fact that his speakers were unable to work the
18
whole area.
The Ruhr Gauleitung, while recounting its
rural victories, made a point of mentioning that the party
was successful only in places effectively canvassed by energetic district or local leaders. 19

Fritz Reinhardt summed

up the consensus among Nazi leaders when he stated, "in
20
areas where we worked hard . . . we won."
Unlike workers,
farmers and middle-class Germans seemed to be susceptible to
18VB, June 12, 1928, p. 3, "Machtvolle
sozialistische Kundegebung in Burg.'1

national-

^9H.A. Reel 5, Folder 136, "Rundschreiben Nr. 79”
June 6, 1928.
20

VB, August 3, 1928, p. 3, "VorwSrts in OberbayernSchwaben."
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National Socialist appeals, but the party still had to sell
itself to these people through intense propaganda campaigns
in order to win their support.
Hard work would certainly be required if the NSDAP
was to succeed with its new strategy; but given the party's
palpable weakness, even hard work was unlikely to be enough.
One of the things the party had to do was develop new tac
tics that would enable it to heighten the impact of its
campaigning.

Of necessity, the NSDAP's entire approach to

campaigning in rural areas and small towns had to be un
orthodox.

It could not spend large amounts of money or rely

upon powerful organizations to do its ground work, because
the party had neither money nor organizational support.

It

could not wait for elections to begin campaigning, because
in many parts of Germany the NSDAP was either unknown or
viewed as an ineffective Bavarian splinter party.

The only

assets enjoyed by the Nazi party in 1928 were a dedicated
membership and a small but reasonably competent cadre of
agitators.

The party would have to take full advantage of

both these assets if it were to succeed.
In 1928, the Reich propaganda section assumed re
sponsibility for developing tactics and adopting programs
to increase the effectiveness of Nazi campaigning.
presented a departure from previous practices.

This re

After the

Putsch the propaganda section had tended to devote most of
its attention to routine matters.

Under Hermann Esser in

1925 and Gregor Strasser from 1926 to 1928, the section
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primarily issued notices describing various leaflets and
posters.

On January 2, 1928, Hitler assumed the position

of propaganda leader, a post he had held before his im
prisonment.

To all intents and purposes, however, the re

sponsibilities of the office were assumed by Heinrich
Himmler, who was appointed deputy chief.

21

All orders and

announcements originating from the propaganda section after
January 2, were issued over Himmler's signature.

Himmler1s

first eight orders like those of his predecessors dealt with
routine matters.

Seven of these directives announced

various pamphlets and posters for campaigning; the eighth
merely requested Nazi national orators to submit a list of
the places where they planned to speak.

It was only after

the final decision to pursue an electoral strategy in
September, 1928, that the propaganda section began to play
an important role in coordinating Nazi campaigning.

From

that time, this office actively directed the party's
national propaganda efforts.
Heinrich Himmler was the man most responsible for
the development of the Nazi political machine.

He did not

develop any new theoretical approaches to propaganda.
Rather, he brilliantly applied the principles set down by
Hitler in Mein Kampf to the expanded campaigning necessary
to bring about Nazi electoral victory.
21

He started with

VB, January 4, 1928, p. 4, "Bekanntmachung."
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Hitler's ideas for appealing to mass audiences and devel
oped the organizational methods that made it possible for
the party to apply these ideas to a geographically dis
persed public.

Himmler's personal contribution to the

Nazi political machine was mainly in the area of tactics.
His other major strength was his ability to recognize val
uable programs developed by others.

Himmler used his

position at the propaganda section to adopt successful
regional schemes and impose them on Nazi organizations
everywhere as national programs.
One of the most difficult tasks facing the NSDAP
in 1928 was making a favorable impression in previously
uncanvassed areas.

Most of these areas were characterized

by a dispersed population residing in small cities and
villages.

The results of the 1928 election indicated that

the party could make progress in these regions, but Nazi
campaigning techniques were designed primarily for dealing
with a geographically compact urban population.

Hitler's

personal experience as an agitator was limited to Munich
and other big cities; thus, his ideas about campaigning
seemed inapplicable to lightly populated areas.

Moreover,

National Socialist propaganda was designed to appeal to a
mass audience.

The party concentrated upon emotional ap

peals and the creation of a variety of propaganda images
that would convince audiences of the party's ability to
transform Germany.

The mass meeting was typical of this

approach to propaganda.

It not only stirred the feelings
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of participants but also created a series of striking im
pressions of the nature and destiny of the NSDAP.

Finally,

it helped to create the picture "of a large community,
which in most people has a strengthening effect."

22

The

Nazis had to devise ways of achieving the same responses
from inhabitants of villages and small cities.
Himmler developed the tactical approach utilized by
the Nazis to make a positive impression in previously un
organized areas.
campaign.

His technique was known as the saturation

It was designed to exploit the party's meager

resources to the fullest.

There were simply not enough

Nazi agitators to stage intensive campaigns in all parts of
Germany simultaneously.

In order to overcome this diffi

culty, Himmler decided to concentrate party activities in
one Gau at a time.

A further advantage of this approach

was that the local Gauleitung could do all the necessary
preliminary work to make a saturation campaign successful.
The first of these intensive regional campaigns took place
in the Ostmark between January 15 and January 25, 1929,
shortly followed by similar efforts in Halle-Merseburg and
Saxony.

23

The purpose of Himmler's saturation campaigns was
^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 478.
23

The Himmler program can be found in H.A. Reel 10,
Folder 203, "Propaganda Aktion" December 24, 1928.
It has
also been published in Tyrell, Ftihrer Befiehl, pp. 255-57.

101

to "bring about a realization of our movement"
where the party was previously unknown. 25

24

in areas

The centerpiece

of these operations was a series of seventy to two hundred
public meetings in a single Gau in from seven to ten days.
Himmler reasoned that these rallies would both raise the
morale of local party members and force the "enemy" press
to cover Nazi meetings "to combat our ideas and in that way
spread our propaganda."

26

Most importantly of all, such

saturation campaigns were designed to "give the whole pro27
vince a feeling of our homogeneity and power."
These campaigns were designed to create a number
of propaganda images favorable to the party.
24

The emphasis

,
Ibid.

25 Joachim Fest mentions the saturation campaigns in
Hitler, pp. 266-67. Dietrich Orlow in Nazi Party, p. 161
refers to the saturation campaigns as specially designed for
use in coming elections or as preliminary preparation for
major party events. Orlow*s interpretation of these cam
paigns is incorrect. They were developed to introduce the
party in previously lightly worked areas. The first three
saturation campaigns were staged in the Ostmark, HalleMerseburg and Saxony in early 1929. No elections or major
party events were scheduled for these areas at the time.
The party later used saturation campaigns before elections
and to prepare areas for major party events, but this can
vassing technique was not initially developed for those
purposes.
Throughout this dissertation many of Dietrich
Orlow*s conclusions will be criticized.
This criticism
should not be taken as a general attack on Orlow's book.
Orlow*s History of the Nazi Party is an invaluable pioneer
work. Orlow made mistakes, but before his study was pub
lished the field was almost entirely unorganized.
His book
remains the basic study of the party during the Weimar Re
public.
Other research on this topic will, of necessity,
be based upon Orlow*s work.
2<*H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda Aktion"
December 24, 1928 and Tyrell, Fiihrer Befiehl, pp. 255-57.
27 Ibid.
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was on quantity rather than quality.

Himmler was indiffer

ent to the specific contents of the speeches delivered
during a saturation campaign, as long as the local Gau
leadership chose speakers and speaking themes appropriate
to the region.

28

These rallies did not attempt primarily to

persuade the public of the correctness of Nazi doctrines.
Instead, they were designed to convince local audiences of
the strength, dedication and enthusiasm of the Nazi party.
As Joachim Fest put it, "enthusiasm . . . . was [the
29
party's] greatest strength."
The immediate problem that
these campaigns overcame was the widespread impression
that the NSDAP was a weak, impotent Bavarian splinter group.
Such a show of force as a saturation campaign was more
effective in disspelling that impression than all the party’s
statements and printed assertions.

Proving that the NSDAP

was a strong and active movement was essential if the party
was to attract a large number of followers.

Those who were

disillusioned with the Weimar Republic wanted change and
action.

The Nazis could only exploit discontent if the

public were persuaded that they were capable of transform
ing Germany; and the massive displays of National Socialist
enthusiasm and strength during saturation campaigns helped
accomplish that goal.
Nazi propaganda was rarely limited to speeches.
28Ibid.
29pest, Hitler, pp. 276-77.
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The party tried to involve the public in its activities.
During saturation campaigns a series of "working evenings"
were held to recruit new members for the SA or for the
Hitler Youth and to win additional subscribers to Nazi
newspapers.^®

Thereby, a National Socialist presence would

be established in the area being canvassed.

Ideally, after

a successful saturation campaign enough local men would
join the party and its various auxiliary organizations to
form a series of new Ortsgruppen and SA units, which would
then carry on party agitation in the future.

The "working

evenings" were also occasions for the Nazis to campaign on
a more personal level than was possible at formal speeches.
The SA "evening" provides a good example of this
type of Nazi field work.

A number of SA men were dispatched

to the town being canvassed.

They then rented a small

hall, so that old SA men and prospective recruits would be
physically close together.

This reduced formality and made

the recruits feel that they were part of the group from the
beginning.

After a brief period of getting acquainted, the

audience was regaled with musical selections appropriate to
the Gau performed either by the town band or by a neigh
boring SA marching band.

This was followed by sports events.

First, the old SA men would join the prospective recruits
in team activities, thus promoting a feeling of solidarity;
30H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda Aktion"
December 24, 1928 and Tyrell, Fflhrer Befiehl, pp. 255-57.
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then some SA men would put on a display of wrestling and
jujitsu to impress the audience.

After this strenuous

interlude the meeting settled down for group singing, often
followed by a display of talent by the nearest SA choir.
The last two events of an SA "working evening" were a
theatrical performance by an amateur SA troupe and the
screening of a movie.

Himmler was not specific about the

type of play that should be presented, but it is fairly
obvious that the sketch would be designed to convey politi
cal ideas or to portray important events in SA history.
The final event was the screening of the party motion pic
ture about the 1927 Ntirnberg rally, which featured a seem
ingly endless column of SA men marching by Hitler on the
scenic streets of the old city.

It was designed to give

the prospective recruits a feeling of the strength and discipline of the organization they were being asked to join.31
The SA evening exemplifies some of the methods
used by the Nazis in non-verbal propaganda.

No speeches

were made extolling the virtues of the party? that was the
traditional approach used by other parties.

On these occa

sions the Nazis preferred instead to present an appealing
picture of the nature of the party.
these meetings went away entertained.

Those who attended
For one evening they

had been part of the Nazi movement; they had participated
in sporting events and singing with SA men and had become

acquainted with these dedicated Nazis.

After a successful

SA evening a certain camaraderie developed between old
members and recruits.

At the same time/ the visiting SA

contingent employed a number of techniques to convince the
audience of the party’s strength and dedication.

They dis

played their prowess as athletes in wrestling and jujitsu
performances; SA choirs often performed after group singing
finally, the party propaganda movie showed thousands of
marching Storm Troopers to the prospective recruits.

The

composite picture of the NSDAP presented at this "working
evening1' was of a strong, dedicated and yet comradely move
ment able to restore Germany.
The Himmler scheme was used during early 1929.

It

provided a workable model for Nazi agitation throughout
the last years of the Weimar Republic.

Most importantly,

the Himmler plan could be implemented with existing re
sources.

The speakers were provided by the propaganda

section after prior consultation with the local Gauleitung.
The campaigns themselves were mapped out by the regional
leadership, to insure that the most susceptible towns and
villages were heavily canvassed.

The Gauleitung provided

advance men to distribute propaganda brochures and hand
bills, and just before the campaign began, to plaster
seventy to one hundred and fifty towns and villages with
party placards.

The printed material was furnished by

Himmler’s office either free of charge or for a small fee.
Finally, most of the work was done by volunteers.

Trans-
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portation was provided by using the private automobiles of
party members.

Volunteers also furnished most of the

entertainment at "working evenings."

The only expenses

involved in this type of campaigning were nominal speakers’
fees, the rent on small halls, and the small rental fee
charged to show the party’s propaganda film.
campaign was both cheap and labor-intensive.

32

Himmler's
It was based

upon an efficient utilization of the party’s prime resource,
its dedicated members.
The Himmler saturation campaigns were in many ways
typical of the National Socialist approach to propaganda.
The NSDAP presented itself to the public through a series
of evocative images.

In this case, the Nazis emphasized

strength, dedication and comradeship— ideal qualities which
were concretely objectified through a series of activi33
ties.
They did not constitute a political program, but
the Nazis rarely tried to persuade people of the correct
ness of their doctrines.

Instead, the NSDAP attempted to

paint a picture of the Nazi future.

The party was pre

sented as a holistic movement, all elements of which were

33

Ernst Nolte saw this emphasis on concretely
objectified images as a product of the monomaniacal
element of Hitler’s personality. He felt Hitler was
impelled by an "elemental urge toward tangibility, in
telligibility, [and] simplicity," Three Faces of Fascism,
p. 368.
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organically linked forming an indivisible whole.

The

public was asked to accept the Nazi party in its totality
as an act of faith without debating details.

In any case,

the party's propaganda images were too abstract to be de
bated or even discussed.
to the Nazis.

This vagueness was very helpful

It allowed recruits to see the NSDAP as the

embodiment of their most treasured ideals; it also obviated
the need to make decisions on clearly articulated programs.
Recruits could accept the NSDAP for any number of personal
reasons without having to reconcile themselves to a collec
tion of doctrines which might or might not appeal to them.
Himmler's second major personal contribution to
Nazi campaigning was to devise a method for using the party's
written and pictorial propaganda as a means of attracting
new followers.

From time to time, the propaganda section

issued pamphlets, copies of important speeches, and major
posters to be distributed throughout Germany.

Each local

group was responsible for obtaining large quantities of
this printed material and making sure that it was widely
disseminated. 34 The defect of this type of campaigning was
that it lacked impact.

Only people who already supported

the party were likely to take the trouble of reading
speeches or pamphlets.

Placards, no matter how graphic,

tended to blend into the background and rarely stimulated
much interest.

Nonetheless, such propaganda was necessary

^ V B , July 29/30, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 28";
VB, December 4, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung 30," etc.
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to communicate the party's position on major issues to the
public and to retain the active interest of members.

The

problem was how to make Nazi written propaganda more effec
tive as a weapon for converting previously uninterested
voters.

Himmler solved this problem in late 1928 by

ordering local groups to hold public meetings on the topics
.
. , 35
covered in printed material.
By August,

1929, three campaigns featuring the co

ordination of Nazi written and pictorial propaganda with
speeches had taken place.

The first of these campaigns

occurred in December, 1928, and January, 1929.

The subject

was a leaflet entitled "Consumer Unions and Department
Stores:
Some Facts and Figures that Every German Should
36
Know."
Every Nazi local group was required to hold a
public meeting exposing consumer unions and department
stores as Jewish threats to the well-being of the German
middle class.

Underscoring the importance of this program
37
Himmler repeated his order two weeks later,
and this
38
second order seems to have been scrupulously obeyed.
The
35VB, December 4, 19 28, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 30."
36Ibid.
37VB, December 16/17, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung N r .32."
38

There are records of rallies being held on this
subject in Berlin, Munich and Bielefeld to give just a few
examples.
VB, January 3, 1929, p. 3, "Aus der Bewegung=
Gau Gross-Berlin," VB, January 5, 1929, p. 3, "Versammlungen" and VB, January 5, 1929, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Aufklarungsarbeit."
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second of these campaigns began on June 21, 1929 and dealt
with the continuing imprisonment of Lt. Schulz.

Schulz was

a member of the notorious Feme, a political assassination
organization active in the early twenties, and had been
convicted of murder.

The Nazis tried to make his case into

a c^use c6l5bre by claiming that this "patriot" should be
released, especially when traitorous communists and crimnals were let out by periodic amnesties. 39

The other occa

sion when printed matter was used as the basis of a speaking
campaign involved a poster.

The placard in question was an

attack on the Young Plan depicting a worker and his child
labeled "Think of the Child and the Future."

The Young

Plan called for the continuation of reparation payments for
fifty-eight years, and one of the Nazi arguments against
the plan was that it would enslave future generations.

Ora

tors were ordered to use this poster as a centerpiece for
public meetings attacking the new reparations settlement. 40
After mid-1929 National Socialist written and pic
torial propaganda was designed almost exclusively for use in
broader campaigns.

In connection with the municipal and

^®VB, June 21, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 41." The
case of Lt. Schulz was apparently common knowledge at the
time.
The Nazis do not describe his crimes beyond mention
ing that he had committed an "honorable" murder.
They do
not even give his first name.
Since Schulz is the German
equivalent of Smith and no one other than the Nazis seemed
to be interested in him, it is not possible to recount his
misdeeds in any detail.
40VB, July 5, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 4 3."
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communal elections of November and December, 1929, the
propaganda section issued pamphlets entitled "With Marxism
41
Marches Corruption" and "Clean Up City Government."
In
conjunction with the referendum campaign against the Young
Plan, the pamphlets, "Young Plan— Human Export," "Fifty42
Eight Years Young Plan" and "The Talmud of the Economy"
were distributed.

Himmler had succeeded in linking written

and spoken Nazi propaganda to heighten the impact of both.
The advantages of such a union were considerable.
Pamphlets and posters provided party speakers with effec
tive props for impressing audiences.

People who attended

meetings at which issues were forcefully presented were
far more likely to read the party’s literature.

Even those

who did not attend Nazi rallies became more susceptible to
the party's written propaganda.
held

The fact that a rally was

meant that people would be talking about it and about

the subject covered in

the public meeting.

Even rabid

opponents of the NSDAP were likely to mention the Nazi
rally, if only to denounce it.

All of this stimulated in

terest in the party’s written propaganda, which was harder
to ignore when it became a topic of conversation.

A last

favorable feature of this type of campaigning was that all
Nazi local groups were dealing with the same topic at the
same time.

This allowed the party to present an impression

^ V B , November

9, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 49."

42VB, December

6, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 51."
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of monolithic solidarity to the voters that could only
serve to increase their confidence in the unity and deci
siveness of the NSDAP, two very desirable qualities in the
chaotic late twenties.
Heinrich Himmler turned the propaganda section over
to Joseph Goebbels on April 27, 1930.

43

In his two years

as deputy chief of the section, Himmler had helped to es
tablish the form and style of Nazi campaigning.

He in

creased the effectiveness of party agitation by organizing
and concentrating available resources to stage impressive
and powerful campaigns.

This tactical approach enabled

the party to make its first major inroads in previously
unorganized areas and left a lasting impression on millions
who, previously, were barely aware of the existence of the
NSDAP.

In doing this Himmler employed propaganda techni

ques developed by Hitler.

He emphasized emotional appeals

and the creation of a series of concretely embodied images.
This approach was similar to the methods used by the Nazis
in mass rallies with their music, banners, torchlight pro
cessions and fiery but vague speeches.

Himmler's great

accomplishment was in devising ways to achieve the same
results when dealing with an indifferent and geographically
dispersed population.

The saturation campaign was a

reasonably successful means of applying the propaganda
principles learned by the Nazis at mass rallies to a very
4^Tyrell, Fflhrer Befiehl, p. 225.
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different situation.

Thus, Himmler's campaigns reveal the

key images that the party wished to stress.

The Nazis

wanted the public to see the party as a strong, dedicated
and comradely movement capable of bringing about change.
In a period of cynicism and indecisiveness the Nazis pro
jected an image of monolithic solidarity and blind faith.
All of these impressions were integrated to a greater or
lesser extent in National Socialist campaigning to produce
an imprecise but attractive composite picture of the NSDAP
as a militant, quasi-religious order that was both ready
and able to bring about a renewal of Germany.

Details

changed over the years, but this composite picture of the
party remained unaltered.

It, in fact, originated in

Hitler's Mein Kampf, but Heinrich Himmler was the man who
first devised the tactical methods to present this idealized
portrait of the party to the uninvolved masses*
Joseph Goebbels, Himmler's successor, made no major
44
changes in Nazi tactics before the 1930 election.
He
simply carried on with programs and techniques developed by
his predecessor.

On May 28, 1930, Goebbels issued his

44Hitler did hire R. Walter DarrS on August 25,
1930 to develop a more effective agricultural organization.
However, Darr€ was hired too late to have any impact on the
1930 election.
For DarrS's appointment see VB, August 29,
1930, p. 3, "Bekanntmachung." For a description of Darrfi1s
later activities see Horst Gies "NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organisationen in der Endphase der Weimarer
Republik," Vierteljahrshefte ftir Zeitgeschichte, xv, 1967,
pp. 341-76, also reprinted and translated in Henry A. Tur
ner, Jr., (ed.) Nazism and the Third Reich (New York:
Quadrangle, 1972'J pp7 45-88.
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first orders as chief of the propaganda section.

These

directives dealt with the Saxon Landtag election campaign.
He placed the campaign under the control of his section,
thus reaffirming the principle of strict centralization.
He further directed that the party "concentrate all our
propaganda potential on Saxony. All speakers are required
45
to participate there."
Here, Goebbels relied upon the
same type of saturation campaign developed by Himmler in
late 1928.

Finally, Goebbels notified the party that his

section was dispatching a batch of pamphlets and posters
46
to be used in conjunction with the speaking campaign.
The link between written and spoken propaganda was
reaffirmed.
The same methods were used in the Reichstag elec
tion campaign of August and early September, 1930.

Here,

the principle of centralization was even more heavily
stressed.

As the leader of one Gau propaganda section put

it in a circular letter, "The Reich propaganda section has
set up a unified election propaganda program for the entire
country to improve our chances of success . . . .
Do not
47
use your own stuff."
The idea that the most effective
4^VB, May 28, 1939, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 56."
46Ibid.
4^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Propaganda-Abteilung"
Gau Gross-Berlin, August 5, 1930.
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way of presenting the NSDAP to the electorate was through
a well organized, highly centralized and unified campaign
was firmly established by the time of the 1930 Reichstag
election.
Himmler's tactical contributions to Nazi campaign
ing were important, but he made an equally significant
contribution through his ability to recognize valuable
programs developed by others.

In his position he was able

to establish successful Gau projects as programs to be im
plemented throughout the Reich.

The next chapters will

examine two successful Gau projects that were adopted by
Himmler and the propaganda section as national programs.

CHAPTER 5
FRITZ REINHARDT AND THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST
SPEAKERS' CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOL
Effective tactics were useful in making initial
gains, but they did not solve any of the party's basic
problems.

In early 1929 the NSDAP was still incapable of

staging major political drives in more than one region of
Germany at the same time.

It did not even have the experi

enced personnel to follow up on its saturation campaigns.
If the Nazis were to consolidate their initial gains and
continue to grow, they desperately needed to augment the
number of trained agitators available for party work.
Above all, the party needed more speakers.

Torch

light parades, marches and major rallies were high points
of Nazi campaigning, but the party could not stage these
activities on a regular basis.

They were too expensive

in terms of manpower, and in any case they were not appro
priate as weekly events.

The commonest form of Nazi pro

paganda was the public speech.

The party tried to stage

speeches every week in areas where an Ortsgruppe existed.
These regular meetings helped to establish the party's
presence as an ongoing political movement with local
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identification.

They also served to increase the enthu

siasm of party members and to attract persons interested
in the NSDAP.

Finally, the speaker communicated the party's

ideas and programs both to members and to potential con
verts .
Perhaps the greatest problem facing the Nazis in
the late twenties was how to increase the number of party
orators.

In 1928 there were fewer than three hundred regu

lar Nazi speakers in Germany.1

They worked hard, addressing

twenty thousand meetings that year, but little more could
be expected from these men.

There were simply too few of

them and too much territory to cover.

Besides, major

figures like Goebbels, Gregor Strasser or Julius Streicher
were far too valuable to spend their time addressing small
audiences in isolated areas.

In any case, this was not

necessary.

The party did not need brilliant orators for

this work.

Rather, it needed an ample supply of reasonably

competent speakers, so that Nazi local groups would be able
to stage regular and frequent public meetings, thereby
keeping the party's program and activities before the popu
lace .
The problem of producing a large number of new
speakers for the party was first dealt with by Gauleiter
Fritz Reinhardt of Oberbayern-Schwaben.

Reinhardt was

^VB, January 27, 1929, p. 3, "20,000
Versammlungen im Jahre 1928." Also see Appendix A.
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thirty-three years old when he was appointed to his post on
May 31, 1928.

His background was unusual for a Nazi re

gional leader.

By profession Reinhardt was an economist,

and from April, 1933 until 1945, he served the Nazi govern
ment as State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Finance.
From 1919 to 1924, he was employed as director of the
Thuringian Commercial College.

At that time, he wrote a

six-volume correspondence course for businessmen.

The new

Gauleiter's forte was organization and teaching, not rabble
rousing.

He used these talents initially to establish

order and discipline in his Gau political organization,

3

and then turned his precise mind to finding solutions to
long-term problems.
Reinhardt’s goal was to increase party membership
fivefold in his Gau and to establish an Ortsgruppe in every
4
community with over a thousand inhabitants.
A major ob
stacle to this objective was the dearth of available
speakers.

This was a serious problem, for as Reinhardt put

it, "the expansion of the National Socialist movement and
with it of the NSDAP is

based primarily on the spoken word
5
and on verbal explanations of our works."
In order to
2VB, June 1, 1928, p. 3, "Bekanntmachung."

3For an example of Reinhardt's efforts to bring
order and discipline to his Gau political organization see
VB, June 6, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Oberbayern-Schwaben, Anordnung
1 ."
^H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3."
^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, a descriptive brochure
issued by Reinhardt entitled "Rednerschule der NSDAP."
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stage a successful recruiting campaign, Reinhardt needed to
increase the number of speakers for such work.

The solution

to this problem was not difficult for a man who had written
a six-volume correspondence course for businessmen.

On

June 11, 1928, Reinhardt announced the establishment of a
correspondence course for orators in his Gau** designed "to
cure the acute shortage of speakers especially for meetings
in small towns and villages."7
Reinhardt had inadvertently found the answer to one
of the party's most pressing needs, how to increase greatly
the number of trained orators.

The original purpose for the

establishment of this speakers' course, the recruiting cam
paign in Oberbayern-Schwaben, paled to insignificance almost
at once.

On August 31, 1928, the new Gauleiter addressed

the delegates at the Reich leadership conference in order
g
to describe his new school.
Reinhardt's appearance at this
national meeting indicates that his program had attracted
the attention of the party's national leadership.
What had started as a local, one-time-only course
soonbecame a

continuing school for neophyte Nazi

eH.A.Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3."
7H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, Police report dated
May 1,19 30, from the Munich police
to the Berlin police
praesidium entitled "Rednerschule der NSDAP zum ers. von
23.4.1930.” Henceforth referred to as May 1, 1930 police
report.
®VB, September 4, 1928, p. 1, "Abschluss
nationalsozialistischen Fiihrertagung. "

der
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orators.

9

All Reinhardt courses after September, 1928 were

announced in the party's official newspaper, the VOlkischer
Beobachter ^ and students from other Gaus in Germany and
Austria began enrolling in the program.

After January,

1929, these men were placed under their own Gauleiters*
supervision for purposes of t e s t i n g . ^

Later that month

some of Reinhardt's students gave their first major per
formances outside of Oberbayern-Schwaben, when they
addressed a large party rally in Chemnitz
12
Stadt) in Saxony.

(now Karl Marx

On May 6, 1929, Himmler designated the Reinhardt
school as the official Reich party office responsible for
training speakers in all parts of Germany. 13 In a circular
letter to all Gauleiters, Himmler stressed the importance
of preparing a large cadre of new orators.

"In order to

expand, we need men who can speak* Without them we cannot
14
move the masses."
Commenting on the efforts of Reinhardt
^Joachim Fest, in what is probably a misprint,
refers to the establishment of a speakers' school in late
1926. Hitler, p. 252.
l^The first of these announcements appeared in VB,
October 4, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Redner =
Fernschule."
11Ibid*
12

VB, January 3, 1929, p. 3, "Bezirk Chemnitz"
refers to a rally held in Limbach on January 27.
13H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda - Abteilung
6 Mai 1929."
14Ibid.
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in this matter, he said, "This problem has been alleviated
by Fritz Reinhardt . . . who on his own initiative opened
a speakers' correspondence school . . . .
of this school has been good."

15

The success of

The school was not only

recognized as a Reich party office; party discipline was
also invoked to recruit new students.

Himmler ordered that

from May, 1929, each Bezirk supply a minimum of two persons
16
to enroll in every subsequent Reinhardt course.
Initially, the school relied upon the enthusiasm and
dedication of party members for recruiting participants.

It

also appealed to the greed and ambition of prospective
students. 17 They were promised high places as candidates in
18
city council elections and advancement within the party.
15Ibid.

17

The Social Democrats created a somewhat similar
school for training members to become trade union or party
officials.
This school which was started in 1906 provided
some upward mobility for ambitious workers.
See Robert
Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the
Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy trans. Eden and
Cedar Paul (New York: Collier, 196T) pp. 68-70.
By 1919,
however, most positions in the SPD and trade union hierar
chy were controlled by a self perpetuating group that was
able to place family members and friends in new openings.
See Hunt, Social Democrats. The possibility of upward mo
bility offered by the Nazi party to participants in the
Reinhardt school must have been very attractive for young
men who had few opportunities to advance in other parties
during the late twenties.
The economic stagnation of the
Weimar Republic reduced the opportunities for young, un
connected men to rise socially and economically.
The great
depression simply made matters worse.
The Nazis, almost
alone, provided a way for ambitious young men to succeed
through hard work and by personal ability.
18H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 7."
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They were also promised speaking fees after completion of
the course, and by 19 30 graduates were receiving "20 RM or
more per evening in addition to their expenses." 19

After

May, 1929, party discipline insured an adequate enrollment
20
in Reinhardt's program,
and the abovementioned inducements
became simply additional rewards for participants.

In

short, the Reinhardt school cleverly exploited the party's
greatest assets, its established membership and its inter
nal discipline, in order to solve the problem of producing
a large quantity of trained orators.
Perhaps, the greatest advantage of the speakers'
correspondence school to the party was the fact that it was
inexpensive.

The entire operation was run from a post

office box in Reinhardt's hometown of Herrsching am
Amersee.

The party did not have to bear the cost of setting

up formal schools and paying instructors.

Reinhardt him

self wrote most of the lessons, and additional ones were
provided by members of the party's Reich specialist bureaus
in Munich.

As the school expanded, the only added expense

l^Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, p. 101, Prussian
Ministry of the Interior report on Nazi activities dated
May, 1930.
^®H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Rednerschule der
NSDAP." This document gives enrollment figures that indi
cate that the district leaders did enroll the required num
ber of students for each course.
In any case, Reichsleitung
orders were rarely disobeyed.
Such actions were tantamount
to defying Hitler, since the Reichsleitung acted as an in
stitutional extension of Hitler.
For a discussion of party
discipline and the Nazi leadership structure see Chapter 10.
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to the party was the employment of a small number of clerks
to read and correct homework.

The fees paid by students

were enough to defray all the costs of this tiny operation
and to make the speakers* school economically self21
sufficient.
The cost to the students was also small.
Originally, students were charged 1.5 RM per month.

22

May, 1929 tuition was raised to a mere 2 RM monthly.

In

71

In

addition to this fee, the student was required to subscribe
24
to the Volkischer Beobachter
and later to Reinhardt's
Wirtschaftlicher Beobachter.25

Since they were taught by

means of a correspondence course, students did not have to
travel to distant cities to receive instruction.

They did

not have to sacrifice their jobs to attend a formal school.
Thus, the financial and personal demands of this kind of
training were minimal— only large enough to discourage those
who did not take the course seriously.
A second major advantage of this type of schooling
was that it guaranteed the participation of students from
all parts of Germany.

Initially two students from each dis

trict, whether predominantly urban or rural, were required to
21H.A. Feel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3."
22Ibid.
23

H.A. Reel 10, Folder 20 3, "Propaganda-Abteilung
6 Mai 1929."
2^H.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3."
2^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529,
NSDAP."

"Rednerschule der
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26
27
enroll, and in 1930 every Ortsgruppe had to enter one pupil.
In practice, this meant that the new speakers would come from
all areas.

They were likely to be well versed in local pro28
blems and unlikely to commit harmful blunders.
2®H.A. Reel 10, Folder 20 3, "Propaganda-Abteilung
6 Mai 1929,"
^ H . A . Reel 10, Folder 203, "Reichspropaganda Abteilung II Anordnung 1, 10 Mai 19 30."
28

Geoffrey Pridham deals with this issue in a some
what confusing passage.
In a section of his book covering
the Darr€ agricultural organization, he makes the following
statement.
"These indoctrination courses and similar
activities demanded an army of party
speakers versed in rural propaganda.
Darr6
lacked this at the beginning.
Party speak
ers from Reinhardt's training school were
at first transferred to rural areas, although
not always with happy results.
Speakers used
to addressing town audiences sometimes un
wittingly committed indiscretions. A great
commotion was caused at a peasant meeting by
a Nazi speaker in Upper Bavaria, who was
tactless enough to remark that in the Third
Reich the 'progressive' peasant who used
artificial manure would remain on his farm,
while farms which were uneconomical and in
debt would be nationalized." Pridham, Hitler *s
Rise, p. 230.
Earlier Pridham described the role of the Reinhardt speak
ers in the 1930 Reichstag election in the following passage.
"The Speakers' School was now beginning to pay dividends
for many of its trainees were sent out to address NSDAP
'peasant meetings', having been well briefed and indoctri
nated in agricultural problems."
Ibid., p. 121.
These two statements seem to contradict each other.
What Pridham probably means in the first passage is that
Reinhardt speakers from cities were not effective when
transferred to rural areas. Pridham's example of the tact
less orator is also confusing, since the man in question is
not specifically identified as a graduate of the speakers'
school.
Dietrich Orlow, on the other hand, describes
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Furthermore, they were more likely to be trusted by their
neighbors than outside speakers sent in by opposition par
ties.

This aspect of the speakers' school served to solid

ify the position of the NSDAP as an ongoing organization
with local identification.
The speakers' course lasted one year, but partici
pants began to address audiences after their initial four
months of training.

Thus, Reinhardt's first students began

appearing on October 27, 1928 in Oberbayern-Schwaben.
These earliest speeches were presented to audiences of from
sixty to seventy persons in small towns and villages such
as Lochhausen, MUnsing and Russdorf, all of which were in
the vicinity of the Amersee or the Starnberger See.

The

purpose of these speeches was either to found new local
groups or to recruit new members.

Most of the audiences

addressed by these first products of Reinhardt's school
were composed of farmers, artisans or burghers from small
towns, though some socialists and communists also attended.
nO

(continued) Reinhardt speakers as village orators
not capable of addressing town and city audiences.
Orlow,
Nazi Party, pp. 158-60. This is not correct.
In H.A. Reel
9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 3," Reinhardt stated that the
goal of his speakers' school was to help in agitation to
found an Ortsgruype in every town with over one thousand
inhabitants in his Gau. This type of campaign did not re
strict Reinhardt speakers to village and peasant audiences.
In truth, Reinhardt speakers came from both rural and urban
areas (see argument above). Some were undoubtedly capable
only of addressing village and peasant audiences, while
others became competent orators.
Generalizations about
them being specifically rural or urban speakers are incor
rect.
Reinhardt speakers were propaganda generalists
trained on a wide variety of topics.
For a discussion of
Reinhardt school training see Appendix B.
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These speeches— all delivered in October and November—
dealt with the theme "the interest and tax slavery of pro29
ductive Germans."
Like many topics treated by student
orators, this subject had previously been covered in the
course.

It was designed to appeal to audiences in small

towns and villages composed of farmers and burghers often
heavily in debt due to the agricultural depression.

The

"interest slavery" speech was also intended to attract
socialists and communists through its radical attack on socalled finance capitalism.

Lastly, this address exploited

traditional religious prejudice against usury especially
prevalent in rural Germany.

There are few descriptions of

these early speeches, but it appears that the students were
expected to perform at length; in one case a four-month
student named Buchner gave a three-hour oration"*^ before a
mixed audience of farmers and socialists in the village of
Traubing.
^®VB, November 13, 1928, p. 3, "Die neuen Reinhardt
Redner."
30

Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 159. Orlow states that
Reinhardt speakers learned only "a set store of speeches,
and some memorized answers for typical questions from the
audience." Though an isolated example, the very length of
Buchner's effort tends to militate against this contention.
Unfortunately, we know the identity of only a handful of
Reinhardt speakers.
This makes it difficult to assess their
performances, since we cannot read a series of reports on
their speeches. Nonetheless, an extant copy of a Reinhardt
course for 1931-32 provides some indications of what was
expected of students. The contents of this course tend to
refute Orlow's contentions on the quality and training of
students.
For a fuller discussion see Appendix B.
Redner."

^1VB, November 13, 1928, p. 3,"Die neuen Reinhardt
No first name is given for Buchner.
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By January, 1928, Reinhardt's students were appear
ing regularly at party meetings.

Participants in the first

course, which began in July, 1928, were ordered to speak at
least eight times between February 1 and March 15 on the
subject of "the expropriation of the farmer."
second course, which began in October,

Those in the

1928, took over the

"interest slavery" speaking assignments and were required
to make ten talks each on this topic by April 1, 19 29.
By March, 1929, the participants in the first two courses
were expected to appear at least once a week; and those in
the third, which began in December, 1928, were beginning to
address public meetings.

33

After four months of training

Reinhardt students became regular party orators available
for addressing small public meetings and rallies.

The value

of this continuing supply of student speakers to Nazi groups
in isolated and sparsely populated areas was considerable.
The best way to understand the role of this new
reservoir of neophyte orators in the growth of the party is
to examine their activities in detail in one area.

The

Oberwesterwald, an almost entirely rural district about
sixty-five miles north-northwest of Frankfurt-am-Main, is
ideal for this purpose.

In 1928, the Nazis received 231 of

13,036 votes cast in the district.

In the only town with

32VB, January 30, 1929, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Redner^Fernschule."
^3VB, March 16, 1929, p. 3, "Nat.= Soz. Redner=
Fernschule."
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over 2,000 inhabitants, Hachenburg, they received 46 of
1,080 votes.

No Nazi local groups existed in the area, and

little if any campaigning had taken place.

The process of

party building did not even begin until June, 1929.

A mere

fifteen months later, the Nazis emerged as the second
largest party in the district only 4 00 votes behind the
predominant Catholic Center party.

On September 14, 1930,

the Nazis polled 3,753 of 15,420 votes in the Oberwesterwald,
and 256 of 1,396 votes in Hachenburg.

Reinhardt's student

speakers played a major role in establishing and then fos
tering the growth of Nazism in this district.

Their work

here was typical of their activities throughout Germany.
The beginnings of the Nazi party in the Oberwester
wald took place in June, 1929, entirely by accident.

In

that month a Nazi named Hammer moved to the area from
Niederschelden bei Siegen/Westphalia.

Hammer immediately

set out to acquaint his new neighbors with the NSDAP.

From

June to September, he conducted a rather haphazard propa
ganda campaign.

A few speakers were recruited, and an SA

march was staged with the help of fourteen of Hammer's
former Storm Trooper associates from Niederschelden.

This

march vividly illustrated the difficulties faced by the new
Nazi organization.

As the SA men trooped through the vil

lage of Winkelbach, they were mistaken for English soldiers.
In short, the Nazis were wholly unknown in the area.
September Hammer's efforts were floundering.

By

His former SA

comrades were unenthusiastic about returning for another
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march.

His most important speaker, a local high school

teacher, had to return to work.

Above all, the Oberwester

wald Nazis lacked any permanent source of orators to do the
initial work of recruiting members and firmly establishing
the party in the district.
On September 15, 1929, Hammer established ties with
Gau Hessen-Nassau-Siid.
from Frankfurt-am-Main.

Regular field men were provided
At first, major speakers such as

Gauleiter Jakob Sprenger addressed Oberwesterwald audiences.
These appearances by party luminaries were designed to get
the new district organization off to a proper start.

By

October, however, the Frankfurt leadership began to grumble
about the expense and time involved in sending speakers to
such an isolated and sparsely populated area.

Furthermore,

Hammer's newly founded organization was in no position to
pay the travel expenses and fees necessary to attract the
party's few professional speakers.

In any case, while the

Nazis were a new and virtually unknown party in the area,
attendance at talks was not large enough to justify utiliz
ing first-line orators.

A year earlier Hammer's organiza

tion might have collapsed, but in October, 1929, the
Frankfurt Gauleitung had Reinhardt's students at its dis
posal.

Hammer was allowed to draw an adequate supply of

neophyte speakers to address Oberwesterwald audiences with
out cost.

The arrival of these men marked the real begin

nings of the establishment of a permanent Nazi presence in
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this district.
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Prom October, 1929, Hammer's organization

expanded rapidly.

Meetings were held regularly, and new mem

bers were recruited from every part of the district.

In a

matter of months five village groups were established.

From

these Ortsgruppen SA and Hitler Youth units were recruited.35
All of these new organizations made it possible for the
NSDAP to increase its support from 1.7 percent to 24 percent
in a mere fifteen months, but without the initial work of re
cruiting and agitation performed by men from Reinhardt's
school, it is unlikely that the Nazis would ever have been able
to establish themselves as a viable political force in this
isolated part of Germany.

Without the readily available sup

ply of speakers provided by the school, the party leadership
would have been unable to furnish any lasting assistance to
Hammer or to men like him in similar areas.
After completion of Reinhardt's course, graduates
were required to make at least thirty speeches over a
36
period of eight months.
Every month they sub
mitted reports on the meetings they addressed stating the
town, the theme of speech, the number in the audience, and
the results.

37

They were officially attached to their Gau

3*H.A. Reel 6, Folder 142, "Kampferlebnisse des Pg.
Hammer," Altenkirchen/Westerwald March 25, 1937. No first
name is given for Hammer.
35Ibid.
3® H .A . Reel 70, Folder 1529, May 1, 1930, Police Report.
37VB, March 16, 1928, p. 3, "Nat.=Soz. Redner=
Fernschule."
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or Bezirk and received speaking assignments from these
38
organizations.
Reinhardt students and graduates were
pledged to be active party workers for at least sixteen
months.

After that time the more able orators could easily

be induced to continue their activities by fees for appear
ances and promises of high positions on the party's local
and district election lists.
By early 1930 the speakers' school had so greatly
expanded the number of available party orators that Rein
hardt was able to initiate saturation campaigns on the
model of Himmler's throughout Germany.

On February 20,

19 30, Reinhardt ordered rallies to be held against the
Young Plan in every town and village; immediately before
the final Reichstag vote on the issue, every Nazi speaker—
including some not connected with the speakers’ school
itself— was to address at least three meetings in as many
days on the subject, "Tear Up the Tribute Plan:
Germany
39
shall Live."
Two other such operations took place later
in the year.

Another campaign against the Young Plan began
40
in early May lasting eight weeks,
and on May 20, 1930,
Reinhardt ordered speakers' school students to attack the
^®VB, January 30, 1929, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Redner - Fernschule."
39H.A. Reel 58, Folder 14 03, "Berichte der
Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politische Lage = Geheim,
19.3.30, Aus der NSDAP."
40H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "ReichspropagandaAbteilung II Anordnung 1, 10 Mai 1930.”
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Schieles agricultural program.

41

Reinhardt's school in less than two years had pro
duced enough new speakers, so that the party could stage
impressive campaigns in all parts of Germany.

By May, 1930,

Reinhardt boasted that twenty-three hundred students had
taken part in the school.
By October, fifteen hundred had
42
graduated.
This represented an increase of five hundred
percent in the number of Nazi orators from the level in
1928.

As early as May, 1930, the Berlin police praesidium

evinced alarm at this rapid increase in the number of Nazi
orators.

It sent a letter to the Munich police asking for

an explanation of how the Nazis were able to produce so
many new speakers.

The Munich police responded to this re-

quest with a description of Reinhardt's program.

43

Long before the Reichstag election the effects of the vast
expansion in the number of Nazi orators was producing con
cern in Berlin.
Reinhardt's speakers played a prominent role in the
national election of 1930.

As Joachim Fest put it,

"The 2,000 to 3,000 graduates of the Nazi
party speakers' school were now thrown into
the fray for marathon sessions . . . .
The
mere appearance of these hordes of preachers
spread the impression of a vast party engaged
^*VB, May 20, 1930, p. 3, "An alle Ortsgruppenleiter."
42H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "ReichspropagandaAbteilung II Anordnung 1, 10 Mai 1930."
4^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, Police Report, May 1,
1930.
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in tireless and overwhelming activity."

44

Fest's estimate of two to three thousand graduates is some
what inflated.

Nevertheless, Reinhardt did release all of

his personnel to the various Gauleiters on the eve of the
election campaign.

Including both students and graduates,

the number may well have approached three thousand.

In any

case, police reports indicate that at least fifteen hundred
Reinhardt speakers were fully trained by the summer of 1930.
These men were ordered to speak at least thirty times each
45
in the Reichstag campaign.
If they all obeyed orders,
they delivered forty-five thousand addresses in a month and
a half.

This was over twice as many speeches as had been

delivered in all of 1928 on behalf of the party.

It seems

unlikely that regional and district leaders failed to use
Reinhardt's men to the full extent during the feverish
election campaign.
from the

It is far more likely that many orators

speakers' school were used to address more than

the recommended thirty meetings.

Thus, the figure of forty-

five thousand speeches is probably a conservative estimate,
especially since it does not take into consideration the
work of students who enrolled in courses after October, 1929.
The intensity of National Socialist campaigning in
1930 is confirmed by a report on party activities from the
Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

"Hardly a day passed on

44Fest, Hitler, p. 276.
45VB, July 23, 1930, p. 3, "An alle R .S .=Teilnehmer."
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which there are not several meetings even in narrowly re46
stricted local areas."
The report goes on to explain
that most of the speakers involved in this campaigning
were products

of

Reinhardt's courses.

These speakers

showed considerable "Rhetorical skill combined with sub
jects carefully chosen to suit the particular audience"
insuring "according to our observation, halls which are
almost invariably overcrowded with enthusiastic lis47

teners."

The Reinhardt speakers' school provided the NSDAP
with a large quantity of trained orators.

It also provided

the Nazis with a large pool of trained manpower to partici
pate in massive campaigns in all parts of Germany at once.
At little if any cost to the party, Reinhardt's innovation
made it possible for the NSDAP to present itself to the
electorate as a dynamic and strong movement.
The Nazi
48
tactic of "perpetual campaigning,"
which convinced so
many Germans that the party was capable of effective action
and thus worth supporting, was largely a product of this
vast expansion of the number of Nazi orators.

For people

disgusted with the indecisiveness of traditional parties,
the very intensity of Nazi political activity acted as a
powerful magnet.

Without the fifteen hundred participants

48Pridham and Noakes (eds.) , Documents, p. 101.
47Ibid.
48Allen, Nazi Seizure of Power, p. 40.
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in the program, the party would have been physically unable
to take advantage of the desire of desperate Germans to
support a strong and decisive movement, because it would
have been unable to create such an impression using its
tiny 192B supply of speakers.
The primary purpose of the speakers' school was to
train new orators, but it also fulfilled a number of secon
dary functions.

Lessons from the program were often used

as party position papers on various issues.

As early as

September, 1929, the school issued major pamphlets concern
ing the city council and communal elections of November and
49
December.
In April, 1930, a lesson on the Young Plan
entitled "Tear-Up the Tribute Plan”
major party pamphlet.

en

was circulated as a

Finally, the lesson dealing with the

Schieles agricultural plan was released for general distribution on May 20, 1930.

This function of the school, to

instruct the membership and supporters in officially ap
proved party positions, was formalized on August 30, 1930.
From that time Reinhardt's students were required to in
struct fellow Nazis on the issues dealt with in their
current lessons and to answer questions from their audi
ences.

The purpose of these "School Evenings" was to give

VB, September 26, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 45,”
VB, December 6, 1929, p. 3, "Rednermaterial."
50VB, April 24, 1930, p. 3,"Neue Massenflugschrift."
^VB,
le i t e r."

May 20, 1930, p. 3,"An alle Ortsgruppen-
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the students experience in addressing a group and "at the
same time spread the National Socialist message to . . .
52
fellow party members."
The Reinhardt courses thus func
tioned as a school for all party members— not just for
those officially enrolled in the instructional program.
A more important secondary function of the speakers'
school was the briefing of Nazi opposition speakers and
hecklers

to disrupt meetings of opponents.

In May, 1929,

when the school was officially recognized as a Reich party
office, a new service to disseminate "speakers' material”
was also founded.

Every Ortsgruppe was required to sub53
scribe to this service at a rate of 5 RM per quarter.

The "speakers' material" consisted mainly of "attack" lit
erature for various election campaigns.

From the middle of

19 30 "speakers' material" dealt with the prominent issues
of the Saxon and Thuringian Landtag elections.

The pur

pose of this propaganda was to familiarize "all party com
rades . . . with the latest lies spread by our enemies
54
against us, so they can counter them."
Members of the
party were expected to use the information to assail op
posing speakers at meetings.

For the Reichstag election

5^H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "ReichspropagandaAbteilung II Anordnung 1, 10 Mai 1930."
53H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda-Abteilung,
6 Mai 1929."
^4VB, July 13/14, 1930, p. 3, "An alle Ortsgruppenleiter."
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campaign a more flexible approach was developed.

Reinhardt

requested that all subscribers provide the school with a
schedule of rival rallies in their areas including towns,
dates, and themes of speeches.

The school would then send

out the appropriate "speakers' material" to each local
group for use against the respective opponents.

Each sub

scriber was urged to do his duty as "as opposition speaker
55
at these rallies."
Party members who acted in this lowly
capacity were encouraged by the speaking material, which
was designed to increase their confidence.

They would now

go to their competitors' rallies armed with a number of set
arguments and some useful data.
chartering this service,

As Himmler commented in

"His knowledge of the material

will make him secure even when faced by the sharpest enemy
56
orator.”
This service was by no means as important as
the training of orators, but it did expand the capacity of
the party for effective campaigning, and it had the effect
of reenforcing the party's image of strength.

The existence

of a cadre of reasonably well prepared opposition speakers
and hecklers meant that every other party in Germany had to
deal with the Nazis at almost all of their rallies.

In

Mein Kampf Hitler had stated that the NSDAP should strive
to convince the public that it was "the only power that
^VB,
Bezieher."

July 23, 1930, p. 3, "An alle Rednermaterial^

^6H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda-Abteilung,
6 Mai 1929."
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anyone reckons with at the moment."
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The activities of

these opposition speakers and hecklers helped to create
exactly that impression.
The Reinhardt speakers' school illustrated the
ability of the party and especially of Himmler to recognize
useful local programs and transform them into national or
ganizations.

Reinhardt's school vastly expanded the capa

city of the NSDAP to campaign and at the same time further
centralized Nazi agitation.

Participants in the courses

and subscribers to the "speakers' material" program were
all provided with the same information and arguments to
present to the public.

This meant, in practice, that the

Nazis were able to present massive and homogeneous cam
paigns that varied hardly at all from one part of Germany
to another.

Reinhardt's school was very useful both in

establishing the National Socialist image of strength and
in reenforcing the party's picture of monolithic solidarity.
The development of the school was consciously fostered by
Himmler, who was always willing to adopt useful programs
initiated by others.

This openness on Himmler*s part was

one of his greatest assets and was not limited to his
support of the Reinhardt school.

^ H itler, Mein Kampf, p. 485.

CHAPTER 6
MODERN METHODS AND RACISM:

BRUNO CZARNOWSKI'S

NATIONAL SOCIALIST SLIDE SERVICE
AND THE FILM AGENCY
Struggle was a central theme of National Socialist
propaganda.

The Nazis tended to divide the world into two

conflicting groups, Aryans and Jews.

This essentially

manichean outlook permeated their propaganda^" and lent
meaning and dignity to the ceaseless campaigning of party
activists.

These dedicated Nazis were able to view them

selves as soldiers locked in mortal combat with the forces
of darkness.

This picture of the party as a crusading

order was necessary for the continued operation of the
political machinery.

It inspired party members to work

hard for the movement; and since most Nazi propaganda work
was carried out by unpaid volunteers, it was essential that
these men remained convinced of the importance of their
strenuous efforts.

This internal need of the party was one

of the major reasons that the NSDAP stressed anti-Semitism.
As Dietrich Orlow put it, "The mythical dichotomy of Jew
^Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 237.
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and German was the basic point of every Nazi speech."

2

The Nazis tended to articulate the theme of struggle
primarily through their anti-Semitism.

For the party

leadership this theme was almost an obsession.

As Pridham

put it, "Hitler’s overriding and consistent passion through3
out his political career was his hatred of the Jews."
Other Nazi leaders and activists tended to follow the
Fiihrer's lead on this issue, and anti-Semitism was espe4
cially prevalent in SA circles.
Even in towns and cities
where there were very few Jews, the NSDAP carried out occa
sional campaigns against them.

Pridham reported that the

Nazis in Hof, a Bavarian town with only twenty-five Jewish
5
families, smashed the windows of the town's synagogue.
In
Allen's small city of Thalburg, where the tiny Jewish popu
lation was integrated with the German populace on class
lines, the party's anti-Semitism was retained in a "ritu
alistic way."

Anti-Semitism was overt and ideological for
7
members of the party.
For the public at large this Nazi doctrine was only
one among many.

These voters were often more concerned with

20rlow, Nazi Party, p. 3.
3
Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 237.
4Ibid,, p. 238.
5Ibid., p. 241.
6Allen, Nazi Seizure of Power, p. 77.
7Pridham, Hitler1s Rise, p. 237.
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economic issues or fear of Marxist revolution.

Nazi cam

paigning tended to be opportunistic; thus in areas where
anti-Semitism had little appeal the party tended to deemphasize it.

8

Nevertheless, even when dealing with other

problems, the National Socialists usually introduced an antiSemitic note.

The plight of the middle class was often
9
blamed on Jewish department stores,
and Marxism was almost
always equated with the Jews through "such Nazi terminology
as 'Jewish Bolshevism.'"^®

In terms of general Nazi propa

ganda the Jew fulfilled the role of an omnipresent devil
figure.

As Joachim Fest commented,

"the Jew [was] the in

carnation of all imaginable vices and dreads, the cause and
its opposite, the thesis and the antithesis, literally 'to
blame for everything.'"^*

For the NSDAP the Jews were the

concrete embodiment of the hidden manipulators that caused
all of Germany's problems.

Faced with hard times in the

late twenties, millions of Germans wanted to blame their
suffering on someone.

It is questionable whether the Nazis

convinced the public that the Jews were responsible for
Germany's woes.

Nevertheless, one part of the Nazi message

was clear; the NSDAP would struggle ruthlessly against the
8Ibid., pp. 240-42 and Allen, Nazi Seizure of
Power, p. 77.
^Pridham, Hitler *s Rise, pp. 238-41.
10Ibid., p. 238.
11Fest, Hitler, p. 211.
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secret forces that were causing Germany's troubles.
Anti-Semitic propaganda was important to maintain
the dynamism of the party and to convince the public that the
Nazis would destroy those causing Germany's difficulties.
For the Nazi leadership the Jews were an obsession.

As

Hitler put it, "Was there any form of filth or profligacy
. . . without at least one Jew involved in it?

If you cut

even cautiously into such an abscess, you found, like a
maggot in a rotting body, often dazzled by the sudden
light— a kike."

12

The only question on this issue was how

best to communicate anti-Semitic ideas to party members and
the general populace.
The Nazis used traditional methods to spread their
racial and anti-Semitic ideas from the earliest days of the
party.

National Socialist newspapers and pamphlets contin

ually attacked the Jews both in writing and in pictures,
while Nazi speakers spent much of their time exposing the
"Jewish world-conspiracy" to their audiences.

Unfortu

nately, both of these techniques suffered serious defi
ciencies. The advantage of printed material in dealing with
the Jewish question was that it could communicate racial
stereotypes visually, the anti-Semitic cartoon being one
of the most effective techniques in this respect.

The

cartoons in Julius Streicher's Niirnberg newspaper, Der
Stttrmer, were noteworthy for their ability to combine antil^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 57.
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Semitism and pornography, but the most successful efforts
of this sort were probably those produced by Mjolnir for
Goebbels* Berlin publication, Der Angriff.

The problem

with this visual approach was that very few people read
National Socialist newspapers.

As Hitler put it, "Only a

man who has already been won to the movement will steadily
read the party organ." 13

As a means of presenting the

party's message, written material had at best a low impact.
The Nazis understood this, and consistently emphasized the
spoken over the written word in their efforts to win public
support.

As anti-Semitic

propaganda, however, speeches

lacked the persuasiveness of pictures.
The lack of visual appeal in anti-Semitic speeches
was a serious matter to the Nazis.

In Mein Kampf Hitler said

that he had begun to become an anti-Semite through ob14
serving Jews in Vienna.
Nazi racism stressed the physical
^ Ibid., pp. 477-78.
^ Ibid., pp. 55-58. The origin of Hitler's antiSemitism is a matter of considerable debate.
Eberhard
Jackel concludes that Hitler's anti-Semitism antedated
World War I. "It appears to be quite credible . . . that,
as he was to write later, he had become an antisemite . . .
during his years in Vienna.” Eberhard Jackel, Hitler1s
Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power trans.Herbert Arnold
{Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan U.P., 1972) pp. 48-49.
Rudolf Binion, on the other hand, disputes this conclusion
and asserts that Hitler's virulent anti-Semitism dated back
only to 1918. The History of Childhood Quarterly: The
Journal of Psychohistory, Fall, 1973, Vol. I, No. 2,
Rudolf Binion "Hitler's Concept of Lebensraum: The Psycho
logical Basis."
In any case by the time Hitler wrote Mein
Kampf, he considered "Jewish physical characteristics*1
sufficiently striking to mention them as one of the causes
of his conversion to anti-Semitism.
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differences between Jews and Aryans. 15

Hitler character

ized Jews as dirty, stinking,^ “bow-legged, repulsive
17
Jewish bastards."
MjQlnir invariably caricatured his
targets by giving them gargantuan noses and little beady
eyes.

One of the lessons in the Reinhardt speakers' course

consisted of a description of the different physical char
acteristics of the various races, so that students could
18
recognize Jews and Aryans alike by their appearance.
The
problem for the Nazis was how to combine the visual effec
tiveness of printed material with the popular appeal of the
spoken word in presenting this issue.
The first serious attempt to solve this difficulty
began as a regional project in Gau Halle-Merseburg.

On

July 4, 1928, the Gauleitung announced the establishment of
a slide service under the direction of Bruno Czarnowski, a
19
regular party speaker from Aschersleben.
The Munich
leadership evidently thought the program was promising from
the first and tried to promote it through regular reports
20

on slide shows in the Volkischer Beobachter.

On July 19,

ISpridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 237-38.
16Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 57.
^ Ibid. , p. 412.
.A. Reel 14, Folder 274, " R e d n e r k u r s p p . 42-46.
19VB, July 4, 1929, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg."
For Czarnowski see Appendix A.
^^e.g. VB, August 7, 1928, p. 3, "Unsere Arbeit*Im
Kreise Aschersleben" and VB, August 24, 1928, p. 3, "Tagungsarbeit in Falkenberg."
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Czarnowski's service was placed at the disposal of all Nazi
21

Gaus and Ortsgruppen.

By mid-November, Himmler asked all

Ortsgruppen to work through the new agency and use it as
frequently as possible.

22

The major breakthrough for

Czarnowski's endeavor came on January 24, 1929, when
Himmler officially adopted it on behalf of the propaganda
23
section as "a worthwhile project for 1929."
From that
time periodic announcements of new slide programs were made
by the propaganda section in all official party newspapers.
The Czarnowski service performed two important
functions for the NSDAP.

It developed new shows, and it

coordinated the distribution of slides and equipment.

The

greatest difficulty facing the early service was obtaining
enough projectors and screens to allow all the local groups
that wanted to stage shows to do so.

Initially, Czarnowski

asked those who had these devices to contact him, so that
they could be utilized; his office acted as a referral agency
to bring the owners of needed equipment together with those
24
who wished to use it.
In addition, the service had some
equipment which it rented to local groups for a fee of
2^VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Anhalt."
22VB, November 14, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistischer Lichtbilderdienst."
2^VB, January 24, 1929, p. 3, "Das Lichtbild im
Dienste der Bewegung."
24H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, No title— presumably
a brief police report, origin unknown, date unknown— first
page missing.
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25

Presumably private owners were also allowed to

charge small fees.
This rather informal system broke down almost at
once.

Demand for slide equipment greatly exceeded supply.

The problem was finally resolved by Himmler in January,
1929.

The propaganda leader commented at the time, that

"the utility of the slide show as a propaganda vehicle was
already established, but many groups were finding it difficult to obtain the necessary equipment." 2 6

To solve this

problem he ordered all Gaus and Ortsgruppen that possessed
the needed projectors and screens to contact Czarnowski,
so that schedules could be set up for their use.

All Gaus

and Ortsgruppen that did not own such devices were urged to
27
obtain them.
This order overcame the initial problems
caused by the rapid expansion of the use of slide shows.
These difficulties did not recur mainly for two reasons.
First, Himmler's order gave Czarnowski access to enough
slide projectors and screens to meet immediate demand; and
secondly, many regional and local groups apparently fol
lowed Himmler's suggestion and purchased their own equip
ment.

The reason many Nazi groups undertook this expense

was put quite clearly in an article in the party paper
about the service.

"With the slide apparatus the smallest

25VB, July 4, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg."
2®VB, January 24, 1929, p. 3, "Das Lichtbild im
Dienste der Bewegung."
27Ibid.
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village can put on a great show.

Slide performances easily

28
pay for themselves by charging admission.’*

Slide shows

were apparently both a propagandistic and a financial suc
cess and in no way a drain on the party's meager monetary
resources.
The other major duty of Czarnowski's office was to
prepare new slide programs.

The service asked party mem

bers to forward black and white photographs and sketches
29
that could be useful;
it also made slides from pictures
and cartoons taken out of newspapers and from drawings sub30
mitted by party men.
From this motley collection of
illustrations the service produced a large number of shows
in the years after 1928.

The overwhelming majority of

these presentations tried to impart the party's antiSemitic attitudes to the public and emphasized the struggle
of the NSDAP against the hidden "wire pullers" who were
wrecking Germany.

The following are examples of slide

shows on these themes:
"Isidor,” "The Great Power of the
31
32
Press,"
"Racial Knowledge,"
"The Blood-Drunk
2®VB, August 29, 1930, p. 3, "Lichtbild=Dienst der
N.S.D.A.P.”
29VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg."
3°H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Berichte uber die
Versammlung der NSDAP, Ortsgruppe Giesing und Au am 2.6.
1930 in Miinchen."
^ T h e Nazis invariably emphasized the role of the
Ullstein chain (Jewish) as an example of Jewish control of
the press. For descriptions of these two slide shows see
VB, January 24, 1929, p. 3, "Das Lichtbild im Dienste der
Bewegung."
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33
34
Bolsheviks,”
"The Murderers of the Workers”
and
"Characteristic Heads in the November Germany:
Would You
35
Vote for Them Again."
The other type of show produced
by Czarnowski recounted high points in Nazi history, again
emphasizing the party’s conflicts with its enemies.

Such

programs included "November 9, 1923" and "Up to Nurnberg.”36
The choice of two principal subjects for all of the party's
slide shows was not an accident,

for the service sought to

convince audiences of the validity of the party's manichean
theory of history.

For members of the NSDAP it dramat

ically presented the "depraved and wicked" Jews pictorially
while using the same approach to emphasize the heroic char
acter of the Nazi party as the defender of the race against
this dire Semitic threat.
anti-Semites, perhaps

For those who were not convinced

the most impressive message of the

Nazi slide shows was their portrayal of the party as the
uncompromising foe of established authority.

The general

public might not accept the National Socialist theory that
the men behind the scenes causing Germany's problems were
all Jews; nonetheless, many could easily be convinced that
32VB, March 31, 1929, p. 3, 11Propaganda-Abteilung."
33H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Berichte iiber die
Versammlung der NSDAP Ortsgruppe Giesing und Au am 2.6.1930
in Mfinchen."
34VB, July 19, 1928, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg."
35VB, August 29, 1930, p. 3, "Lichbild-Dienst der
N.S.D.A.P.”
36VB, March 31, 1929, p. 3, "Propaganda-Abteilung."
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there were such hidden manipulators.

For these Germans the

message of the slides was that the NSDAP would fearlessly
fight the secret corrupters whomever they might be.
These slide shows have not been preserved, but it
is possible to examine this Nazi propaganda technique on
the basis of police reports and by inference.
major program of slides was entitled "Isidor."

The first
No police

report describing this effort is available, but it is fairly
obvious what the show was about.

"Isidor" was the Nazi

nickname for Dr. Bernhard Weiss, vice-president of the
Berlin police department.

Soon after his arrival in Berlin,

Goebbels was in trouble with the local authorities; his
aggressive tactics caused one riot after another.

The

police responded by prohibiting the NSDAP for a brief
period of time, an act that enraged the new Gauleiter.

In

response to the ban, Goebbels decided to attack the Berlin
police by staging a scurrilous campaign against Dr. Weiss.
Weiss was a Jew, and his position of authority over gen
tiles made him a ready target for Nazi abuse.

The party

even took advantage of the fact that he was only vicepresident of the city's police.

In Goebbels' eyes Weiss

was a prime example of the "hidden” Jew, the "wire puller"
who controlled things from a technically subordinate posi
tion.

Weiss' superior was portrayed as little more than a

figurehead

behind whom the "hidden" Jew controlled the

situation.

Physically Weiss was also easy to caricature;

he had a pointed nose, small eyes and wore horn-rimmed
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glasses.

The campaign against Weiss continued from 1927

until mid-1929 without any appreciable slackening.

The

high point of this effort was a series of cartoons drawn
by Mjolnir.'*7
The "Isidor" slide show of early 1929 was almost
certainly a showcase for Mjolnir’s sketches.

These car

toons were especially effective, and it is unlikely that
Czarnowski failed to use them in a show dealing specifi
cally with the police vice-president.

"Isidor," the

11hidden" Jew, was relevant both for party members and for
the general populace not merely for those who had to deal
with him in Berlin.

The slide show technique enabled the

party to present fine examples of this type of Nazi antiSemitic propaganda to a far broader audience than was
reached by Goebbels* newspaper.
Some specimens of Mjolnirfs work can serve to re
capture the character of this major slide show which
Himmler approvingly described as "especially coarse."

37

38

Bramsted, Goebbels, p. 36.

^®VB, January 24, 1929, p. 3, "Das Lichtbild im
Dienste der Bewegung."
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Cartoon Number One:
Caption:

Der Angriff, December 5, 1927, n.p.
Top:

"The New Nero."

Bottom:

"'Bernhard' mainly only plays
thankless roles."

Nazi at Stake:

"Greetings, you hideous one."

Cartoon number one established the physical images used in
the MjSlnir series.

Weiss' nose, his "beady eyes" and his

horn-rimmed glasses were accentuated.

He was depicted as

physically repulsive and morally degenerate.

The contrast

between Weiss and the police, dressed as Roman soldiers,
was striking.

The police were seen as straight-backed,

racially superior types in the service of a depraved in
ferior.

This was an attempt to establish the parallel be

tween Weiss and Nero.

The Nazi tied to the stake
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symbolized the character and plight of the NSDAP under the
Weimar Republic.

He was depicted as a well muscled, tall,

Aryan type unwilling to obey the likes of "Isidor” even
under coercion.

He suffered torture with a smile on his

face and openly defied Weiss by saying "Greetings, you
39
hideous one."
The attempt here was to portray the party
as a dedicated movement of superior and high-minded men
willing to suffer martyrdom rather than yield their beliefs.
Note the contrast between the bound Nazi and the standardbearer, Heimannsberg, who was a high-ranking professional
policeman.

Although the Nazi appeared happy even while

suffering, Heimannsberg, who is holding up a star of David,
looked ashamed of his role in this scene.

The principal

appeal of this cartoon was visual as with most of MjSlnir's
work.

The captions were of only secondary interest, and in

this case the bottom caption, "'Bernhard' mainly plays only
40
thankless roles,”
was a simple attempt at sardonic humor.

39

Ner o ."

Der Angriff, December 5, 1927, n.p.

"Der neue
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Cartoon Number Two:

Der Angriff, December 26, 1927, n.p.

Caption:

Top:

Record Player:

"Isidor, if he were to
celebrate Christmas."
"Daughter of Zion Rejoice."

Cartoon number two was an attempt to exploit religious
bias against Judaism.

"Isidor," the Jew, was depicted

celebrating Christmas in his own manner; his tree had a
star of David on its top, and it was decorated with
hanged Nazis, sacrificed to the Jewish police vicepresident.

A loyal Berlin policeman, depicted as a blood

hound, stood up on his back legs and awaited further com
mands from his master.

On the wall a portrait of Weiss

was suspended beneath which were two crossed blackjacks,

"Isidor*s" coat of arms.

The picture symbolized the Nazi

belief that all Jews were egocentric and only really be
lieved in themselves and their own race.

The record playe

was rendering an appropriate seasonal piece, "Daughter of
„41
Zion Rejoice."
■

■

Cartoon Number Three:
Caption:

Der Angriff, January 16, 192 8, n.p.

"In the well known hospital of 'St.
Bernhard' true Bernhardines bring in
new sacrifices daily."

Cartoon number three did an admirable job of capturing the
crusading spirit of Nazi anti-Semitism.

This idea was

developed through the persistent theme of martyrdom.

The

caption read, "In the well-known hospital of 'St. Bernhard
41Der Angriff, December 26, 1927, n.p., "Isidor,
wenn er das Christfest feiern wttrde."
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true Bernhardines bring in new sacrifices daily."

42

For

dedicated Nazis who would be looking for such a meaning,
this may have been taken as a subtle reference to Jewish
ritual murders, a continuing theme of Nazi propaganda.

In

any case several other elements of this cartoon are quite
clear.

A picture of "Isidor" was prominently displayed

between St. and Bernhard on the hospital wall; this was
another allusion to Jewish egotism.

The pious monks all

had long noses, and the "hospital" was a jail complete with
one victim sticking his hand out between the bars trying
to escape.

The Berlin police again were portrayed as

bloodhounds in the service of depravity.

The latest Nazi

"sacrifice" was a strong, young man delivered into the
hands of his inferiors.
The "Isidor" series attempted to create racial and
moral stereotypes of Jews and Nazis in the context of an
attack on the "hidden" Jew.

In this show Weiss was de

picted as representative of all Jews and of the "secret
wire pullers" who controlled Germany's destiny according
to the Nazis.

This method of presenting general themes

through attacks on individuals was one of the commonest
tactics of Nazi propagandists.

It was employed in other

slide shows especially those which communicated the party's
position on Marxism.
42Per Angriff, January 16, 1928, n.p., "Ins
bekannte Hospital zum 'St. Bernhard.'"
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The 1930 slide show, "The Blood-Drunk Bolsheviks'**^
provides a good example of how the NSDAP sought to portray
Marxism as a movement controlled by the secret enemy, the
Jews.

The show began with a series of photographs and

drawings of the leaders of the Russian Revolution.

This

was followed by pictures of mass murder, of slaughtered
men and their wives, and of butchered women, girls, and
babies.

The pictures of the Russian revolutionary leaders

were shown again, interspersed with the atrocity scenes.
Toward the end of the program pictures were presented of
German soldiers in the Baltic States being murdered.

The

performance concluded with a series of portraits of the
leaders of the German revolution.

As the police report

described this effort, "The show emphasized the Jewish
44
character of the revolutionaries."
With these slides the Nazis sought to convince
their audiences that Marxism and especially Communism were
part of a blood-stained Jewish plot.

The method was to mix

various images and finally drive home the point in the last
minutes of the presentation.

At least in the case of the

German revolutionaries, this was a fine example of the Nazi
technique of establishing guilt by association.

The show

began and ended in the same manner with pictures of revolu*3H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Berichte ttber die
Versammlung der N.S.D.A.P., Ortsgruppe Giesing und Au am
2.6.1930 im Mttnchen." Police report dated June 5, 1930.
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tionary leaders.

The atrocity scenes in the middle of the

performance created the impression that the Russian revolu
tionaries were blood-drunk monsters.

The pictures of the

German revolutionaries at the end of the performance at
tempted to draw parallels between the two groups.

The most

striking parallel was obviously that both consisted almost
entirely of Jews.

This technique was skillfully designed

to convince audiences that Communism and more broadly
Marxism were essentially Jewish movements.

Nazi opposition

to Marxism then could be explained as part of the party's
anti-Semitic crusade and not merely as the product of dif
fering ideas.
Both the theme of the "hidden" Jew presented in
"Isidor" and the show castigating Marxism had one thing in
common; they emphasized individuals.

The basic National

Socialist message was in the way the pictures portrayed
Nazis, men like Weiss, and the various revolutionaries.
45
This was a typical method used by the party
and deserves
some discussion.
racism.

A basic element of Nazi ideology was

Thus, the NSDAP believed in distinct physical and

moral differences between the races.

The physical differ

ences could best be portrayed by dealing with individuals
often in caricature.

"Jewish" noses, eyes, legs and shapes

could be most effectively communicated to party members
and the public by the use of carefully selected pictures
45 Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 22.
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and drawings.

The intention here and elsewhere in National

Socialist propaganda was to present Jews as alien beings.
By accentuating physical differences between Jews and gen
tiles, the Nazis sought to establish their point that
Judaism was not a religion but a vast conspiracy of de
praved, sub-human animals masquerading behind innumerable
facades.

This approach tended to reenforce the crusading

zeal of party members by exposing the enemy to plain view.
Yet, the effect of this type of propaganda on those who
were not primarily interested in the party because of its
anti-Semitism was probably quite different.

In small towns

and villages where there were few if any Jews, the specifi
cally anti-Semitic message of these shows might well have
been lost.

The Jewish enemies portrayed in slides most

likely were lumped together in the minds of such audiences
with others who

they thought constituted the shadowy hidden

rulers of Germany.

For the public at large facing a series

of seemingly insoluble and incomprehensible political and
economic problems, the notion that a small group wielding
enormous covert power was causing all of Germany's troubles
must have been consoling.

The very simplicity of this

message was appealing, since hidden, alien enemies could be
destroyed.

These slide shows might not elicit any overt

anti-Semitic responses from such persons, but they were
nonetheless effective.

Local, well-known Jews would pro

bably not be identified by such audiences with men like
Weiss or the revolutionaries, but the Nazi message that
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the party would struggle ceaselessly against Germany's
hidden enemies would retain its appeal.
By the middle of 1930 the Czarnowski slide service
seems to have been a success.

At least, eight programs

were developed between 1928 and 1930.

Enough Gaus and

Ortsgruppen had obtained equipment, so that the shortages
of early 1929 did not recur.

By the summer of 1930,

<±small

group of Nazi agitators were traveling around Germany pre
senting shows.

One such agitator was Richard Buyard, who

spent his weekends screening slides from town to town.

46

This type of work seems to have been amply supplemented by
local groups staging shows on their own initiative.

By the

time of the 1930 Reichstag election, the slide presentations
were an established and popular form of Nazi propaganda.
Unfortunately, the central records of the Czarnowski
service are not available.

This absence of documentation

makes it impossible to determine the number, dates, or
locations of slide show performances.

The evidence is in

sufficient to draw meaningful conclusions about the impact
of slide shows on various parts of Germany; but, though
scanty, it does indicate that they were both well attended
47
and well received.
In any event they were used frequently
46H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, Police Report dated
June 17, 1930 and "Stadtrat Kitzingen 7 August 1930 NSDAP
hier Buyard-VortrSge."
4^H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Berichte iiber die
Versammlung der NSDAP; Ortsgruppe Giesing und Au am 2.6.19 30
in Miinchen," and Police report dated June 17, 19 30, and
"Stadtrat Kitzingen 7 August 1930 NSDAP hier Buyard-VortrSge
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by the Nazis as a propaganda tool after 1928.

In villages

and small towns such performances were likely to attract
large audiences simply as entertainment.

In larger towns

and cities shows would be welcome as a diversion from the
more usual round of speeches that tended to dominate Nazi
activities in urban areas.

In Mein Kampf Hitler stated

that the principal function of propaganda "consists in
48
attracting the attention of the crowd.”
Slide shows were
one effective way for the Nazis to do just that.
The development of the motion picture as a form of
National Socialist propaganda was slower than the growth
of the slide service.

Films were not a regular part of the

party's campaigning repertoire until the middle of 1929,
and even then there were only three Nazi movies.

The

motion picture was a mildly useful but expensive form of
propaganda.

Films cost a great deal to make and then it

was difficult to show them.

The propaganda section could

reasonably ask all Nazi Ortsgruppen that did not possess
slide projectors and screens to purchase them, but motion
picture equipment was entirely too costly.

The Czarnowski

slide shows were rented to local groups for between 6.5 and
49
10 RM a performance.
Rentals on films averaged 40 RM per
50
showing.
In addition to the cost of the film, a local
JQ

Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 180.
^ V B , March 31, 1929, p. 3, "Propaganda-Abteilung."
^°H.A. Reel 9, Folder 190, "Anordnung 64 Oberbayern,
15 Juli 1930."
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group would have to rent a movie house and pay a projec
tionist.

The motion picture as a propaganda vehicle could

not be used extensively at this stage of Nazi development.
Nonetheless, a few silent films were produced between 1928
and 1930.
The films made during the late twenties all at
tempted to depict the growth and strength of the party.
They generally tried to capture the spirit of the movement
by showing major Nazi rallies and marches.

The earliest

Nazi film was paid for by the Reich leadership and appeared
in 1928.

It was a thirty-minute account of the Niirnberg

party rally of 1927, and consisted mainly of footage showing
columns of brown-shirted Storm Troopers marching by Hitler
and other party leaders.

This movie

in the saturation campaigns of 1929.

was used by Himmler
51

The goal here was

to project an image of the party's vitality.

Later, a

ninety-minute film was made about the Niirnberg rally of
1929.

Like its predecessor, it exhibited a great deal of

marching, but it also provided footage of the torchlight
parade and the huge fireworks display of that year.

The

intent of this film was the same as the earlier movie.

It

recorded a major party event and hoped to impress the public
with Nazi strength.
Other films made in the late twenties were produced
as Gau projects.

Most of them were modeled after the movies

^ S e e Chapter 4, pp. 104-105.
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of the Niirnberg rallies.

Gau Halle-Merseburg released a

film on July 11, 1929 entitled, "Struggle in Middle Germany
52
For Freedom and Bread,"
which depicted party activities
in this area.

Gau Hessen-Nassau-Siid undertook a similar

project in 1930.

This movie, "Adolf Hitler leads our
53
Columns to a better Future,"
was banned by the Reich and
Prussian ministries of the Interior on the grounds that it
tended to subvert public order.

cession staged on Whitsunday,
through the Wetzlar district.

It depicted a Nazi pro

1930 from Frankfurt-am-Main
SA men in uniforms were shown

boarding lorries in Frankfurt and marching in larae groups
through various towns and villages.

The film ended with

some scenes of a large SA rally in Wetzlar addressed by
^
54
various leaders.
These Gau productions served two purposes.

They

encouraged Nazis in their own region by recording major
local events for posterity.

Party members could be proud of

the fact that National Socialism was strong enough in their
area for them to undertake such a task.
proud

of

They could also be

their activities because such films would be shown

in other parts of Germany before party audiences.

The Gau

leadership was in effect telling its members that their work
52V B , July 11, 1929, p . 3,"Bin neuer nationalsozialistischer Film."
53H.A. Reel 28, Folder 535, "So kaempften wir" von
Adalbert Gimbel.
54Ibid.

would be admired by fellow Nazis everywhere.

Secondly,

this type of film was designed to attract followers who
might otherwise be too timid to join the NSDAP.

The por

trayal of National Socialism as a dynamic, mass movement
was designed to convince the timid that joining the party
or at least supporting it was not a futile gesture.

In

this respect the local and national films both served to
eradicate the widespread impression that the NSDAP was an
impotent and tiny faction— one of the most difficult tasks
faced by the party between 1928 and 1930.

Aside from

boosting internal morale and persuading timid supporters
of the party's strength, the early Gau and Reich films pro
bably accomplished very little.

They did not present any

of the party's more complex propaganda themes or attempt
directly to persuade audiences of the correctness of Nazism
They had very little plot and were unlikely to attract nonNazi audiences, since for those not involved in party work
these efforts would simply be boring.

In any case there is

little evidence to indicate that the Gau films were widely
distributed.

As morale builders these films were admirable

As vehicles to convince others to support the NSDAP, they
seem to have been of small value.
Most Nazi films made in the late twenties seem to
have been aimed mainly at party audiences, but the Nazis
did produce one that seems to have been designed to per
suade the general public to support the party.
Berlin Gau film, entitled,

The first

"Battle in Berlin" was produced
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by Goebbels, and unlike its counterparts from other Gaus,
it attempted to use a number of Nazi propaganda themes.
The first part of this movie showed wandering Galician Jews
on Berlin's KurfUrstendamm Strasse; their peculiar dress
and long beards served to differentiate them from the rest
of the populace.

In this manner Goebbels sought to portray

the degradation of the German people and at the same time
identify the Jewish culprits in this tragedy.

The film

went on to depict the history of the Berlin SA with empha
sis on incidents of violence.
of battles with Communists.

The SA was shown in a number
These fights were probably

staged for the cameras, but it is unknown whether Goebbels
used SA men to provoke actual fights or merely reenacted
previous skirmishes for filming purposes.5^
Goebbels' production marked the beginning of the
Nazi effort to use movies to present complex propaganda
themes.

The opening scene with the Galician Jews was a

fine example of the Nazi visual approach to anti-Semitism.
The street fights and history of the development of the
Berlin SA had little to do with Galician Jews, but the
opening served to identify the enemy and to explain to the
audiences that Communists and Socialists who fought the
Nazis were nothing more than the unknowing pawns of the
Jews.

The fight scenes themselves were a new development

55H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Nat. Soz. Propagandafilm, Mtinchen, 14 Oktober 1929, Polizeidirektion."
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in Nazi film making.

The marches and rallies presented in

other movies were one way of impressing
party's strength and determination.

audiences with the

Fights# on the other

hand# were convincing displays of Nazi aggressiveness and
courage.

The film "Battle in Berlin" was the first National

Socialist movie fully to exploit the party's emphasis on
violence as a means of persuading the masses to support
the NSDAP.

In addition# Goebbels departed from the docu

mentary approach to film making and actually staged events
to increase the effectiveness of his work as a propaganda
vehicle.
"Battle in Berlin" enjoyed far more success than
other Gau movies.

By December# 1929, sixty local groups

had shown it to audiences totaling— according to the Nazis—
56
thirty thousand.
Two subsequent films were produced in
Berlin before the national elections of 1930.

One, en

titled "Germany Awakened#" depicted the Berlin SA at the
1929 Niirnberg rally, the SA working in the 1929 city elec
tions, and finally the storm troopers in combat against
57
"red mobs."
The other film from Berlin was a fifteenminute feature that concentrated upon showing scenes of the
58
burial and grave site of Horst Wessel,
an SA man killed
by a Communist.

This short subject was part of Goebbels'

^6VB# December 8/9, 1929, p. 3, "2 Berliner N.S. Film."
57Ibid.
58VB, July 20/21# 1930, p. 3, "N.S. = Filme."
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successful campaign to make Hessel into a party martyr.
A total of eight Nazi films were produced between
1928 and 1930.

Aside from Geobbels* efforts, all of these

movies seem to have been designed primarily for internal
party consumption.

Only the films of the Niirnberg rallies

of 1927 and 1929 and Goebbels'

"Battle in Berlin" appear

to have been widely distributed.

Over all, the impact of

this type of campaigning on the general public seems to have
been minor.
Nonetheless, by the middle of 1930 a sufficient
number of films existed to justify the creation of a party
agency for their distribution under the supervision of the
59
propaganda section.
Fdlms were sent to the various Gaus
one at a time for distribution.

The Gauleiters then con

tacted their district leaders, who attempted to arrange
showings in seven different towns and forwarded the fees
60
for these screenings to the Gauleitung.
By 1930 the Nazi
film was an established if limited form of National
Socialist propaganda.

H .A . Reel 9, Folder 190, "Anordnung 64 Oberbayern
15 Juli 19 30." The VQlkischer Beobachter announcement of
July 20/21, 1930 *'N.S.= Filme” is the earliest announcement
by the Reichsfilmstelle der Reichspropagandaleitung. Rein
hardt’s "Anordnung 64" on the distribution of films also
dates from July, 1930.
The author suspects that this agency
was created about this time.
Goebbels became head of the
propaganda section on April 27, 1930.
His experience with
film making in Berlin suggests that he would create such an
agency.
Himmler, on the other hand, showed very little in
terest in the development of Nazi movies, concentrating in
stead on slide shows.
Dietrich Orlow contends that the
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The contrast between the apparent usefulness of
slide shows as a campaigning tool and the seemingly limited
value of Nazi movies in recruiting supporters requires some
discussion.

Slide shows were more effective, in large part

because they were cheaper than movies; local groups could
use slides more frequently.

Yet, the real contrast between

these two propaganda techniques was in presentation.

Movies

were designed for an audience to sit and watch; there was
no way of heightening the impact of the silent images on the
screen with oral commentary.

If a speech was presented, it

occurred after the screening of the film.

With the slide

show no such separation of words and pictures occurred.

As

the pictures were shown, the speaker explained their mean
ing to his audience.

Images and words were presented simul

taneously increasing the impact of both.

This was the pri

mary advantage of the slide show over the silent movie as a
method of attracting followers to the party.

(continued) film service was founded in November,
1928.
He further states that local groups were ordered to
purchase projectors.
Orlow, Nazi Party, pp. 160-161.
In
this section of his book Orlow seems to be confusing the
slide service which he fails to mention with the film ser
vice.
The author has found no evidence to support Orlow*s
statements and considers it highly improbable that the
party leadership would order its Ortsgruppen to purchase
motion picture projectors.
These projectors even for 16 m.m.
movies were very expensive and in November, 1928 only one
Nazi propaganda film existed.

CHAPTER 7
REGIONAL PROGRAMS:

REINHOLD MUCHOW AND

THE STREET CELL ORGANIZATION/
THE N. S. AUTO CLUBS
Nazi programs and tactics were often developed or
officially adopted by the party's national leaders as in
the cases

of

Himmler's saturation campaigns,

Reinhardt's speakers' school and Czarnowski's slide ser
vice*

Other effective innovations were first initiated by

various Gaus and later copied by other party units without
any official policy decision by the Reich leadership.

In

ternally the NSDAP tended to function as a large club.
Ready communication existed among its leaders, and whenever
a useful regional stratagem was developed, party chieftains
from all parts of Germany became acquainted with it almost
at once.

Such programs were discussed at leadership con

ferences and by traveling speakers in conversations with
their hosts.

More formally, these programs were described

in the party's newspapers.

In Mein Kampf Hitler described

these organs as "a running news service— of . . . [thel
movement,"1 and one of their principal functions was to
^-Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 478.
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print ’’news of the Party activities."

2

In practice, this

meant that successful regional experiments were rapidly
transformed into national programs often by direct orders
from the Reich leadership, but occasionally simply by
various Nazi Gauleiters copying them.

Two examples of

successful regional organizations adopted elsewhere

were

the Muchow Street Cell Organization and the National
Socialist Auto Clubs.
The Muchow Street Cell Organization was founded on
July 9, 1928

3

as a special project to expand the party's

capacity for campaigning in Berlin.

The idea was to divide

the city into sections and to work them intensively using
party members to spread National Socialist propaganda.

The

device was created by Reinhold Muchcw and was copied from
similar Communist tactics that had been reasonably success4
ful in working class districts.
Muchow headed Gau Berlin's
organization section, which was in charge of developing "a
unified program for Berlin's sections" and of setting up
5
appropriate "organizational forms"
for this purpose.
From
2Roland V. Layton, "The Vdlkischer Beobachter, 192 5193 3; A Study of the Nazi Newspaper in the Kampfzeit" (Uni
versity of Virginia: unpublished doctoral dissertation,
1965) p. 111.
Berlin:

^Der Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p. "Kampf um
Die Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
^Heiber, Goebbels, p. 80.

^Der Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p. "Kampf um
Berlin:
Die Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
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his position as city organization chief, Muchow was able to
deal with the peculiar problems of urban campaigning.
Before 1928 Nazi city organizations did little to
exploit the potential of common members as active propa
gandists.

The rank and file were expected to attend meet

ings and informally to discuss the NSDAP with friends and
neighbors; but aside from these minor duties, they played
little part in the party's propaganda efforts.

Most cam

paigning was conducted by professional or semi-professional
Nazi agitators.

This tended to restrict activities, since

the party had a strictly limited number of regular agita
tors.

These men were used primarily to organize party

activities, to make speeches, and to write pamphlets or
newspaper articles.

There were not enough of them to con

duct personal campaigning, and in any case they were in
appropriate for the task.

This left the bulk of what the

Nazis referred to as "small work" to the SA, but the storm
troopers had other jobs, such as guarding meetings and
staging marches, better suited to a paramilitary organiza
tion.

Thus, the NSDAP was not able to conduct sustained

house-to-house "small work."

The failure to use ordinary

party members for this purpose was a waste of manpower, and
the relative inactivity of party men also violated the prin
ciple that all National Socialists should be fully involved
in expanding the movement.

Ideological reasons for this

aside such activism tended to raise morale; and it also
helped to establish the impression that the NSDAP was a
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participatory movement in which anyone could play an im
portant role.

Yet party leaders had been unable to find an

effective means of using ordinary Nazis as active propa
gandists.

Muchow overcame this difficulty with his street

cells.
The Muchow system divided cities into three organi
zational levels.

At the top, the city's Ortsgruppeftthrer

(or Gauleiter in metropolitan areas) determined general
policy and issued orders to subordinate officials.

Below

this level, there was a cadre of Zellenleiter, supervising
several cells.

They were answerable for the success of

their units and were required to remain in close personal
contact with the ZellenobmSnner or cell leaders.

These

men in turn oversaw the activities of a small number of cell
members who did most of the actual work.^

The positions of

Zellenleiter and Zellenobmann were unpaid but officially
recognized party offices.

Success in these jobs could lead

to promotions within the party and even to positions as
National Socialist candidates in local elections.

As Muchow

put it, "the best young men rise through the hard school of
Cell Organization service."

n

The principal duty of the street cells was to conduct
®H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 16.7.30,
Von der NSDAP."
Berlin:

7Per Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p., "Kampf urn
Die Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
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intensive "small work" campaigns.

Before big meetings, the

Zellenobmann received announcements, pamphlets and news
papers to be distributed from house to house and given out
in the streets.

Cell members were also provided with

tickets that they were expected to sell.

Each of these men

was required to bring at least two guests to every big
rally.

This system enabled the NSDAP to fill a hall after
8
a mere two days of canvassing.
The earliest examples of
such accomplishments came in Berlin.

Here by late 1929 the

Nazis were able to fill the gigantic Sportpalast for their
9
rallies without any particular trouble.
The same degree of
success was reported in Frankfurt-am-Main,^ a city which
adopted Muchow's organization early.

Aside from promoting

Nazi meetings the street cells also conducted intensive
campaigns to distribute written propaganda.

The Wttrttemberg

police reported that after the establishment of the cell
system, it was possible for the Nazis "to fill Stuttgart
with propaganda leaflets and posters in a very short time.
The other duties of the street cells were to
8H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim
24.4.30 Aus der NSDAP."
9VB, March 11, 1930, p. 3, "Die Bilanz der Berliner
Mitgliedersperre."
1®VB, January 8, 1929, p. 3, "Im Gau Hessen-NassauSttd."
^ H . A . Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim
24.4.30 Aus der NSDAP."
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"educate" party men and to maintain discipline.

At cell

meetings National Socialist questions were discussed, and
"School Evenings" were held to keep cell men up to date on
the party’s program and policies.

This educational opera

tion made it certain that members were well informed and
able to discuss current issues with the public.

It also

served to immerse individuals in Nazi ideas leaving them
little time to consider alternative programs proposed by
other parties.

Finally, the cell leader collected member12

ship dues from each of his men by the tenth of every month.
Failure to pay dues under these circumstances would be
personally embarrassing, since the cells consisted of a
small number of men all of whom knew each other and worked
together.

In this manner the party overcame the sense of

anonymity so often encountered in large organizations and
made it much easier for the party to discipline its ordinary
members effectively.
The Zellenleiter was an intermediate official who
coordinated the activities of several cells and attempted
to maintain a degree of unity between them.

He eliminated

unsuccessful Zellenobmanner and encouraged other cell offi
cials by holding small informal discussion evenings with
them.

Active Zellenleiter were allowed to hold small

speaking evenings with orators provided by the municipal
l^H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 16.7.30
Von der NSDAP."

organization.

These sessions served to bring all the mem

bers of several cells together and to promote a feeling of
camaraderie among those involved.

At the same time these

meetings were not so large that cell men lost their sense
of personal participation.

Everyone attending one of the

speaking evenings shared the experience of being a cell
worker and would be able to recount stories of his activi
ties to an interested and appreciative audience.

By August

1930, these meetings became obligatory in the city sections
providing a forum for Reinhardt's students to gain exper
ience and to communicate party programs and ideas to the
13
membership.
Muchow claimed a great deal for his organization;
he stated that it had enabled the party to score striking
14
gains in the Berlin municipal election of 1929.
The
Wttrttemberg Gauleitung, which adopted the system, also con
tended that it was instrumental in the rapid expansion of
15
the NSDAP.
These claims are by their very nature unprovable; however, some striking facts do indicate that the
street cells were a success.

In 1928 only a handful of

party officials existed in Gau Berlin; by early 1930 there
13Ibid.
14
Per Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p., "Kampf urn
Berlin: Die Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
15H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim
24.4.30 Aus der NSDAP."
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were nine hundred Zellenobmanner and two hundred and eighty
Zellenleiter *

This meant that Berlin alone had around

twelve hundred party functionaries, the overwhelming major
ity of whom were unpaid volunteers.

This in itself repre

sented a significant expansion of the number of men involved
16
in National Socialist propaganda work.
Other Gaus that
adopted the Muchow system enjoyed a similar growth in the
number of official party functionaries,

and enough other

party organizations adopted the street cell system by 19 30
for Muchow to boast proudly that:

"The success of the last

year and a half is best illustrated by the fact that today
many, many Ortsgruppen of the party have followed our ex
ample and modeled their internal development after our
18
form."
Finally, on March 11, 1930, the VSlkischer
Beobachter published a report on Muchowfs system describing
it as "a model for others to emulate in its propaganda and
19
organizational form."
The street cell organization was helpful to the
Nazis in a number of ways.

It enabled them to publicize

16VB, March 11, 1930, p. 3, "Die Bilanz der Berliner
Mitgliedersperre."
17H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim,
24.4.30, Aus der NSDAP."
^®Der Angriff, February 9, 1930, n.p. "Kampf um
Berlin:
Die- Vollendung der Strassenzellen Organisation."
19VB, March 11, 1930, p. 3, "Die Bilanz der Berliner
Mitgliedersperre."
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their events and to distribute their written propaganda
without cost.

It also made it possible for the party to

create a favorable impression on uncommitted Germans by
saturating cities with party propaganda in a very short
time.

Such intensive campaigning was certain to create an

illusion of National Socialist strength in the minds of
the general populace.

Everywhere Germans turned they would

see party posters or have party newspapers or pamphlets
thrust upon them.

Muchow's system had another feature:

it forced the other parties to deal with the NSDAP contin
uously.

Well publicized Nazi rallies and heavily distrib

uted Nazi pamphlets and posters attracted public attention.
Charges against other parties made so frequently had to be
answered.

This created the illusion that the NSDAP was the

only force that had to be dealt with.

The very intensity

of campaigning made possible by the Muchow system helped to
eradicate the idea that the party was an insignificant
faction and forced discontented voters to take the Nazis
seriously.

Overcoming the party's reputation of weakness

was one of the greatest problems facing the NSDAP in 1928.
The Muchow system did much to accomplish this task.
The street cells also made it possible for the
NSDAP to use and to retain its enthusiastic membership
while attracting new supporters who felt lost in big cities.
The division of metropolitan organizations into cells
allowed the party to function as if it were composed of a
series of village groups.

In this manner the problem of
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size was overcome.

Party members no longer needed to fear

that they would become the anonymous statistics of a mass
movement.

No matter how large the party became the basic

urban unit, the cell, would remain small.

The cell provided

ordinary Nazis both with a political function and with a
setting in which to develop feelings of camaraderie.

In

this way everyone in the NSDAP could believe that he was an
important participant in the movement and not just a cipher
on a piece of paper.

The effect of this organizational struc

ture on party morale was considerable.

The evidence pre

sented by Theodore Abel in his book The Nazi Movement:

Why

Hitler Came to Power tends to support the view that the
street cells convinced even the lowliest party member of
the importance of his contribution to the success of the
NSDAP.

Abel's six hundred biographs

repeatedly referred

to the "small work" performed by the rank and file as being
20
factors in the ultimate party victory.
This sense of
positive participation helped the party to retain the en
thusiasm of its membership as well as providing it with
practical assistance in the realm of propaganda.

Finally,

the opportunity of belonging to such a closely knit organi
zation as the Nazi cell may well have been a powerful in
ducement to join the party for men who felt atomized in an
urban environment.
The Muchow system was designed primarily for muni20Abel, Nazi Movement, passim.
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cipal organizations numbering several hundred members.

It

was a useful organizational form wherever the Nazis had
large Ortsgruppen.

Records are not available for all the

Gaus that adopted the system.

Yet it is known that Gau

Hessen-Nassau-Sud established street cells by early 1929,

21

and Gau Wtirttemberg had a well developed organization in
operation by early 1930.

22

These examples indicate that

Muchow1s plan was copied by Nazi leaders geographically
far removed from Berlin.

In any case all remaining local

reluctance to do so was almost certainly overcome by the
"suggestion" in the Vfllkischer Beobachter that other urban
groups model their own city organizations after Muchow*s
23
plan.
By September, 1930, most Nazi metropolitan units
were probably able to stage, through the street cells, cam
paigns touching every block and house in their cities with
out any additional expense to the party.
The National Socialist Auto Clubs were less impor
tant to the party than Muchow*s system, but they provide
an interesting example of how it used the assets of its
members for propaganda purposes.

The idea of setting up

motoring clubs originated in Gau Halle-Merseburg; it was
21

VB, January 8, 1929, p. 3, " Im Gau Hessen-Nassau-

Sttd."
^ H . A . Reel 58, Polder 1403, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wttrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Streng Geheim,
24.4.30, Aus der NSDAP."
23VB, March 11, 1930, p. 3, "Die Bilanz der Berliner
Mitgliedersperre."
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publicized in the Volkischer Beobachter in the middle of
24
1929,
and seems to have been adopted in several regions
by the end of the year.

On the surface the auto clubs

appeared to be little more than another auxiliary organiza
tion for Nazis with special interests.

The Berlin club for

instance held regular meetings to discuss technical mech25
anical matters and automobile sports.
The original group
in Halle-Merseburg promised its members "good comradeship."

2g

Yet, these clubs also functioned as part of the Nazi propa
ganda apparatus; they provided the party with a readily
available supply of cars for campaigning trips. 27

The

ultimate purpose of these clubs was to "mechanize propa28
ganda."
For efforts to open up new territory or to expand
the party in weakly organized areas, free transportation was
invaluable.

The NSDAP liked to create the impression that

it was a strong movement with many supporters.

The auto

clubs enabled the party to concentrate its personnel even in
2^VB, May 23, 1929, p. 3, "Kraftwagen=und Motorradbesitzer des Gaues Halle-Merseburg.1'
^ Der Angriff, June 24, 1929, n.p."Nat. Soz. Automobilklub.11
26VB, May 23, 1929, p. 3, "Kraftwagen=und Motorradbesitzer des Gaues Halle-Merseburg."
27H.A. Reel 58, Folder 14 03, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wurttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 9.5.30.
Aus der NSDAP."
^®VB, May 23, 1929, p. 3, "Kraftwagen=und Motorradbesitzer des Gaues Halle-Merseburg."
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remote towns and villages.
the effectiveness of SA men.

Greater mobility also increased
Storm troopers who could ride

to rallies were likely to march with greater briskness and
to be cleaner than those who had to walk to such events.
Furthermore, with cars SA men could stage marches through
several towns and villages on the same day.

Finally, more

communities could be canvassed by large NSDAP contingents
if they did not have to waste a lot of time getting from
place to place.
The National Socialist Auto Clubs like most Nazi
organizations were useful to the party on a number of dif
ferent levels.

They mechanized party propaganda without

costing the NSDAP anything; through the clubs, members with
automobiles were persuaded to volunteer their cars for
political operations.

In turn, the societies were made

attractive to Nazi motorists as organizations where they
could discuss common interests with fellow drivers.

The

auto clubs were a fine example of the way the NSDAP ex
ploited the assets of its membership for propaganda work.
The Muchow system and the auto clubs were both
examples of regional experiments
by a process of simple copying.

that were widely adopted
They increased the party's

propaganda capacity at no expense to the NSDAP.

In the

late twenties Nazi regional organizations seemed to have
been willing to implement successful programs developed in
other areas even without being ordered to do so by the Reich
leadership.

This in itself was a commentary on the
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abilities of the Nazi regional leaders and on the excellence
of intra-party communication.

CHAPTER 8
NAZI NEWSPAPERS AND SUBSCRIPTION CAMPAIGNS
Newspapers were never a major means of Nazi cam
paigning.

From the earliest days of the party Hitler tended

to de-emphasize written propaganda.

In Mein Kampf he stated

unequivocably that "all great# world-shaking events have
been brought about, not by written matter, but by the spoken
word."

As for newspapers, he commented that they "slide

off the millions of the lower classes like water from oiled
2
leather."
Nonetheless, the NSDAP developed a rather exten
sive press network.

The VSlkischer Beobachter was the first

Nazi newspaper and the p a r t y ’s central organ.

Another

national paper was the Illustrierte Beobachter, which ap3
peared weekly from October, 1928 and provided a pictorial
account of party activities.

The number of subscriptions

to these two national Nazi news organs was quite modest.

In

1928 the Vfllkischer Beobachter had a circulation of only
■^Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 469.
2 Ibid., p. 471.
-i

H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1516, "Generalmitgliedversammlung der N.S.D.A.P. am 31 August 1928 im BttrgerbrSukeller"
Police Report.
This report estimated that the Illustrierte
Beobachter had about 30,000 subscribers.
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18,400, and this only rose to 39,600 by the time of the
1930 election.

Even this small rise in the number of sub

scribers seems to be attributable solely to the growth of
the party; the newspapers themselves seem to have played
4
little direct part in this growth.
The primary purpose of the Nazi national newspapers
was not to make new converts to the party; instead, these
papers helped the NSDAP to enforce ideological conformity
upon party members.

In a movement characterized by a high

degree of decentralization, the VSlkischer Beobachter acted
as a powerful unifying tool.

It presented the official

party line on all key issues, printed news of party activi
ties, and fought for Nazi victory during election cam5
paigns.
Major speeches by Hitler were reproduced in the
paper or in special supplements, so that members could be
come acquainted with his positions on various issues.

Page

three of the Volkischer Beobachter included a section en
titled, Aus der Bewegung, which printed orders issued by
Hitler or by other members of the Reich leadership.

Through

these features, party members learned of new decisions on
policy and tactics.
cribing party events.

The same page carried articles des
In this manner, Nazis were familiar

ized with successful programs and stratagems employed in
^Oron J. Hale, The Captive Press in the Third Reich
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U.P., 1973) p. 31.
5Roland V. Layton, Jr., "The Volkischer Beobachter,"
p. 111.
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other parts of Germany.

Finally, there appeared a large

number of informative and theoretical articles which formed
the basis for party positions on many issues.

It is not

surprising that Reinhardt used the Volkischer Beobachter as
a written supplement to his speakers' school lessons.

It

provided an up-to-date guide to Nazi policy.
The role of the Vblkischer Beobachter as a means of
enforcing unity on the party was especially marked in its
relationship to the Nazi regional press.

These newspapers

were controlled mainly by local Gauleiters who were also
£
responsible for their finances.
All Gau newspapers had to
agree to four conditions before they received official party
recognition:
"First, the editor must observe the party
line and directives issued by the party
propaganda office; second, editors and
publishers were subject to reprimand and
disciplinary action for infractions of
regulations or breaches of party disci
pline; third, the paper must publish free
of charge party announcements and notices
emanating from the departments of the
Reichsleitung; fourth, they could not _
accept advertising from Jewish firms."
This set of regulations enabled the Reichsleitung to control
all Gau publications on ideological matters and to subor
dinate them to the VSlkischer Beobachter.
Even though Gau publications retained no indepen
dence in the formulation of National Socialist theory, each
feHale, Captive Press, p. 39.
7Ibid., p. 41.
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Gau attempted to establish its own newspaper in the years
after 1928.

Before this time many areas had relied upon

Gregor and Otto Strasser's Kampfverlag to provide them with
newspapers.

This publishing house, based in Berlin, printed
0
no less than seven weeklies to be sent to various Gaus for
distribution.

The papers published by the Strassers in

cluded appropriate local news, but local control was en
tirely lacking.

This lack of autonomy was considered

intolerable by the various Gauleiters who sought to estab
lish their own news organs to replace those produced by the
distant Kampfverlag.
The Gau newspapers attracted an even smaller
audience than the Vdlkischer Beobachter.

The circulation

of the regional newspaper of Baden, Der FUhrer, stood at
9
around three thousand in 1928.
The Nazi daily in SchleswigHolstein, Schleswig-Holsteinische Tageszeitung, started
1929 with a circulation of twenty-five hundred— a figure
10
that only rose to three thousand by July, 1929.
The
number of readers attracted to these papers hardly justi
fied their publication, and usually produced only enough
income to keep the various party news organs from going
bankrupt.
8Ibid., pp. 40-41.
Q

H.A. Reel 47, Folder 1014, "Erinnerungen aus der
'Grundzeit’" von F. Moraller.
*°H.A. Reel 48, Folder 1119, "SchleswigHolsteinische Tageszeitung."
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In terms of the audience reached the number of
regional newspapers was wholly unjustified, but they did
serve other purposes.

The development of these papers may

well have been an example of empire building by Gauleiters^
as well as a way for the party's regional chieftains to
assert their authority over subordinates.

Control of a

newspaper increased the prestige of a Gauleiter, and the
Gau press tended to fulfill the same purposes as the
Vdlkischer Beobachter but on a regional level.

These news

organs publicized party activities, communicated orders
from the Gauleitung, and criticized local leaders who op
posed the policies of the various Gauleiters.

Another

possible explanation for the establishment of these papers
is that the Nazis were simply emulating other Weimar par
ties, which had established their own press networks much
earlier.

"Newspapers as adjuncts to political parties had

been a feature of public life since the revolution of
1848."

12

Perhaps, the most pressing reason for setting up

these regional news organs was to improve internal party
There are several examples of circulation battles
between various Nazi regional newspapers, for example the
struggle between Streicher and Feder for control of the
Niirnberg market; see Hale, Captive Press, pp. 44-45.
In
the late twenties all of these intra-party conflicts seemed
to be centered on efforts by various secondary leaders to
obtain more power within the movement.
There is no evi
dence of ideological conflict in any of these intra-party
squabbles. Hitler felt that such rivalries were healthy
and commented simply that "The stronger will prevail"
(Ibid., p. 46) and that such conflicts only served to im
prove Nazi newspapers.
*^Ibid., p. 49.
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morale.
The publication of Gau Ruhr, Die Neue Front, pro
vides a good example of how the local papers functioned.
It was founded in 1928 and was succinctly described by the
Gauleitung as "their battle paper."

Each Ortsqruppe was

expected to submit reports on its activities by Thursday
noon, so that they could be printed in the weekly appearing
on Friday m o r n i n g . ^

Thus, the principal function of this

publication was to improve the morale of party members.
Local Nazis were encouraged by having their efforts pub
licized in the regional press.

At the same time, the paper

fostered a spirit of unity within the Gau by familiarizing
individual Nazis with the work of other groups in their
region.

This also helped to overcome any feelings of iso

lation that might sap the enthusiasm of local units.

The

weekly reports reassured all party members in the Gau that
they were not operating in a vacuum and that they were, in
fact, part of a dynamic movement.
The Nazi press justified its existence primarily as
a means to inform the rank and file and to raise their
morale, but it also served secondary propaganda purposes.
Party newspapers were often distributed free of charge, as
14
if they were political pamphlets.
Cities that estab
lished the Muchow system frequently used street cell men
■^H.A. Reel 5, Folder 136, "Gau Ruhr
Presserundschreiben" 6.6.28.
^*Hale, Captive Press, p. 60.
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to sell papers.

Thus, Nazi publications provided these men

with yet another task for their ceaseless campaigning.
Local groups not only sold the organs of the Gau and Reich
on the streets but were also responsible for obtaining ad15
vertising.
Given the circulation of Nazi papers ad
vertising in them was either an act of political faith or
a recognition of the importance of Nazis to a business.

In

any case spending money to buy space in a National Socialist
publication was a tangible commitment

to the NSDAP.

Finally, intensive campaigns were staged to obtain new sub
scribers, especially to the VSlkischer Beobachter.
The subscription campaign of 1929 provides an inter
esting example of how Nazi newspapers were used in propa
ganda drives.

This effort was not intended merely to in

crease the revenues of the party's central organ.

Increas

ing the paid circulation of the Volkischer Beobachter was
certainly one of its objectives, but the campaign also
served other purposes.

The Nazis were well aware of the

fact that only party members were likely to read the NSDAP's
major paper.

In Mein Kampf Hitler stated, "Only a man who

has already been won to the movement will steadily read the
party organ."1®

Given the meager number of persons willing

to subscribe to Nazi publications, this prophecy seems to
l^H.A. Reel 5, Folder 136, "Gau Ruhr Presserundschreiben" 6.6.28.
Each Ortsgruppe was expected at least
to get the bar that they held meetings in to advertise.
1®Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 477-78.
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have been accurate.

Thus, if the party simply wanted to

increase newspaper sales, the logical approach would have
been to order party men to subscribe.

The Nazis did this

on a small scale in December, 1928 when Himmler directed
every Ortsgruppe and Zelle with more than three members to
take the Volkischer Beobachter.^

Yet this technique was

not used in the circulation campaign of 1929.

Instead, the

Nazis concentrated upon trying to get non-members to sub
scribe.

In reality this operation was an effort to ac

quaint the general public with the Nazi press and Nazi
ideas.

It was also an excuse for staging a mammoth cam

paign during a period of relative political inactivity;
the effort took place during the early months of 1929 be
fore the Young Plan was proposed and well before any of
the important Landtag and municipal elections of that year.
Without any important new issues or elections to concen
trate upon, the Nazis used the campaign for subscriptions
as a means of staging a national propaganda drive and
keeping party members active.
The campaign lasted from January 1 to April 5

18

during which time the entire party was mobilized to sell
the VClkischer Beobachter in an all-out effort.

Proper

l^VB, December 16/17, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 31."
18
VB, December 22, 1928, p. 2, "An alle Parteigenossen, Bezieher und Leser des 'VSlkischer BeobachterI'"
For a description of the earlier and cruder 1925 circula
tion campaign see Pridham, Hitler *s Rise, pp. 60-61, for
the 1927 campaign see Hale,~Captive' Press, p. 42.
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incentives were provided for individuals, Ortsgruppen and
Gaus that participated in the campaign.

Party members who

sold five new subscriptions were rewarded with a small auto
graphed picture of Hitler.

If any individual sold as many

as sixty, he received a giant autographed picture.

The top

ten Ortsgruppen in Germany were awarded exact replicas of
the 1923 party flag known as the "Blood Banner.”

The most

successful Gau in Germany received a new Opel sports model
19
car.
Intra-party competition was viewed by the Reich
leadership as a healthy outlet for party members.

It in

sured that all units would strive to do well and at least
attempt to surpass neighboring Ortsgruppen or Gaus.

The

prizes themselves were designed to instill a sense of pride
and accomplishment in the rank and file.

Every Nazi who

applied himself could expect to enroll enough new sub
scribers to win an autographed picture of the Fiihrer.

The

ten best Ortsgruppen could proudly display their replicas
of the party's "Blood Banner."

Finally, the Gau that won

the automobile was expected to use it for party work.

The

Opel was both a useful addition to the victorious u n i t ’s
propaganda apparatus and a continuing reminder of the
region's successful participation in the competition.

As a

means of insuring that the car was only awarded to a Gau
that strenuously applied itself, a provision was added to
19VB, December 22, 1928, p. 2, "An alle Parteigenossen, Bezieher und Leser des 'VSlkischer Beobachter.1"
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the contest rules which stated that the grand prize was
only to be awarded if the winning Gau obtained at least six
hundred new subscribers.^
The contest was only one method employed by the
Reichsleitung to insure that all elements of the party
actively participated in the canvassing for subscriptions
in 1929.

A more concrete incentive was also provided.

For

each subscriber the Ortsgruppe that enrolled him received
6 0 p f ., the Gau 30 p f . the town SA group 60 p f ., and the
SA leader of the Gau 40 pf.

Thus, the party's local and

regional political and SA units were awarded a total of
1.9 RM per subscriber.

For purposes of this division four

subscriptions to the Illustrierte Beobachter were consi21

dered equivalent to one of the Volkischer Beobachter.

Nazi local and regional organizations were invariably in
financial trouble, and there were few ways for these groups
to raise funds.

Accordingly, the opportunity to earn even

a small amount of cash, while at the same time campaigning
for the party, was an extremely attractive proposition.
Furthermore, money obtained in this manner was almost cer
tainly used by party organizations for more propaganda work,
since these units spent most of their income on propaganda
campaigns.

In this fashion the NSDAP fully mobilized its

members to sell the party's newspapers without losing any
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
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more than a small portion of the money that would normally
be used for propaganda purposes.

Finally, increased sub

scriptions to the party's newspapers would mean an improve
ment in the financial position of the Nazi press and an
increase in the number of persons who read it.
A good deal of help was provided by the Reich
leadership to those who wished to participate in the effort,
All canvassers were given handbills, some illustrative
matter, and instructions on how to convince people to sub
scribe to the newspapers.

Later in the campaign a formal

"canvassing kit" was furnished to the chairmen of the vari
ous Ortsgruppen who were responsible for distributing this
material to individual members.

In addition, they super

vised party workers and made sure that those who received
"canvassing kits" made use of them.

Finally, in the last

weeks of February a large number of free samples of the
Vdlkischer Beobachter were provided to local groups without
charge for mass distribution.

This part of the campaign

was timed to occur after the initial canvassing had hope
fully excited some interest in the newspaper.

At this

point potential subscribers had been hearing about the
paper for well over a month, and receptivity
be at its highest.

was likely to

Again the chairmen of the Ortsgruppen

had the duty of seeing that the free copies were used in
22
the most productive fashion possible.
22

Ibid.
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The activities in Frankfurt-am-Main provide a good
example of the methods used by the Nazis in this newspaper
campaign.

The canvassing at Frankfurt was directed by

Adalbert Gimbel.

This youthful Nazi held the posts of
23
organization and propaganda leader for the city.
He had

no money for this campaign, but he did have the use of a
truck and numerous copies of the Vdlkischer Beobachter and
24
the Illustrierte Beobachter.
Gimbel decorated the truck
on one side with advertisements for the VSlkischer
Beobachter; on the other side, he prominently displayed
portraits of various "Jewish department store plutocrats
crushing German business."

The theme of Gimbel1s campaign
25
was "Germans sell German goods in a German newspaper.”
Driving about Frankfurt, Gimbel or an aide would stop and
describe to any group that would listen the virtues of the
Vdlkischer Beobachter and the wickedness of the Jewish
businessmen whom the Nazi press exposed.

On a number of

occasions, these trips took the campaigners into the work
ing class district of Frankfurt where Gimbel attacked
Vorwarts, the newspaper of the Social Democrats,

for being

financed by the Jewish banker Goldschmidt in the amount of
800,000 RM.26
23

H .A. Reel 28, Folder 534, "So kaempften wir."

24Ihid.
25H .A . Reel 28, Folder 532, "Kampferlebnisse des
Pg. Adalbert Gimbel."
26Ibid.
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Gimbel's campaign was a representative instance of
the combination of conventional propaganda with an effort
to increase the circulation of the party's newspapers.

In

an attempt intended ostensibly to sell subscriptions, Gimbel
managed to attack Jews and department stores, two major
targets of Nazi opprobrium.

He also represented the Social

Democrats as pawns of the Jews rather than as a real
workers' party.

In this case the party's newspapers were

used essentially as effective props.

The main theme--that

the Nazis were combatting a nefarious and alien enemy— was
conveyed through the pictures on the truck and through the
short speeches presented by Gimbel and his aides.

These

devices were designed to convince audiences that they needed
to know more about the various insidious conspirators
against Germany.

The way to find out more was, of course,

to subscribe to the Nazi press.
The strategies used by Nazi leaders in their cam
paigns for subscriptions were left largely to the individual
Ortsgruppen.

Nonetheless, each party group was expected to

conduct a vigorous drive.

Some local groups such as the

one in Stuttgart relied upon its SA men exclusively.

There,

the storm troopers were ordered to canvass the city directly
seeking new subscribers.

The city's SA leader provided an
27
array of propaganda material for the individual workers.
^ H . A . Reel 48, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staatspolizei wUrttemberg zur politischen Lage, 3.4.29, Aus der
N.S.D.A.P."
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They were required to spend many hours distributing this
material on the streets and trying to convince passers-by
28
to read the party's papers.
In territory still occupied or under the jurisdic
tion of the Allies, the problems of canvassing were some
what different.

Here, the Volkischer Beobachter was pro

hibited, but not the Illustrierte Beobachter.

In these

areas the party made much of the opposition of the Allies
to the Nazi press.

The main theme of campaigning was that

buying a subscription to the Illustrierte Beobachter was a
patriotic act of defiance against the Inter-Allied Rhineland
29
Commission.
In the Rhineland the party sold newspapers by
stressing nationalism.
The Nazi campaign for subscriptions in 1929 provides
an instructive view of the p a r t y ’s efforts during a period
of relative political calm.

Mobilizing its full membership

by promises of prizes and monetary rewards, the NSDAP used
the project of increasing the circulation of party news
papers to stimulate efforts on the local level.

Propaganda

was provided to party canvassers, and overall direction of
individual campaigns was left to the discretion of local
leaders.

The approaches adopted would necessarily vary

greatly from one town to the next.

Gimbel in Frankfurt em

phasized anti-Semitism with additional attacks on department
28Ibid.
29H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, "So kaempften wir."
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stores and on Marxism.

Leaders in the occupied Rhineland

played upon the nationalistic sentiments of the region.
Finally, the rather unimaginative leadership in Wiirttemberg
simply used personal solicitation to win new subscribers.
The one thing that the campaign did accomplish everywhere
was to stimulate party activity.
No figures were released to reveal the number of
new subscriptions sold in this campaign, and one suspects
that it was not very successful.

Nevertheless, because the

car was awarded to Saxony, that Gau presumably enrolled
over six hundred new readers.

Gimbel's Gau of Hessen-

Nassau-Sud came in second, and the city of Wiesbaden was the
30
most successful town by far.
In any case, the increase of
circulation was of only secondary importance.

What the

campaign did accomplish was to encourage additional Nazi
activity in all parts of Germany and to advertise the
party's newspapers.

In this manner, the general public be

came more familiar with the National Socialist press.

The

Volkischer Beobachter and the Illustrierte Beobachter were
no longer merely the party's house organs, but had become
readily identifiable to non-Nazis.

The NSDAP had always

claimed that its newspapers were designed for a national
audience; through subscription campaigns like that of 1929,
these papers finally succeeded in gaining recognition all
over Germany.

Those interested in the NSDAP seem far more

VB, July 20, 1929, p. 3, "Parteigenossen."
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likely at least to look at headlines in Nazi papers after
these forceful introductions to them.

This alone tended to

add to the political impact of the National Socialist press
on the general populace.

Indeed, the canvassing for sub

scribers may have had an effect on Nazi successes at the
polls.

During election campaigns thousands of free copies

of the Nazi papers were distributed to the public.

After

the efforts to increase circulation, Germans were more
likely to recognize Nazi papers and to realize that they
were not ordinary political literature.

Those who had

become acquainted with the Nazi press and who had been im
pressed by the canvassers would be more inclined to read a
free copy than those totally unfamiliar with the newspapers.
In this manner, the subscription campaigns served to pro
mote the reputation of National Socialist news organs.

CHAPTER 9
THE ROLE OF THE SA
The SA performed a number of key services for the
NSDAP.

It attracted middle-class Germans through its

tactically effective use of violence.

Confrontations—

especially with Communists— helped the Nazis to convince
German burghers that they were in danger of losing their
property and lives to the leftists and that only National
Socialism could save the bourgeoisie.

The quasi-military

garb of the storm troopers helped to create the illusion
that the NSDAP was the heir of Germany's cherished military
tradition.

The trappings of a secret society that were so

pronounced within the SA attracted declasse young Germans
who often felt excluded from the social structure of the
Weimar Republic.

The attributes of a secret society also

helped the SA present the propaganda theme that the NSDAP
would create a Volksgemeinschaft.

The storm troopers

tried to embody this racial community by highly visible
displays of internal camaraderie.

Finally, the SA pro

vided the party with martyrs; the storm troopers were the
party's angels of death and promise of revolutionary change.
Through a number of quasi-religious ceremonies the storm
197
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troopers were portrayed as the specially consecrated aven
gers of the fatherland, a role which was justified by the
peculiar National Socialist cult of death.

This chapter

will examine the various ways the storm troopers served the
NSDAP as propagandists.
During the late twenties the SA remained basically
unchanged.

It possessed an autonomous leadership structure

that did not correspond in all cases to Gau divisions.

SA

leaders were not directly subordinate to the Gauleiter in
their area and received many of their orders directly from
Munich where the national head of the SA, Franz von Pfeffer,
exercised considerable control over the organization.

The

tendency of the storm troopers to support the more revolu
tionary elements within the NSDAP also remained as it had
been in the early twenties.

At the end of the decade, the

strongest SA units continued to be those in urban

areas,

and these organizations retained a good deal of the enthu
siasm for social revolution that had characterized the
1
party under the earlier "socialist" plan.
Nevertheless, the autonomy and radicalism of the SA
were not major problems for the NSDAP, largely because the
paramilitary organization was numerically rather small.
Although there are no reliable statistics a rough reckoning
is possible of the number of storm troopers in Germany in
the late twenties.

Alan Bullock estimated that there were

^Orlow, Nazi Party, pp. 141, 151, 161.
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one hundred thousand SA men in January, 1931.
was undoubtedly far smaller in 1928 and 1929.

O

The figure
At the end

of 1928 there were only six hundred and fifty-eight SA men
in all of Wiirttemberg,

and at the Reichsparteitag rally of

19 29 the Niirnberg police estimated that twenty-five thou4
sand storm troopers were present.
Since all SA men were
required to attend this meeting, twenty-five thousand is
probably a reasonable approximation of the number of active
storm troopers in August, 1929.

Considering these figures,

Bullock’s estimate of one hundred thousand SA men at the
beginning of 1931 is probably either overly generous or
indicative of a major
last months of 1930.

expansion of the organization in
In any case,

the

the existing, but frag

mentary evidence, indicates that the SA was a relatively
small organization in the late twenties.
tended to reduce the importance
autonomy of the storm

In practice this

of the radicalism and

troopers.There

were not enough SA

men to initiate massive and violent confrontations with
the party's enemies or to articulate the ideals of social
revolution effectively.

This numerical weakness enabled

2Bullock, Hitler, p. 136.
^H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.12.28,
Aus der NSD A P ."
4H.A. Reel 57, Folder 1390, "Polizeidirektion
Nttrnberg-FGrth 29 August 1929." The Nazis estimated that
there were sixty thousand SA men at Ntirnberg which is pro
bably indicative of the party's tendency to exaggerate its
numbers.
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the Nazis to conceal the radicalism of the SA from the
general public.

The SA's organizational independence also

produced fewer difficulties in these years than it would
later.

Even SA leaders did not seriously believe that

their paramilitary units could bring the NSDAP to power,
and this realization made them willing to subordinate them
selves to the regional political leadership and to use
their contingents primarily for propaganda work.

Pfeffer

endorsed this approach at the Reich leadership conference
in 1928 when he emphasized the political role of the storm
troopers in protecting meetings and strengthening party
groups.

He went on to denounce those who sought to trans

form the SA into an independent military organization and
fully embraced the strategy of gaining power by electoral
victory.^
As propagandists the storm troopers tended to per
form most of their duties on the local level.

The only

occasion on which the entire SA was assembled in the late
twenties was for the Reichsparteitag in 1929.

The decen

tralized character of SA activities makes it difficult to
discuss all of the work of the organization in detail.
Nevertheless, it is possible to assess the nature of SA
campaigning by examining some of their efforts.

Storm

troop units tended to perform the same duties in all parts
5H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1516, "Generalmitgliederversammlung der NSDAP am 31 August 1928 im BttrgerbrHukeller"
Police Report.
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of Germany.

Thus, a few examples serve reasonably well to

characterize the work of the organization as a whole and to
explain its role in presenting Nazi propaganda.
The storm troopers have often been referred to as a
central organization in Hitler's rise to power.

One his

torian described their role in the following way.

"As a

weapon of propaganda; the SA came to rank perhaps higher
than Hitler's speeches.

To stimulate emotion and violence,

and to benefit by their interaction, were the first aims
of Nazi propagandists."^

Violence was clearly one major

activity of the SA, but this organization performed other
services for the party too.

As a quasi-military body, it

represented a link between the NSDAP and the past.

As

Eitel Dobert— a one-time SA leader who became a bitter
enemy of the NSDAP in the early thirties— observed,

"nothing

impresses the average German as much as military discipline
7
and order."
Looking at columns of marching storm troopers,
Germans could imagine that these man were the heirs of the
old Imperial military traditions and the defenders of estab8
lished values.
For other voters the SA left the impression
that the NSDAP was a vast movement that could transform
6Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 18.
7

Dobert, Convert to Freedom, p. 177.

8e.g. Allen commented that in 1930 the identifica-*
tion of the Nazis by the public with "fervent patriotism
and militarism . . . . was a foot in the door of respecta
bility."
In the small town that his study examines these
values were widely accepted.
Allen, Nazi Seizure, p. 28.
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Germany.

The Nazi image of a "new Germany" was found first

in the storm troopers— a Germany that was dedicated to the
"'new marriage of life with danger,* and the idea of
9
1glorious death.*"
The storm troopers of the late twenties were not
numerically strong enough to seize control of the streets
for any sustained period of time.

Thus, Nazi violence of

this period tended to take on a symbolic quality; its prin
cipal function was the creation of vivid, real-life drama.
The three activities in which SA violence was most likely
to occur were marches, hall defense and street work.

All

of these duties of the SA had a propaganda impact of them
selves even without benefit of violence.

Violence, however,

served to heighten the impact of all SA activities and to
create the impressions that the Nazis most desired.
One example can serve to illustrate the effect of
violence in campaigning.

On August 3, 1929, a fight occur

red at a party meeting in the Grafs Garten in Frankfurt-amMain.

SA man Paul Bierwith reported that "forty red hooli

gans appeared and demanded entry to the meeting."

Bierwith,

the cashier, forced these men to pay before allowing them
in.

He informed his superiors of the situation, and the

"reds" were seated in the back of the hall surrounded by
storm troopers.
re enforcements.

The Nazi leaders sent out orders for SA
After a brief exchange between the

^Fest, Hitler, p. 105.
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speaker and the "reds” a fight broke out.

The communists

used lamps, waterflasks, and glasses to pelt the audience.
They finally pulled out cudgels, but were overwhelmed by
10
the newly arrived SA men and thrown out some windows.
The above incident in itself is of no special significance,
but it was typical of thousands of hall fights that occurred
in the last years of the Weimar Republic.

As a prototype,

the Grafs Garten riot can provide us with some clues to the
importance of violence in winning public support.
Above all, hall riots were a set of actions.

The

whole tone and substance of Nazi propaganda was designed
to convince potential supporters that the party intended to
move decisively to solve Germany's problems.

Nazi speeches

were intentionally provocative and crude in their language.
Campaign activities went on at all times.

Marches, speeches

and rallies emphasized the party's activism, but the riot
was probably the most persuasive way of
of the party's willingness to act.

convincing Germans

Words even in their most

brutal form were not taken seriously by many voters in the
Weimar Republic.

Every party made promises, but somehow

nothing ever seemed to happen.

Of all the bourgeois par

ties only the Nazis were willing to fight and bleed for
their ideals.

Such activism was likely to make a favorable

impression on politically disenchanted middle-class voters.
1®H.A. Reel 28, Folder 532, Paul Bierwith "Mein
Weg zum Nationalsozialismus und Erlebnisse aus der
Kampfzeit."
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The hall riot also helped to
types.

reenforce Nazi stereo

National Socialist propaganda concentrated upon

convincing the electorate that Germany was divided into two
groups.

The Jews and their "red" lackeys were on one side

of this manichean dichotomy, dedicated to the destruction
of all existing values and the annihilation of the middle
class.

On the other side were the Nazis, defenders of both

the ideals and persons of bourgeois Germans.

The form of

the riot at the Grafs Garten tended to substantiate Nazi
claims.

The "reds" were described by Bierwith as dirty,

poorly clothed hooligans.

They were admitted to the meet

ing for ten pfennigs each (the special rate for the unem
ployed) , because they were so obviously poor.

Here was the

perfect Nazi stereotype of the "red", a dirty unkempt gang
ster.

Bierwith was hardly an objective observer, but his

Kampferlebnisse also indicates that he was not particularly
imaginative.

His physical description of the "reds" proba

bly exaggerated their slovenliness, but there may also be a
good deal of truth in it.

Even the manner in which the

fight broke out was useful to National Socialist propaganda.
The "reds" indiscriminately pelted the audience with
glasses, lamps and water flasks.^

Broken glass did not

differentiate between enthusiastic Nazis and simple obser
vers.

The attack on everyone in the room accorded exactly

with what Nazi speakers were telling audiences throughout
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Germany:

the communists planned to destroy all middle-

class Germans whether they belonged to the NSDAP or not.
In the ensuing melee the audience was presented with the
dramatic struggle of clean, uniformed SA men against dirty,
lower class "reds.”

In this case the only group protecting

the spectators from assault was the storm troopers.

This,

the Nazis were contending, was the precise situation every
where; only the NSDAP stood between the middle class and
destruction by the communist.
imagine

It is hardly possible to

a more effective way to put across the party's

message to respectable, bourgeois Germans than by such a
fracas.
A final useful result of hall fights was that they
left the impression that the SA was the defender of order
in Germany.

Most Nazi violence during this period appeared

to be "defensive."

The numerical weakness of the SA pre

cluded the organization from launching open attacks on
enemies in most places.

Instead

the Nazis provoked their

Marxist opponents by continual taunting and by such be
havior as marches through "red" districts.

The party's

"defensive" posture was helpful to National Socialist pro
pagandists, but even in cases in which the Nazis were the
aggressors SA violence was usually directed toward Jews
or Marxists.

It is questionable whether these acts were

considered disreputable by the hard pressed middle class in
the late twenties.

In the case of the Grafs Garten riot the

"reds" were thrown out windows with no assistance from the
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police.

By usurping the police functions at party meetings,

the SA also appropriated the respect given to law enforce
ment agencies as defenders of order.

The very absence of

police at such brawls gave support to the Nazi contention
that the Weimar Republic was incapable of maintaining law
and order, or, worse yet, part of a conspiracy with the
"reds" against the lives and values of middle-class Germany.
The actions and physical appearance of storm troopers at
hall riots implied that they were both policemen and
soldiers, and above all protectors of bourgeois Germans
against the lawlessness of the unwashed legions of
Bolshevism.
Most SA violence had the same effect on Nazi cam
paigning as hall fights.

Riots that occurred during marches

or street duty also helped to create a favorable impression
for the party.

This impression was based in large part upon

the belief that the SA represented military virtues.

The

popular association of the NSDAP with the second Empire
arose primarily from the identification of the storm troop
ers with militarism.

This link with the past was very use

ful in attracting voters; it was also helpful in maintaining
party unity.
The suggestion that the SA was a military organiza
tion was one of its greatest assets.

This illusion was

maintained largely by a series of quasi-military regulations
which made the SA appear to be a disciplined military organ
ization and prompted storm troopers to believe themselves

20"
to be part of an army.

An interesting document known as
12

the "ten commandments" of the SA casts
nature of

the organization.

This set

much light on the
of directives was

issued to only one large group, but it admirably captures
the tenor of the SA.

The virtues of the storm trooper

fell largely into two categories.

First, he was expected

to maintain the physical bearing of a soldier, and second,
he was expected to serve as a model for the future vQlkisch
community.

Storm troopers were not required to emulate the

strict discipline and class structure of the old Imperial
army.

A certain amount of camaraderie existed within the

SA, and the relationship between leaders and followers
tended to

copy the informality of theFree Corps of
the
13
_
_ , . ,. .
post-war years.
In terms of propaganda this did not
matter much.

Audiences that were favorably disposed toward

militaristic appeals could identify the SA with either the
Imperial army or the Free Corps according to their prefer
ences, since the organization's military trappings recalled
both groups.
*2H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.12.28,
Aus der NSDAP."
See Appendix C.
1^
The Nazis consciously tried to identify themselves
with both the imperial army and the Free Corps.
For the
attempt to link the NSDAP with the Imperial heritage see
Holborn, Modern Germany, pp. 726-27 for the ceremonies at
Potsdam in 1933.
The Nazis used similar ceremonies to link
themselves to the Free Corps.
See Robert G. L. Waite,
Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar
Germany 15X8-1923 (New York: W. W. Norton, X952) pp. T95-96,
530, 254.
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The impression that the SA was the embodiment of
military virtues was based almost entirely upon appearances.
Storm troopers were forbidden to carry weapons, and they
were not allowed to participate in military games of any
14
kind.
Absolutely no effort was made to prepare SA men
for any form of armed combat; the storm troopers bore little
resemblance to a real army.

The only similarity between the

SA and the Imperial army or the Free Corps was that all of
these groups impressed outsiders with their external disci
pline.

The illusion of SA military bearing was created by

regulations that were enforced on storm troop contingents.
In his "ten commandments" Sturmf iihrer Max Biicherl ordered
his men to do the following.

"It is especially important

that when the SA man appears at the place of assembly for
setting out on a march that he not have his hands in his
pockets or a cigarette in his mouth."

He went on to direct

his men to be punctual and to obey orders.
it, "We do not need dead carcasses.

As BUcherl put

Support your leader by

following his orders, dilatory comrades can demoralize
everyone, so be fast in carrying out orders.”

Finally, he

directed his men to ask questions and make announcements in
"a short and snappy manner.” 15
appearances.
clean.

The SA was interested in

Storm Troopers were expected to be neat and

They were to obey orders in a "snappy manner."

They

14Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 152.
15H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.12.28,
Aus der NSDAP."
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were play soldiers and brawlers and not the heirs of the
Kaiser's troops or the post-war freebooters.
The second major function of the SA was to serve as
a laboratory for National Socialist social experimentation.
Bucher1 in his "ten commandments" described Nazi social
ideals rather succinctly.
class.

"The SA does not represent any

Workers of both the head and the hands find them

selves together in this fighting society.

Personal animo

sities have no place in our organization.

Through this

fighting society we will build a true vdlkisch community."

16

The Nazis believed that class differences were best overcome
by participation in the same struggle by men of all classes.
Their socialism was strictly a product of World War I and
of the comradeship of the trenches rather than any desire
to level economic differences.

The social aspect of the SA

was very real, though it was often belittled by Nazi oppo
nents.

As an ex-SturmfUhrer described it, "Our enemies were

wrong when they insisted that our comradeship rested on our
common experience in daily brawls . . . .

When we climbed

on our trucks of a cold winter morning, to spend the Sunday
on a propaganda excursion, we all shivered— intellectuals,
workers, rich landowner's sons . . . .

We shared our bread
17
with the poor comrades, and often our money."
The storm troopers were extremely useful to the
16Ibid.
17Dobert, Convert to Freedom, p. 176.
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party as the embodiment of its social ideal.

Those who did

not want social reform simply discounted this characteristic
of the SA.

In this they were aided by the NSDAP's oppo

nents, who also thought that SA egalitarianism was a sham.
Many Germans both in and out of the party, however, were
concerned about the class divisions so prevalent in German
society.

This concern was especially widespread among

young Germans who had found it impossible to obtain posi
tions for themselves in the depressed economy of the Weimar
Republic.

These young men often identified with the middle

or upper class but were not

really part of either of these

social strata.

income many of these dfeclass&

In terms of

youths could be more properly placed in the lower class, but
they rarely had anything in
workers.

common with unionized factory

For such persons the Nazi claim that it would end

Germany's class divisions was very inviting.
old system these men were excluded.

Under the

Under the National

Socialist state to come they would be equals in a new so
ciety based upon the external, physical and military vir
tues of the German middle and upper classes.
For young idealistic Germans the SA was more than
just a model of the Nazi future; it provided an opportunity
for them to belong at once.

In the absence of any other

organization to identify with the storm troopers became an
attractive outlet for youthful energies that were otherwise
being wasted.
18

18

The peculiar structure of the SA made it

The Nazis tended to be interested primarily in
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especially appealing.

For of all the Nazi organizations,

the SA most closely resembled a secret society.

Hannah

Arendt has characterized secret societies as ones that
"adopt a strategy of consistent lying to deceive the non
initiated external masses, demand unquestioning obedience
from their members who are held together by allegiance to a
19
frequently unknown and always mysterious leader.”
She
goes on to suggest that such groups divide the world between
"sworn blood brothers and an indistinct inarticulate mass of
20
sworn enemies."
This description aptly fits several of
Btlcherl's "ten commandments."

As he put it, "Amongst your

friends be careful what you say.

It is not good to wear

your heart on your tongue, when everyone within hearing dis
tance is not with us."
amongst yourselves?

And, "Can you discuss matters

Yes, but you must keep it quiet and do

not let anyone in on the discussion.
away to the enemy rabble."

21

Do not give anything

These SA "commandments" urged

(continued) supporters of voting age. As Walter
Laqueur observed, "All through the twenties the Hitler
Youth remained a negligible force." Laqueur, Young Germany,
p. 191. Even in 1930-31 after the Nazi electoral Ibreakthrough the Hitler Youth only had about twenty thousand
members.
Ibid., p. 69. The NSDAP was not a children's move
ment; rather, its appeal was to young adults facing an un
certain future.
1Q

Arendt, Totalitarianism, p. 376.

20Ibid., pp. 376-77.
2iH.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.12.28,
Aus der NSDAP."
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members to remain aloof and secretive toward the uninitia
ted.

Other "commandments" ordered storm troopers to "culti

vate the company and companionship of your fellow members"
and to dedicate their lives to "the great ideas of Adolf
Hitler."

22

For those who were otherwise excluded, this

type of organization offered the intimate identification so
lacking in the rest of their lives.

The organizational

form of the secret society was also socially acceptable.
For young d€class6 Germans the SA was easily identifiable
with such harmless secret clubs as the Masons or University
fraternities, which in turn were strongholds of the middle
and upper classes.

For young men membership in the SA

meant that they could immediately belong to a socially re
spectable type of organization while they were fighting for
their proper place in a future Nazi society.

Yet the ega

litarianism of storm troopers was peculiarly contradictory.
Members were considered equal within the SA, but they be
lieved themselves superior to outsiders, especially to such
outsiders as Jews and Marxists.
A final feature of the SA that underlines its charact.i as a secret society was its emphasis on symbolism and
ritual.

As George Mosse observed, "These myths did not

stand in isolation, but were made operative through the use
of symbols.

Symbols were visible, concrete objectifications
23
of the myths in which people could participate."
The most

23

Mosse, Nationalization, p. 7.
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obvious example of the use of symbols in the SA was the
distinctive collar tabs and other trappings to identify
various storm troop units and ranks.

Each SA contingent
had collar tabs denoting its geographic origin. 24 Officers

were designated by distinctive symobls of rank.

Group

leaders wore one star on their collar tabs, troop leaders
two stars, storm leaders three stars and Standartenfilhrer
four stars.

Standartenftihrer were also entitled to wear a

silver cord on their shoulders.

Their adjutants were

marked by the insignia of a wolf on the right lapel; this
badge symbolized the werewolf, which in German mythology
represented the partriotic guerrilla fighter carrying on
the struggle against an army of occupation.
Higher SA
25
officials wore silver and gold oak leaves,
specially
decorated caps, and in the case of SA leader Pfeffer, red
26
shoulder pads, gold cords and a red cap.
All of these
devices bear marked similarities to the colorful pageantry
of such benign organizations as the Masons; they were also
employed in an attempt to ape military forms.

Finally,

such mythological symbols as the wolf and oak leaves were
part of the effort to make the SA into a quasi-religious
24H.A. Reel 57, Folder 1391, "Festzug der NSDAP
Ntirnberg."
2S y mbolically the oak was the tree of liberty.
Mosse, Nationalization, p. 41.
2®H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 27.12.28."
For a list of the various SA ranks and their responsibili
ties see Appendix C.
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organization.

This trait, however, can best be seen by ex

amining the Nazi cult of death.
The central event and myth of the NSDAP was the BeerHall Putsch and the blood sacrifice of the Nazis who fell
on the streets of Munich on November 9, 1923.

All SA units

were ritually linked to the Putsch by means of the conse
cration of their flags which was carried out at national
party days rallies by touching the ensigns of new contin
gents to the party's blood banner, the flag that was carried
on the day of the Beer-Hall Putsch.

For a movement born of

the bloody sacrifice of World War I and reconsecrated in the
slaughter of the Feldherrnhalle, a continuing blood ceremony
was necessary.

The dedication of SA flags was useful in

linking the post-1925 storm troopers with the Putsch, but
this event occurred only once for each SA unit.

The con

tinuing ceremony that celebrated the cult of death was the
commemorative day of mourning conducted by every Nazi
Ortsgruppe from 1926.

In memory of those who had fallen on

November 9, 1923, all flags were placed at half mast or
unfurled.

Members were obliged to visit neighboring grave

yards to mourn all those who had died for the party since
1919.

All National Socialist daily and weekly newspapers

appeared bordered in black and Nazis wore black arm bands.
Finally, all party groups proceeded to the highest mountain
27
in their vicinity to light a fire symbolic of rebirth.
^7VB, October 25, 1928, p. 3, "Anordnung 29” and
VB, October 30, 1929, p. 3, "Anordnung Nr. 47."
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Karl Dietrich Bracher has described this type of observance
as one of the "grotesque practices" that "testified to the
quasi-religious impact"

28

-

of Nazi propaganda. It w a s , however,

far more than merely a bizarre Nazi ceremony; it was one of
the unifying rites of the movement, and the SA played a
central role in this mummery.
The meaning of the memorial ceremonies can best be
understood by examining one of them.

In 1928 the NSDAP of

Gau Hessen-Nassau-Stid held its annual Gautag on November 9.
The event was fully described by an eyewitness.
were draped with flags of the Third Reich.
was dressed in black serge.

The walls

The platform

The band played patriotic and

funeral music as the membership remembered the fallen dead.
Speakers discussed the German will to freedom with allusions
to such famous freedom fighters as Andreas Hofer.

The meet

ing concluded with the assembled storm troopers making the
following pledge.

"All of us who dedicate ourselves to the

founding of the Third Reich are willing to lay down our
29
lives."
Even death was to hold no terror, since it re
presented "the first sign of the awakening of the German
30
will to freedom"
and a form of purification for the
fatherland.
The cult of death was useful to the party in a num28Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 148.
2®H.a . Reel 28, Folder 432, Adalbert Gimbel "So
Kaempften wir."
30Ibid.
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ber of ways.

It was a prime justification for the violence

of the SA and for the activism of the party.

According to

Hitler, the NSDAP was born in war and consecrated in the
blood sacrifice of the Putsch.

The ultimate victory of the

movement and the revolutionary changes it was to bring about
were legitimized by these blood sacrifices.

The cult of

death also established overt parallels between the Nazi party
and early Christianity.

For the suffering of Christian

martyrs, the Nazis substituted the death of the men at the
Feldherrnhalle.

This parallel allowed Hitler to use the
31
Catholic imagery that had so impressed him as a child.
As an acolyte in Lambach monastery, Hitler "was stirred to
the depths by images of suffering and despair against a
32
background of triumphant belief in salvation."
The cult
of death secularized this same system of symbols.

In both

Christianity and Nazism the blood sacrifice was a focal
point of attention.

It validated the activities of both

groups and held the promise of the establishment of a com
pletely reborn world.

The martyrs produced by the activi

ties of the SA, like those of the early Christians, seemed
to bear witness to the ultimate victory of their movement.
For the Nazis the memorial mourning services of November 9
were the equivalent of communion.

These quasi-religious

^ E r n s t Nolte has properly concluded that, "The
dominant trait in Hitler's personality was infantilism."
Hitler's use of Catholic imagery was simply another mani
festation of that trait.
Nolte, Three Faces, p. 368.
-^Fest, Hitler, p. 152.
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rituals of the storm troopers emphasized the revolutionary
character of the NSDAP, while at the same time they were
performed in comfortingly traditional forms.

Violence,

tradition and revolution all came together in the SA through
the cult of death which synthesized National Socialist acti
vities into a coherent pattern leading both to a real and
to a mystical rebirth of Germany.
Perhaps the most important function of the SA was
found in these ritual observances.

It staged key party

rites that lent meaning and significance to Nazi activities.
The storm troopers were the party's angels of death, mar
tyrs, and the prototypes of the new society all wrapped up
in one.

They were the promise of the Nazi revolution,and the

men who, by vicarious participation in the blood sacrifice
of the Putsch, were entitled to carry out that revolution
in practice.

The role of the SA as agents of the National

Socialist transformation of Germany continued long after
1930.

The savage street violence of 1932-33 was largely

the work of the storm troopers.

The anti-Jewish pogrom of

19 38 known as Crystal Night was carried out by the same
group.

Lastly, the final solution of the Jewish problem

was effected by the SS, the direct heir and successor of the
33
SA.
None of this was by chance.
The cult of death of
33Hitler elevated the SS above the SA in 19 34 mainly
because the storm troopers had ceased to be an elite group
as a result of mass expansion and had become a threat to
Hitler's position because of their continuing revolutionary
fervor.
Nevertheless, the SS which began its career as a
subordinate group within the SA carried out the same duties
that the storm troopers were expected to perform after the
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the late twenties had prepared the SA and its subsidiary, the
SS, for their future tasks.

Hitler's promise of a reborn and

purified Germany was inextricably tied to the existence of the
storm troopers, the ritually cleansed executioners of the Nazi
revolution.
SA activites allowed the Nazis to create a series of
ambivalent impressions for the general public.

For conserva

tives the SA— because of its military trappings and disci
pline— was the embodiment of Imperial militarism.

For others

it was the necessary tool of repression for a war of the rich
against the mutinous poor, and a way to avert an eventual com
munist victory.

For dgclassg German youth the SA provided an

organization that both embraced middle-class external values,
and promised to reform the class structure that had rejected
these young men.

In the socially appealing guise of a secret

society, the SA embodied the party's social idealism.

The

storm troopers were all of the above to different people,
but most of all through the cult of death the storm troopers
were the sanctified executioners of Nazi policy and the
living promise of the Nazi revolution of the future.

It was

this promise that enabled the NSDAP to retain its most rad
ical and energetic supporters.

It also helped the party

attract those voters who desperately wanted major change.
The credentials of the NSDAP as a totalitarian movement
capable of transforming Germany rested largely on the actions,
character and rituals of the SA.
3 3 (continued)party came to power.

CHAPTER 10
THE CHARISMATIC NATURE OF THE NAZI LEADERSHIP AND
THE DYNAMICS OF NAZI CAMPAIGNING
The question of the nature of authority within the
NSDAP goes to the heart of any discussion of Nazi propaganda
drives.

Throughout this dissertation the party has been

described as a dynamic movement characterized by ceaseless
activism.

Himmler in his saturation campaigns, Reinhardt

in his initial recruiting efforts for the speakers' school,
and Muchow with his street cells— all relied upon the un
flagging enthusiasm of party men who were willing to volun
teer their services free of charge.

At the same time stren

uous efforts were made by the propaganda section to central
ize Nazi activities; Reinhardt's school and the Volkischer
Beobachter were especially effective in doing this.

Finally,

the party was notable for a considerable amount of local
initiative and an opportunistic willingness to adopt suc
cessful regional innovations.

In short, the NSDAP managed

to combine intense activism with considerable centralization
in a movement characterized by a willingness to experiment
with new programs on a regional level.

One of the princi

pal reasons the Nazis were able to function in this fashion
can be found in the party's peculiar leadership structure.
219
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On a theoretical level the NSDAP appeared to operate
as a strict hierarchy based upon Fuhrerprinzip.

Wolfgang

Dorn describes this doctrine as the belief that all power
comes from above and that those in lower positions are auto
matically required to obey their

superiors.

Dorn goes on

to state, however, that this was merely an ideal and that in
practice considerable internal conflict existed in the
NSDAP.^

In discussing the Nazi party of the late twenties

one does not find the concept of Fiihrerpr inzip very helpful.
It seems to have been primarily a propaganda ploy designed
to convince the unobservant that the party was a model of
rational organization.

In reality though,the entire National

Socialist leadership structure— seemingly based upon hier
archical

principles— was little more than a facade masking

rather chaotic and confused lines of
On the national

authority.

level Hitler tended to function as

the absolute charismatic leader of the movement.
NSDAP, he was viewed as

Within the

the personal embodiment of the

coming German rebirth.During the Weimar Republic

theNazi

party was even referred to as the "Hitler Movement," and
this designation was entirely appropriate.

Belief in Adolf

Hitler and absolute obedience of his directives were arti
cles of faith which were never seriously challenged after
the Bamberg Conference of 1926.

2

Hitler’s special position

^Dorn, FUhrerideologie, p. 279.
2
Nyomarkay, Charisma, passim. Also see Chapter 2,
p. 41, ftn. 19. and pp. 50-52.
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enabled the Reichsleituner to impose its authority of the
party's subordinate officials, for in practice,

it tended

to function as an organizational extension of the Fuhrer.
National party leaders resided in Munich and were able to
meet frequently with him; as a result, orders issued by
such men as Himmler from the propaganda section and Gregor
Strasser as organizational chief were taken by the member
ship as coming second-hand from Hitler himself.
Within the NSDAP such orders had the force of law,
but this absolute authority was not exercised on most
issues.

The party had the potential for considerable

centralization, but this remained largely
twenties.

latent in the

Instead of controlling all activities, the Munich

leadership tended to exercise pre-emptive authority over the
NSDAP.

On questions that were considered important, speci

fic directives were issued, but on most matters Munich re
mained silent and allowed subordinate leaders to make their
own decisions.
The theoretically absolute power of the Munich
leadership has led to some erroneous conclusions about the
degree of central control present in the NSDAP.

Dietrich

Orlow asserts that the party after 1925 entered a period of
increasing bureaucratization and centralization.

One of the

main thrusts of Hitler's actions, Orlow states, was "the
transformation of members into reliable party workers"
through the establishment of "an efficient administrative
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apparatus and bureaucratic forms of administration."

3

He

further contends that by 1928 this process had reached a
very advanced stage.
cisions

"Hitler made all major political de

(and defined what these w e re), Hess made the routine

political decisions, while the division chiefs of the
Reichsleitung made routine administrative decisions.

The

Gauleiters carried these out for their geographic regions
. . . .

Finally local leaders carried out the orders of
4
their Gauleitungs."
Thus, leadership in the NSDAP was
characterized by "a concentration of all but routine deci5
sions in the person of Adolf Hitler."
This description
of the party seems to be based as much on a priori assump
tions as upon the evidence.

Orlow believes that it was

only natural for the NSDAP to develop a "highly centralized
and hierarchical" organizational structure,6 for this was
"the most effective form of controlling and communicating
within a mass society:
they needed a highly bureaucratized
7
administration."
He does present some evidence to support
these conclusions, but it is highly questionable whether
Orlow's depiction of the NSDAP is accurate.
■^Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 78.
4Ibid., p. 151.
5Ibid., p. 150.
®Ibid, p. 7.
7Ibid.
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The first flaw in Orlow*s view of the Nazi party is
the person of Hitler himself.

In a truly centralized or

ganization one would expect that all orders would emanate
from Hitler.

In practice, however, very few directives

were issued by the Fiihrer.

Probably the most important

reason for this was that Hitler was an almost classically
undisciplined person.

He was unable to keep to strict

schedules, much to the chagrin of numerous assassins.

He

worked in fits and starts and did absolutely nothing much
of the time.

He was incapable of concentrating on routine

tasks for long periods of time.

These personality traits

seem to have been deeply ingrained perhaps even dating back
to his youth.

In Mein Kampf Hitler severely criticized his

father, an Austrian customs' official, for wasting his life
on trivia, and clearly expressed his opinion of routine
work in the following passage.

"I . . . grew sick to my

stomach at the thought of sitting in an office, deprived of
my liberty, ceasing to be master of my own time and being
compelled to force the contents of a whole life into blanks
that had to be filled out."

8

In the late twenties the personal characteristics
of the Fiihrer were very much in evidence.

During much of

this period he "lived largely in retirement at Obersalzburg,
9
often virtually invisible for weeks.”
Hitler even cutback
®Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 8.
9Fest, Hitler, p. 250.
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the number of speeches he delivered.

In 1927 he spoke

fifty-six times, while in 1929 he made only twenty-seven
public appearances.

It was during these years that he began

to cultivate an image of semi-divine remoteness producing
many complaints about his "negligent conduct of party
10
affairs."
Even Orlow comments that, "Hitler often left
written communications addressed personally to him unans
wered for several w e e k s . " ^
Hitler's neglect of the day-to-day activities of the
party was partially a result of his temperament, but the
policy also had a coldly practical rationale.

Even while

he was in prison, the FUhrer realized that one of his great
est assets was his aloofness from the petty bickering that
discredited his rightist rivals.

The speaking prohibition

after his release further convinced him of the usefulness
of personal

isolation in enhancing his image.

After 1925

Hitler rarely intervened in party operations and then pri
marily on a policy level.

The Bamberg Conference was almost

the only major instance of his involvement in intra-party
affairs during this period.

Here, the Fiihrer became active

only after he was convinced that his position as leader was
threatened by the northern faction.

After settling the

dispute, Hitler retired to a position of splendid isolation
and refused to meddle in ordinary party matters.
10Ibid., p. 254.
^ O r l o w , Nazi Party, p. 146.

He left
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the divisive task of running his movement to subordinates
and concentrated upon allowing his image as a man of destiny
to grow.

Hitler chose to maintain his standing as absolute

ruler of the Nazi party by refraining from leading it in
its ordinary activities.
No one within the NSDAP questioned Hitler's all
embracing power, but in the absence of any action by the
Ftihrer, his subordinates were not only free but obligated
to make decisions on their own for the benefit of the move
ment.

The Nazi political machine of the late twenties was

largely a product of the lack of administrative centraliza
tion.

As propaganda chief, Himmler initiated the saturation

campaign as well as other techniques.

12

Gauleiter Reinhardt

developed his school for orators without benefit of any
13
instructions from the National leadership.
Czarnowski and
Goebbels started programs which led to the slide and film
14
services.
None of these schemes were originated by
Hitler.

Instead they were developed independently by his

underlings.

Orlow concluded that the NSDAP was character

ized by "a concentration of all but routine decisions in
15
the person of Adolf Hitler."
The development of the Nazi
12

See Chapter 4.

i:*See Chapter 5.
14
See Chapter 6.
15Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 150.
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propaganda apparatus casts much doubt on this assertion.
Rather, the NSDAP seems to have been organized as "a pliable
and vigorous instrument for [Hitler's] aims."16
selectively centralized.

It was only

The Munich leadership was capable

of imposing its will on the party in the name of Hitler and
did so by adopting successful regional innovations.

Other

wise, Nazi leaders at all levels remained free to conduct
experiments that might prove useful to National Socialism.
The above conclusions on the nature of the NSDAP
tend to conflict with the second part
tion of the party.

of Orlow's descrip

He asserts that by the late twenties the

NSDAP was showing tendencies of becoming a top-heavy bureau
cratic organization with "increasingly cumbersome decision
making processes that just as inevitably accompanied
17
bureaucratic growth."
According to this view, operations
below the national level were conducted on the principle of
strict subordination of lower officials to their superiors
in a chain of command.

Yet Orlow fails to provide anything

approaching a comprehensive definition of what he means by
a bureaucracy.

The closest he comes to doing this is in

his introduction where he describes bureaucracies as ideally
"human computers" that "systemize the work of the organiza18
tion" and'depersonalize the agent doing the work."
The
16Fest, Hitler, p. 228.
17

Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 150.

18Ibid., p. 7.
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NSDAP, he goes on to explain, did not depersonalize its
agents but was nonetheless a bureaucracy. 19

This confused

effort at establishing the bureaucratic character of the
Nazi party defies refutation, since one remains unclear as
to what Orlow is trying to denote by the term.

Neverthe

less, it is useful to examine the nature of leadership with
in the party if only to determine its role in promoting Nazi
activism.
Before the hypothesis that the NSDAP was a bureau
cratic organization can be tested, one must first clarify
the term.

According to Max Weber, bureaucracies

are

characterized by 1), "Fixed and official jurisdictional
areas"? 2), stable distribution and strict delimitation by
rules of "the authority to give the commands required for
the discharge of . . . duties"; and 3}, exclusive employ
ment of "persons who have the generally regulated qualifications to serve.

„ 20

The NSDAP did not meet any of the criteria set
forth in this precise definition.

After the party came to

power, it was notable for bringing Germany to the brink of
administrative chaos.

Government under the Nazis has been

described best by David Schoenbaum as "institutional
21
Darwinism."
"New institutions grew, flourished or died,
19Ibid., pp. 8-9.
20

Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 196.

21David Schoenbaum, Hitler* s Social Revolution: Class
and Status in Nazi Germany (Garden City, New York: Anchor,
t ^ 7) p. 19<rr
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spawned mutations, struggled for survival, and thrust their
offshoots under the very doors of the established minis
tries . . . .
of nature."

The process was a kind of bureaucratic state

22

This description of the National Socialist

state in action hardly fits Weber's definition of bureau
cracy.

Official jurisdictions, duties and lines of command

were thoroughly confused.
jungle prevailed.

In the NSDAP the law of the

Organizations and individuals prospered

or withered according to their ability to grasp authority.
As for the selection of qualified officials, Hitler followed
no clear pattern in choosing his secondary leaders; they
23
came from diverse backgrounds
and either succeeded or
failed as their capabilities dictated.

The Nazi party was

never a bureaucratic institution.
In terms of organizational structure, the NSDAP can
perhaps best be described as an almost purely charismatic
movement.

Weber defines charismatic movements in the fol

lowing way:
"In contrast to any kind of bureaucratic
organization of offices, the charismatic
structure knows nothing of a form or of an
ordered procedure of appointment or dis
missal.
It knows no regulated 'career,'
'advancement,' ’salary,’ or regulated
and expert training of the holder of
charisma or of his aids (sic). It knows
no agency of control or appeal, no local
bailiwicks or exclusive functional juris
dictions; nor does it embrace permanent
institutions like our bureaucratic
22Ibid., pp. 199-200.
2^Orlow, Nazi Party, p. 172.
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'departments, ' which are
of persons and of purely
charisma."24

independent
personal

Hitler's charismatic role within the party as a possessor
25
of "special gifts . . . not accessible to everyone11
has
never been seriously disputed.

26

Nazis tended to accept

the Fdhrer's commands because they believed him to be
Germany's

savior and the personalized basis of the coming

German renaissance.

Similarly orders

from the Reichsleitung

were usually accepted without question because this organi
zation, composed of men in close personal contact with
Hitler, tended to act as an institutional extension of the
Fiihrer.

The role of subordinate leaders stationed away

from Munich, however, was somewhat different.

The Gauleiters

had to assert their authority without any more than formal
support from the messianic leader of the movement.

The

methods these men employed to control their local organiza
tions provides numerous clues to the nature of authority
within the NSDAP.
The Gauleiters asserted control over their sub
leaders by combining a certain amount of derivative power,
acquired through their official appointment, with demonstra
tions of their personal talents for leadership.

Hitler, as

the undisputed master of the movement, was able to transmit
2^Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max W e b e r , p. 246.
25Ibid., p. 245.
26

See Nyomarkay, Charisma, passim.
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some of his own prestige to his subordinates.

These men

held their offices by virtue of being chosen by the Fiihrer
and thus were accorded a certain amount of respect automa
tically.

Nevertheless, this delegated authority was rarely

sufficient to insure that a Gauleiter would be able to con
tinue to exercise control in his area.

Like all party
27
officials, he was essentially a charismatic leader.
No
body expected a Gauleiter to possess the same amount of
charisma as Hitler.

These regional chieftains were not

expected to be messiahs destined to bring about Germany's
rebirth.

They were, however, expected to possess some

charismatic qualities.

Gauleiters had to demonstrate their

personal courage, their willingness to make sacrifices for
the cause and their ability to lead party activities.

If

they failed to convince subordinates that they possessed
these qualities, sub-leaders were free to revolt— for in
the last resort authority was based, as in all charismatic
organizations, upon consent.^

Such insubordination was

often based upon loyalty to Hitler rather than upon any
implied criticism of him.

A Gauleiter was especially vul

nerable to attack if it appeared that he was not doing
enough for the movement.

Intra-party factionalism in such

27

Orlow does mention that the Gauleiters served as
"the romantic agent of history in the person of Hitler."
Orlow, N*zi Party, p. 145. He tends, however, to lay all
of his emphasxs on their role as "the subordinate of a
thoroughly unromantic bureaucratic superior, the
Reichsleitung." Ibid.
28Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 249.
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instances underscores the charismatic nature of Nazi author
ity; the Gauleiter came under assault precisely because he
29
had proven himself inadequate for his assigned task,
and
thus had failed as a charismatic leader.

An incident in

WUrttemberg provides the clearest example from the late
twenties of a regional dispute motivated by a failure of
leadership.
Wiirttemberg was an especially unpromising area for
the Nazis.

The state was dominated by the Social Democrats

and the Catholic Center.

Members of both of these parties

were peculiarly invulnerable to Nazi appeals.

The Social

ists were able to maintain their following largely because
the SPD was part of an all-embracing working class society.
The party and its associate organization, the free trade
unions, represented laborers both politically and in econo
mic negotiations with employers.

Even workers' free time

was organized through a series of quasi-socialist clubs.
All of these activities tended to re-enforce the identifi
cation of the working class with the SPD.

The adherents of

the Center party were also part of an all-embracing organi
zation, which differed from that of the SPD only in being
less socially homogeneous.

Here, the basis of identifica

tion was religious conviction.

From this starting point

Catholics were organized into various clubs and even into
labor unions with overtly Catholic allegiances.
29lbid., p. 246.

Politically
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the Center party was mainly the representative of church
interests, and those who showed signs of straying from the
fold were often subjected to harangues by parish priests.
The Nazis did not make significant progress in regions dom
inated by the SPD or the Center until after 1930, and even
then NSDAP vote totals were lower in these areas than else
where in Germany.30
Given the best possible leaders, Nazi prospects in
Wtirttemberg were bleak.

Weaknesses in leadership further

exacerbated the situation.

The Gauleiter of Wiirttemberg

was Wilhelm Murr who lived in Esslingen, instead of in
Stuttgart, the principal city of the state.

Since early

19 28 he had been carrying on a bitter feud with Nazi Reich
stag deputy Wilhelm Dreher, the man most closely identified
with the development of the party in Stuttgart; and the
dispute was worsened by the failure of the National Social
ists to make significant progress in this part of Germany.
Mur r 's conduct was frequently called into question, and
toward the end of 1928 an open factional struggle broke out
between the Gauleiter and the Stuttgart leaders.
The opposition against Murr was spearheaded by the
youthful chief of the city group, Hans Kuhn.

Kuhn also

served as head of Stuttgart's SA units, a bureaucratically
unsound confusion of duties.

He was supported in his revolt

by the former leader of the Gau's Hitler Youth, the Gau's
30Besson, Wtirttemberg, passim.
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secretary, the editor of the regional newspaper and the
area's treasurer.

This group charged Murr with a number of

serious and petty offenses, and demanded that he resign or
be dismissed.

All the allegations focused on acts of either

incompetence or corruption.

The Gauleiter was accused of

spending party money to buy an
take his family on Sunday trips.

automobile that he used to
The Kuhn faction further

contended that Murr had exploited his position to hire a
friend as Gau propaganda chief at 80 RM per month, an ac
tion that his critics considered to be both corrupt and
incompetent.

The person in question was at the same time

receiving unemployment compensation; moreover, Kuhn dis
missed him as an effective propagandist on the grounds that
he was born in Bohemia and had "no command of the German
31
language either spoken or written."
The Gau's heavy debt,
over 2,000 RM in December, was taken by the rebels as proof
32
of the Gauleiter's poor business management.
Finally and
most damning of all, Murr was charged with having no speak33
ing ability at all.
For the Stuttgart faction, this de
ficiency alone was sufficient cause for his removal, since
it negated his value as a leader in propaganda actions.
H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wurttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 23.1.29,
Aus der NSDAP."
32Ibid. For a discussion of the role of Nazi sub
leaders in maintaining the financial integrity of their
organizations see Appendix D.
33Ibid.

This often petty and totally non-ideological dis
pute arose from Murr's complete incompetence and lack of
charisma.

In a purely bureaucratic organization either the

Gauleiter or Kuhn and his allies would have been dismissed
at once in order to restore clear lines of command.
did not happen in Wiirttemberg.

This

Rather, the factional strug

gle lasted for over a year with neither side winning in the
end.

The Reichsleitung could not accede to the demands of

the rebels because Murr was appointed to his position by
Hitler.

Thus, the revolt against the Gauleiter was an in

direct affront to the Fiihrer's own authority.

At the same

time, since Murr's failing was mainly a personal lack of
talent as a leader, headquarters in Munich could not restore
his authority anymore than they could make him into an
inspiring commander.

Murr attempted to impose his author

ity upon the Stuttgart branch during a meeting on December
34
20, 1928 and was shouted down by the membership.
As a
charismatic figure, Murr had been totally rejected, the
membership flatly refusing to follow him.

In a party based
35
upon voluntary subordination of members to leaders,
Murr*

authority had crumbled.
The factional struggle in Wiirttemberg was embarassing to the Reichsleitung, especially since no immediate
34H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 23.1.29,
Aus der NSDAP."
35Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 249.
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solution was possible.

It simply dragged on with both sides

making various appeals to national' headquarters in a tho36
roughly disorganized fashion.
Kuhn resigned his office
as chief of the group in Stuttgart, but kept his position in
the SA command.

Murr was unable to remove Kuhn from this

post because the city's storm troopers were loyal to him
and also because the Gauleiter lacked authority over the
organization.

In any case simple dismissal was not enough.

That had been tried with Murr assuming the duties of
Ortsgruppefuhrer of Stuttgart, but the membership simply
refused to obey the Gauleiter.

The dispute in Wiirttemberg

continued, bringing the party in the area to the brink of
chaos.
The first move by the Reichsleitung to deal with
the situation came in May, 19 28 with the appointment of exNaval Lieutenant a. D. von Jagow as head of the Gau's storm
37
troopers.
Von Jagow was technically appointed by the
national leader of the SA, von Pfeffer, but he seems to
have been chosen to do far more than command the area's
storm troopers.

His job was to restore some semblance of

order to the Gau's political organization and apparently
several members of

the Reichsleitung were involved in his

36H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 3.4.29,
Aus der NSDAP."
3^H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.6.29,
Aus der NSDAP."

selection.

38

Von Jagow, a former aide of the notorious

Commander Ehrhardt, had a considerable reputation as a hero
of the Free Corps period.

He quickly restored discipline

in the Gau's SA units and apparently began to insinuate him
self into the process of making regional political deci
sions.

At any rate, after his arrival Wiirttemberg began

to adopt propaganda programs initiated by the national
leadership and to copy highly successful local schemes such
as the Muchow street cell system.

The amount of party acti

vity greatly increased; and with the general upswing in
National Socialist prospects in late 1929, the quarrel be
tween Kuhn and Murr became less important to members.

As

late as the beginning of 1930, however, the Wiirttemberg
police reported that the NSDAP was doing poorly there by
comparison to the rest of Germany at least in part due to
39
continuing factional conflict.
Von Jagow finally put an
end to this petty internal quarrel by expelling Kuhn as
40
Stuttgart's SA leader
and throwing him and twenty-eight
41
of his followers out of the party on February 16, 19 30.
The solution of the dispute in Wiirttemberg was
38Ibid.
^9 H.A. Reel 58, Folder 140 3, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 5.3.30.
Aus der NSDAP."
40 Ibid.
41H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staatspolizel Wiirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 19.3.30,
Aus der NSDAP."
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exactly what could be expected from a charismatic organiza
tion.

Both factions ultimately lost.

Gauleiter Murr was

never able to regain the wholehearted support of party men.
He was in effect replaced by von Jagow, who continued to
play a prominent role into the early years of the Third
Reich.

At the same time, Murr was not dismissed; his power

simply withered away.

This administratively untidy solution

of the problem of an incompetent Gauleiter was typical of
the Nazi approach to organization.

As Weber put it, "the

charismatic structure knows nothing of a form or of an or42
dered procedure of appointment or dismissal.”
Von Jagow's
usurpation of power in Wurttemberg was but one example of
the Nazi practice--that later became commonplace— of allow
ing party leaders to carve out empires for themselves at
the expense of men in technically superior positions.

This

kind of empire building and chaotic organization was much
in evidence after 19 33.
The fact that Murr was not dismissed but simply
shunted aside was also typical of Nazi procedure.

Murr had

been appointed by Hitler, making it difficult for the Fiihrer
to remove him in response to ptossure from below.

Hitler

always insisted that his power over the party was absolute,
and that this power was not based upon any feeble vote but
upon the universal faith of party members in his mission.
To bow to pressure from below in the case of Gauleiter Murr
42Gerth and Mills (eds.), From Max Weber, p. 246.
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would be to admit a degree of party democracy.
was unwilling to do.

This Hitler

Murr remained secure in his position,

but he also lost most of his real control.
The fate of Hans Kuhn was also predictable.

Kuhn

was tolerated only until the party was able to siphon off
his popular support.

As soon as von Jagow succeeded in

accomplishing this, Kuhn was expelled.

Inadvertently, the

young SA leader had challenged Hitler's authority by at
tacking the Ftihrer's appointee.

No matter how often Kuhn

and his followers proclaimed their loyalty and devotion to
Hitler, this act of rebellion was unforgivable.

Within the

NSDAP revolt from below could never be completely success
ful.

Such factional struggles might precipitate changes in

the distribution of political power, but in the end the
party was always compelled to expell the rebels in order to
reaffirm Hitler's absolute power and to discourage any in
cipient signs of democracy within the movement.
The criticism of Gauleiter Murr provides a good
example of what was expected of a Nazi regional leader.
First and foremost, a Gauleiter was expected to lead his
followers in vigorous and hopefully successful propaganda
drives.

He usually asserted his leadership in these ac-

tions by giving speeches.

43

In his role as charismatic

chieftain, the Gauleiter had to reaffirm his strength con
tinuously by following a course of never-ending activism.
A

In order to get an idea of the role of the Gau
leiters as speakers see Appendix A.

Another way for him to impress his subordinates was by con
spicuous self-sacrifice.

He could convince these men of hi
44
dedication to the cause by foregoing personal pleasures.
Lastly, a Gauleiter had to maintain close contact with his
sub-leaders.

Gauleiters did not have Hitler's reputation,

and thus were unable to foster an image of semi-divine de
tachment.

Their effectiveness was based upon the willing

ness of members to follow them.

This peculiar form of con

sent could be withdrawn, as it was in the case of Murr.

A

Gauleiter could not afford to ignore widespread discontent
within his organization.

It was not necessary for these

regional leaders to accede to the demands of their sub
ordinates, but at the same time it was fatal to a Gauleiter'
authority to allow dissatisfaction to smolder unnoticed.
The most effective way of dealing with intra-party strife
was to initiate a program of intense activism.

In this

fashion the Gauleiter was able to divert the thoughts of
his followers from internal problems and to concentrate
their attention on external party foes.

Consultation and

activism cured most intra-party difficulties and made obe
dience to the Gauleiter almost automatic.
Most Nazi Gauleiters in the late twenties seem to
have understood the requirements of their office.

This

meant that the case of Wilhelm Murr was not repeated else44This fits another part of Weber’s definition of
charismatic leadership.
See Gerth and Mills (eds.), From
Max Weber, p. 248.
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where.

Two Nazi Gauleiters provide clear examples of how

these regional officials were able to assert their author
ity and to function effectively.

Joseph Goebbels and Erich

Koch were both Rhinelanders appointed to serve as Gauleiters
far from home.

Goebbels was given the task of taming the

often restless organization in Berlin.
tiny Nazi party in East Prussia.
difficult assignments.

Koch took over the

Both of these men faced

They could expect a degree of local

resentment and were not immediately identified with their
new Gaus.
at once.

In both cases these problems evaporated almost
After a brief initial stage during which they

relied upon their derivative authority as Hitler's ap
pointees, they were able to gain the loyalty of their party
organizations on a personal level.

This was done through

deeds and not by a formal written commission.

By their

actions Goebbels and Koch were able to convince their sub
ordinates that they were worthy of being obeyed.
Goebbels' method for winning the support of Berlin's
Nazis was a program of intense activism.

Almost at once he

began a campaign centering on savage confrontations with
the communists.

The most spectacular incident of this poli45
tical drive was the bloody fight at the Pharus Hall.
By
leading his men at this rally, Goebbels added greatly to
his prestige.

In this battle and in other skirmishes, he

demonstrated his bravery and convinced the Berlin party
4 5For a description see Chapter 2, p. 59-60.
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that he was a courageous leader.

These fights also created

a common bond of experience between the Gauleiter and his
men.

All Governmental attempts to discipline Goebbels sim

ply backfired.

He was not criticized by his followers when

the party was banned in Berlin.

Instead, the local Nazis

took a peculiar pride in their Gauleiter being "a bad boy."
Short stays in various jails also added luster to his repu
tation.

For Nazis living in the Weimar Republic being an

outlaw was a praiseworthy achievement.

In the case of

Joseph Goebbels activism and lawlessness cemented his per
sonal hold on the Berlin party and the fact that he was not
a Berliner was soon forgotten.
Erich Koch in East Prussia established his authority
in a manner similar to that of Goebbels.

He used violence,

activism and visible self-sacrifice to impress his new
followers and win their support.

Koch arrived in East

Prussia on September 15, 1928, and by the middle of March
he had participated in four major hall fights.

A brawl in

the city of Leuth became an East Prussian party legend.
This battle took place on October 2, 1928 and resulted in
seven casualties.

These wounded men were tended by a group

of Nazi wives, as Gauleiter Koch went on to deliver a speech
46
in which he denounced Marxism.
Koch also used personal
appearances to cement his authority.
46H.A. Reel 48, Folder 1101,

In January and Febru"Preussiche Zeitung."
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ary, 1929, he spoke fourteen times in various parts of his
region.47

This grueling schedule was designed to convince

members of his dedication to the movement and was largely
successful in doing this.

One young bank clerk in recount

ing his early party experiences made
ment about his Gauleiter.

the following state

"If there were times when we

wanted to give up, we looked to him [Koch], who made the
greatest sacrifices.

He had at his disposal for the support

of the activities of the district,

for travel and propaganda,

and finally for his own maintenance, barely two hundred
48
marks.”
Koch's recipe for success included violence,
activism and visible self-sacrifice.

All of these attri

butes convinced the East Prussian Nazis that he was an
effective leader, and eliminated intra-party factionalism
in this region.

The Koch formula was emulated by Gauleiters

throughout Germany.

It insured party unity, but it also

meant that activism was not merely a desirable quality in
a Nazi secondary leader but an organizational necessity.

As

charismatic leaders the Nazi regional chieftains could only
maintain their positions by a continuous series of deeds.
The Gauleiters who failed to lead could expect to see their
authority wither away as was the case with Wilhelm Murr.
Joint participation in propaganda actions was vital
in cementing ties between Gauleiters and party members, but
47

VB, March 22, 1929, p. 3, "3 Monate Kampf um
Ostpreussen."
48Abel, Nazi Movement, p. 284.
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more formal organizational structures were needed to main
tain contact between secondary leaders and their subordi
nates.

In a bureaucratic organization clear lines of com

munication could have been established through correspon
dence.

This, however, did not happen in the NSDAP.

Even in

cases in which relatively complete collections of corres
pondence exist, it is clear that little business was con49
ducted in writing.
Gauleiters communicated with their
subordinates in person.

This was done casually during pro

paganda drives and more formally at leadership conferences.
The Nazi regional leadership conferences were un
usual institutions in a seemingly authoritarian movement.
At these meetings all of the party’s functionaries assem
bled to discuss plans for forthcoming campaigning.

Since

the Nazi party at its lower levels was notable for the large
number of offices available to members, this meant that all
active Nazis were invited to these conferences.

Usually

three or four men from each Ortsgruppe attended.

All Gau

speakers and students in Reinhardt's school were invited.
Finally, city sub-leaders down to the cell level could
attend.

The leadership conferences were a veritable con

gress of all the active party men in a region.

The purpose

of these meetings was to formulate tactical policy for the
Gau usually for a period of three or four months.
49

All

For an example of several years of complete
correspondence of a Bez irks fiihrer see H.A. Reels 9 and 10,
Correspondence of Siegfried Kasche.
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decisions on campaigning were arrived at by the consent of
the officials present.

The Gauleiter had to present his

program and answer any objections from the floor.

He had

to explain party tactics and policies that were unclear to
the membership, and he had to deal with suggestions or cri
ticisms.

In a way these conferences were the Nazi equiva50
lent of representative meetings.
At these gatherings the
Gauleiters obtained the active consent of their subordinates
for propaganda campaigns, while at the same time acquiring
useful information about the temper of the party and the
political situation in the area.
The leadership conferences existed because the
Gauleiters were in no position to give arbitrary orders to
their subordinates.

Lesser party officials had the right

of prior consultation before they committed themselves to a
course of action.

A regional chief who refused to consult

his sub-leaders was asking for trouble, since these men
could simply refuse to obey him.

If this type of passive

revolt occurred, there was little a Gauleiter could do to
remedy the situation for, in truth, all Nazi officials
^Detailed records of these meetings were not kept,
but one can get an idea of what went on by studying agendas
and newspaper reports from the VSlkischer Beobachter. See
VB, September 7, 19 28, p. 3, "Gautag des Gaues Berlin Brandenburg"; VB, November 3, 1928, p. 3, "Gautag HessenNassau-SUd"; VB, January 9, 1929, p. 3, "Gau Oberfranken";
VB, January 11, 1929, p. 3, "Gau Halle-Merseburg"; VB, Jan
uary 16, 19 29, p. 3, "Gau Rheinland-Gauvertretertag"; VB,
February 21, 1929, p. 3, "Organisatorische Arbeit in
Oberfranken." There are numerous other examples of descrip
tions of such meetings in the Vfllkischer Beobachter.
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tended to function as semi-autonomous political chieftains
united only in their common dedication to the cause of
Adolf Hitler.

These men were not paid by the party; so the

Gauleiter could not fire them.

They all had personal fol

lowings; so it was hard to expell them from the movement.
The case of Hans Kuhn is a good example of the difficulties
involved in dismissing a Nazi leader.

Unless the NSDAP was

willing to chance the loss of a subordinate leader's fol
lowers, expulsion was impractical.

The only effective way

of controlling Nazi officials was by involving them in the
decision-making process and in effect accepting their colla
boration on terms of a near partnership.

As long as a

Gauleiter appeared to be worthy of his position, he could
expect obedience after proper consultation.

Nevertheless,

if he displayed personal weakness or excessive arrogance,
his authority would collapse.
The Nazi leadership conferences are perhaps the
best argument against the theory that the party was bureau
cratically organized.

Their existence indicates that the

Gauleiters could not impose their will arbitrarily upon sub
leaders.
sonal.

Within the NSDAP authority was essentially per
Only Hitler, who was viewed as an idol to be wor

shipped slavishly, could impose his authority in writing.
The Gauleiters and other subordinate leaders had to culti
vate their followers in person.

Only if a Nazi chieftain

could convince his subordinates that he was serving the
common cause with special effectiveness could he hope to
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retain their loyalty.

The charismatic qualities appropriate

to a subordinate leader were enthusiasm, dedication and
above all activism in the interest of the movement.

A sub

leader lacking these qualities would find his power ephem
eral .
The Nazi party cannot be called a bureaucratic
organization without destroying the meaning of that term.
Orlow's description of the so-called bureaucratization of
the party after 1925 is incorrect.

His error is in mis

taking the trappings of bureaucracy

(such as modern account

ing methods)

for the reality of this kind of organization.

Rather, the NSDAP was almost a classically charismatic
movement at all levels of command, and this was one of the
most useful features of the party in the late twenties.
Nazi officials maintained a very weak hold on their follow
ers.

They were only able to exercise authority as long as

they could convince their subordinates that they deserved
their positions.

In short, legitimacy within the NSDAP

was based upon deeds and not written commissions.

The Nazi

official was compelled to work tirelessly for the movement
or drop out of a leadership role.

Activism was built into

the NSDAP's organizational structure and was as necessary
for party stability as it was for the expansion of the
movement.

Intra-party competition to better serve the

FUhrer also helped to foster an attitude favorable toward
innovations that might serve to demonstrate the zeal of
Nazi sub-leaders in promoting the NSDAP.

At the same time.
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efforts to centralize campaigning were immediately obeyed,
since Munich meant Hitler to the rank-and-file party offi
cials.

In this fashion the Nazi leadership structure man

aged to promote intense activism, while accepting consider
able centralized direction from the national leadership and
at the same time fostered the development of local innova
tions.

Wolfgang Sauer has perhaps best described the Nazi

system, stating that it was based upon the principle of
51
"stability through movement."
The facade of monolithic
solidarity based upon Ftthrerprinzip was merely a propaganda
device to disguise the charismatic nature of the National
Socialist leadership structure.

Karl Dietrich Bracher, Gerhard Schulz, and Wolf
gang Sauer, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung
(K81n: Westdeutscher Verlag, 19601 p. 689.

CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSIONS
The Nazi political breakthrough of 1930 was the
result of many factors.

Undoubtedly, the severe difficul

ties facing the Weimar Republic in the late twenties greatly
assisted the NSDAP.

The Nazis systematically exploited the

onset of the great depression, the Young Plan, and the
political crisis of 1930.

The party was powerless to create

these difficulties, but it could try to turn fortuitous
circumstances to its advantage by means of propaganda.

The

impact of Nazi campaigning on the electorate is not subject
to quantification; we can never know for certain what fac
tors convinced millions of Germans to support the NSDAP.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Nazis had to convince
a mass audience that they offered a viable alternative to
the Weimar system before they could effectively exploit dis
content.

This dissertation has dealt with the character of

Nazi propaganda and with the development of the Nazi politi
cal machine.

It makes no claim that propaganda alone

brought about the Nazi electoral victory.

The development

of an effective propaganda apparatus, however, was the most
important accomplishment of the party between 1928 and 1930;
248
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this political machine in turn was making a considerable
impression upon the public by 1930,

It is the contention

of this dissertation that the existence

and actions of

this propaganda apparatus was one of the factors accounting
for Nazi electoral success.
Nazi weaknesses in 1928 were all too evident.
Geoffrey Pridham has succinctly described the situation in
the following passages.

"Propaganda had been non-existent

in some areas," and "The Reichstag Election of 1928 . . .
made the Nazis aware of the limitations of their propaganda
The principal defects of the NSDAP that led to its failure
to attract mass support were the following:

1), "the appeal

of the party was limited geographically;" 2), "the scarcity
of party finance reduced the scale of

propaganda activity,"

and 3), "the effects of the lack of success on the morale
2
of party workers" were highly deleterious.
In short, "the
Nazis did not possess in 1928 a nationwide electoral machine
3
covering all areas of the country."
In the next two years
the Nazis directed their efforts toward overcoming these
difficulties and creating a propaganda apparatus that could
carry the party's message to all Germans and dominate poli
tical life.
The difficulty of improving sagging morale was
^"Pridham, Hitler's R i s e , p. 84.
2Ibid., p. 56.
•*Ibid. , p. 92.
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dealt with by mobilizing the membership as active parts of
the new Nazi propaganda apparatus.

After 1928 every Nazi

had the opportunity to play a role in the expansion of the
movement.

Ambitious Nazis could become speakers by taking

Reinhardt’s course.

Humbler members could display their

loyalty and devotion to the cause by handing out leaflets
or selling tickets as workers in one the the street cells.
In the years after 1928 the NSDAP became a truly partici
patory movement in which party men no longer felt themselves
powerless to shape events.

The active role of the member

ship increased the dynamism of the NSDAP while improving the
morale of ordinary Nazis, who could now view themselves as
part of a growing and vibrant movement.

The ever increasing

activism of individual party men made it possible for the
NSDAP to convince the public that the movement was charac
terized by dynamic growth.

Participation also heightened

the internal unity of the movement.

Activist members shared

common experiences which made them feel closer to each other
and to the NSDAP.

This camaraderie in turn helped the Nazis

to convince members and outsiders of the desirability of
such highly publicized Nazi goals as the Volksqemeinschaft.
The unity and brotherhood fostered by common experiences at
the propaganda front seemed to be replacing the lovingly
remembered camaraderie of the trenches of World War I .

For

outsiders such displays of dedication and harmony must have
been impressive.

Here was a movement that welcomed the

active participation of common men, inspired open profes-
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sions of faith and vast amounts of self-sacrificing work.
In the atmosphere of despair and impotence of the late twen
ties, this was a unique phenomenon.

The participatory party

developed by the Nazis to heighten sagging morale acted as
a powerful magnet attracting those who felt themselves
crushed and powerless when faced with the realities of
Germany in the late twenties.
Reliance upon ordinary party men as propagandists
also served to overcome the NSDAP's financial difficulties.
Reinhardt's speakers1 school, Czarnowski's slide service,
the Muchow street cell organization and the National Social
ist Auto Clubs all shared one thing in common; they were all
very nearly financially self-sufficient or even produced a
profit for the party.

Nazi rallies were specifically de4
signed to pay for themselves.
Finally, the party employed

very few professional workers.
staged by unpaid volunteers.

Most Nazi activities were
Even the party's few employees

were not paid very well and often depended primarily upon
their income as members of the Reichstag or a Landtag.

In

short, the party did not need major outside contributors.
Income from dues and occasional small or moderate contribu
tions was adequate to support the NSDAP.

The secret of Nazi

financing was self-sufficiency, not a hidden group of
patrons.
Most previous studies have emphasized the role of
the Nazi alliance with the conservatives to oppose the Young
^See Appendix D.
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Plan as an explanation of how the NSDAP overcame its finan
cial difficulties.

Konrad Heiden and Ernst Hanfstaengl first

offered this view.

Hanfstaengl went so far as to say that

the campaign against the Young Plan led directly to the
financing of Nazi activities by the industrial magnates
5
from the Ruhr, especially Emil Kirdorf.
There are several
problems with this interpretation.

Hanfstaengl was politi

cally inactive between 1928 and 1930.

Thus, his observa

tions were based upon gossip and pure speculation and can
not be viewed as those of an eyewitness.

Furthermore, his

remarks are not supported by any documentation.

Lastly,

Emil Kirdorf joined the NSDAP in 1927, but as Henry Turner
6
revealed, "In 1928 . . . Kirdorf resigned in anger.”
He
was not a party member during the crucial two years leading
up to the Nazi political breakthrough, and it is very un
likely that he contributed much money to the NSDAP.

At

this time, the theory that big business played a major role
in financing the party before 1930 stands largely refuted.
The crusade against the Young Plan— even without the
hypothetical support of big business for the Nazis— still
remained a focal point of discussion for those interested
in Nazi finances.

Joachim Fest summarized his views in the

following statement:

"After concluding the alliance, the

Heiden, National Socialism, p. 124 and Hanfstaengl,
Hitler, p. 148.
^Turner, Nazism, p. 93.
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Nazi party for the first time had funds enough to crank up
its excellent propaganda apparatus.

It at once began show

ing the public a style of propaganda of unprecedented radi7
cality and impact."
Fest seems to assume that the NSDAP
needed an infusion of outside funds in order to begin cam
paigning in earnest.
terpretation.

There are several flaws in this in

Fest refers to an already existent and ex

cellent propaganda machine which the Nazis were able to
"crank up" for the first time with the funds provided by
their conservative allies.

How such a political machine

could be created when the party was unable to use it for
lack of proper funding is not explained.

If the Nazi pro

paganda apparatus already existed at the time of the con
servative alliance, then this alliance was not crucial to
the development of the NSDAP*s political machine.

Further

more, money from conservative sources earmarked for the
NSDAP dried up as soon as the referendum on the Young Plan
was concluded in December, 1929.

As Henry Turner concluded,

"There is not a trace of documentary evidence . . . that
any of Hugenberg's resources were thereafter diverted to the
g
Nazis."
Yet, Nazi campaigning intensified rather than
diminished in 1930, reaching a screeching crescendo in
September just before the Reichstag elections.
7

The evidence

Fest, Hitler, p. 26 3. Karl Dietrich Bracher also
emphasized the role of this campaign in providing the party
with proper finances and undreamed of propaganda and organ
izational resources.
Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 161.
^Turner, Nazism, p. 92.
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seems to indicate that the development and activities of the
Nazi political machine were in no way directly linked to the
acquisition of funds from the party's allies in the fight
against the Young Plan.

The most that can be said about

this added income is that it undoubtedly made it easier for
the party to conduct massive campaigns for a short period
of time.

Conservative money was helpful but not essential

to Nazi political drives.

The campaign against the Young

Plan was very important in explaining Nazi success and will
be discussed later, but the reasons for its significance
had little to do with party finances.
The emphasis on conservative monetary support of
the NSDAP in late 1929 is a corollary of the old theory of
big business financing the party.
frustration.

It is also a sign of

The Nazis developed an effective and seeming

ly omnipresent political machine in the years after 1928.
How was the party able to finance this organization?
question has haunted historians for four decades.

The

The

Nazis themselves helped to cloud the issue by practicing
"a psychotic form of secrecy concerning their financial
resources . . . .

From the very beginning it was an un

written law of the party that no records should be kept of
contributions."

This secrecy plus some exposes originat

ing from the period 1930 to 194 5 led historians to believe
that the party might be under the control of covert mani
fest,

Hitler, p. 166.
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pulators who were also major contributors.
come to jettison these theories for good.

The time has
The search for

the money men behind the NSDAP has been a search for the
little man who was not there.

The secret of Nazi financing

is best exemplified by the development of the party's propa
ganda apparatus; the secret was self-sufficiency which ob
viated the need of relying upon the generosity of wealthy
outsiders.
The development of the Nazi political machine was
based upon the acceptance of the party's limitations.

The

Nazis made a lack of finances into a virtue; and they re
stored party morale by vigorously exploiting the willing
ness of members to become active participants in the move
ment's unceasing propaganda drives.

The last major limita

tion on Nazi propaganda was the fixed set of rules devel
oped by Hitler in the middle twenties.

The party tended

to follow these precepts in all of its activities.

Nazi

propaganda consistently stressed violence and emotional
appeals while shunning any attempt to "educate" the general
public on the merits of National Socialism.

The goal re

mained to present a picture of the party's model counter
society or "fictional world."

This element of propaganda

was best exemplified by the party's regional rallies, the
Reichsparteitag of 1929 and the mystical celebration at
Caub.

It enabled the NSDAP to portray itself as "less a

party than an association of fighters who made demands
on the whole man and answered a brittle and crumbling world
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with the battle cry of a new o r d e r . A l l

Nazi propaganda

devices developed after 1928 attempted to create impressions
similar to those emphasized at major rallies and stressed
by Hitler in Mein Kampf.
The principal task facing the NSDAP in 1928 was to
devise ways to present their message to a mass electorate.
Heinrich Himmler attempted to do this through his saturation
campaigns, but these efforts were limited geographically to
one Gau because of the dearth of available propagandists.
The solution to the problem of quantity originated as a
strictly local program in Oberbayern-Schwaben.

Gauleiter

Fritz Reinhardt's correspondence school for speakers trained
almost two thousand orators between 1928 and 1930.

This

vast expansion of the number of Nazi speakers enabled the
party to stage continuous campaigns in all parts of Germany.
Such intensive agitation was very important in Nazi politi
cal drives.

It helped to create an image of party strength

and dedication which added to the attractiveness of the
NSDAP.

As Geoffrey Pridham observed:
"The continuous agitation of the NSDAP
was necessary in view of the kind of
electorate to which it was primarily
appealing— especially to non-voters and
those whose attachment to other parties
could be shaken.
A series of public
meetings was the surest way of making
contact with voters who were either
politically indifferent or had no strong
political commitment."11
10Ibid., p. 275.
■^Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 138.
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Reinhardt's speakers made it possible for the party to reach
and to impress cynical and indifferent voters.

The impres

sion of unceasing activism was important to the party since
a revolutionary renewal of Germany could seemingly be
brought about only by a dedicated, militant order.

The

Nazis could best create the impression that they were such
a movement by continuous agitation, and Reinhardt's speakers
made it physically possible for the NSDAP to do precisely
that.
Nazi propaganda was by no means limited to the
spoken word.

In fact, the content of Nazi speeches was

rarely as important as the quantity of such performances.
Himmler in his instructions regarding the saturation cam
paigns did not recommend any particular speaking themes.
Rather, he directed his subordinates to make speeches on
12
topics appropriate to the area being canvassed.
Most
Nazi orations were on general themes in any case, in
keeping with the party's emphasis on its role of bringing
about a rebirth of Germany.

In order to develop this idea

effectively, Nazi propagandists employed non-verbal techni
ques as often as the spoken word.

Again the problem was

reaching a geographically diverse mass public.

The NSDAP

through a number of innovations in the years after 1928 was
able to overcome this difficulty and to present its non
verbal message to the bulk of the populace.
12H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "Propaganda Aktion"
December 24, 1928.
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As with Reinhardt's school most of the party's
innovations in visual campaigning originated as local pro
grams.

Czarnowski's slide service and the National

Socialist film agency enabled the party to utilize pictorial
propaganda extensively.

The combination of slides and ver

bal commentary presented at Czarnowski's shows was espe
cially effective.

Nazi slides reenforced the party’s ef

forts to create exemplary images of the NSDAP's opponents
adding validity to Nazi racial stereotypes.

Just as the

Nazis attempted to create a "fictional world" at their major
rallies, they also tried to heighten the believability of
their conception of struggle by making enemies seem real and
omnipresent, something that could best be done with

pictures.

The Nazi tendency to present these ideas by personal attacks
on individuals was exemplified by the slide show "Isidor"
which maligned Dr. Bernhard Weiss, the Vice-President of the
Berlin police.

By focusing upon an individual, the Nazis

were able to make their arguments less theoretical and to
convince the public that the threats they were referring to
were real.

The other major advantage of visual propaganda

was the attractiveness of such events.

Slide shows and

films were excellent ways of getting people to attend meet
ings.

In a small town or village with little to do at night,

such a performance would be welcomed simply for its enter
tainment value.
Other Nazi : innovations in non-verbal propaganda
such as the Muchow street cell organization and the National
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Socialist Auto Clubs served to arouse the mass participa
tion necessary to create a believable image of the Nazi
counter-society.

The Muchow system mobilized large segments

of the party as workers to distribute pamphlets and hand
bills, and to sell tickets to Nazi event.

These activities

were useful to the NSDAP in themselves, but a key by-product
of the Muchow organization was to strengthen the impression
that the Nazi party was a participatory and militant move
ment.

Muchow*s workers by their efforts were demonstrating

their active faith in the movement, an impressive quality
in an age of cynicism.

The auto clubs enabled the party to

mass its personnel at major canvassing events to create an
illusion of strength.

The Muchow system and the auto clubs

helped the NSDAP to present many of the same images used at
Nazi rallies on a continuous basis throughout Germany.
Finally, the charismatic nature of Nazi leadership
enabled the party to heighten the effectiveness of its
campaigning.

Heinrich Himmler as propaganda chief was able

to initiate useful programs and adopt successful regional
innovations.

These schemes were easily imposed on the

NSDAP in all parts of Germany because Himmler, as a member
of the Reichsleitung, was acting as an organizational ex
tension of Adolf Hitler, the absolute chieftain of the
movement and the living embodiment of the coming German re
birth.

Orders from Munich were obeyed without question

enabling the national leadership to impose some central
direction upon the movement.

At the same time, lesser Nazi

260

commanders had to display a somewhat different variety of
personal charisma than Hitler.

They had to persuade their

followers that they were worthy of support by displays of
courage, self-sacrifice, and above all activism.

Nazi sub

leaders were able to maintain their power only in this man
ner making activism a necessity for those who wished to
command and thus reenforcing the party's efforts to create
the impression that the NSDAP was a dedicated crusading
order fighting for German renewal.

Lastly, the intensive

intra-party rivalry among leaders continuously trying to
demonstrate their dedication to Hitler and their effective
ness in the service of National Socialism engendered an
atmosphere favorable to local experimentation.

Successful

regional innovations were applauded by the Reichsleitung
which tolerated a good deal of independence as long as sub
ordinate leaders obeyed commands emanating from Munich and
worked hard for the movement.

By combining centralization,

activism and encouragement of local schemes the Nazi leader
ship structure helped to foster the growth of a dynamic yet
flexible propaganda apparatus.
The role of propaganda in the Nazi electoral break
through of 1930 can only be speculatively assessed.
documentation on Nazi campaigning is at best spotty.

The
This

dissertation has tried to surmount the problem by dealing
primarily with national programs which it can reasonably be
assumed were adopted in most areas of Germany.

There is

still, however, a great deal that we do not know about the
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Nazi political machine.

We do not know the identities of

Reinhardt's speakers, or where they spoke, or what effects
their efforts had on audiences.

We do not know the number

of slide show or film performances staged by the party, the
size of audiences attending, or even the locations of these
events.

No complete evidence about the street cell organi

zations exists.

Data on rallies are also fragmentary, and

the sources of such information are often of questionable
value.

Incomplete documentation makes it impossible to

deal with the impact of Nazi propaganda on the basis of
quantification.

Even if such detailed evidence existed,

however, it is difficult to see how a quantifier would ap
proach the subject methodologically.

Over six million

Germans voted for the NSDAP in 1930 for a variety of rea
sons.

To isolate propaganda from all other factors would

be a near impossibility.

This dissertation does not claim

that the development of an effective political machine alone
brought about the Nazi political victory of 1930.

It simply

suggests that this was one factor leading to the party's
electoral triumph.
The existence of a Nazi political machine in 1930
has been generally accepted.

In commenting upon Nazi agita

tion in Gau Hanover-South Brunswick, Noakes stated that the
Nazis possessed "a formidable propaganda machine" and staged
"a campaign of exceptional skill."

He summed up the role

of the Nazi propaganda apparatus in the following,

"The

NSDAP . . . had the advantage that it could simply increase
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the tempo of its already well-oiled machine, while the
other bourgeois parties had to improvise a campaign specif ically for the election."

13

Bracher described the role of

propaganda in this way, "The party owed its growth to the
application of commercial advertising techniques to politi
cal recruitment, which, violating the rules of good taste
and acceptable levels of noise, began an assault on the
14
collective subsconscious."
Elsewhere he commented, "The
National Socialists, with their noisy and violent SA demon
strations, tireless propaganda forces, turbulent mass meet
ings, and interminable speeches, dominated public life more
15
than any other party.”
Fest summed up the general im
pression of the Nazi political machine.

"Nothing of the

kind had ever existed in Germany."16
The expansion of the NSDAP between 1928 and 19 30
was a slow process which accelerated considerably from late
1929 to the Reichstag election of September, 1930.

On May

20, 1928 the NSDAP polled 2.6 percent in a Reichstag election.

17

On the same day the party received 1.8 percent in

the election to the Prussian Landtag, 6.1 percent in Bavaria,,
1.8 percent in Wiirttemberg, 7.5 percent in Oldenburg and
13
LJNoakes, Lower Saxony, p. 151.
14 Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 150.

15Ibid., p. 182.
16Fest, Hitler, p. 263.
17Pridham, Hitler1s Rise, p. 322.
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2.1 percent in Anhalt.

On June 1, the NSDAP polled 3.3 per18
cent in the election to the Lippe Landtag.
By the end of
1928 the party was showing some gains in local elections.
In Heimar Nazi totals rose from under 11 percent in May to
19
over 17 percent in December.
By the middle of 19 29 the
party scored impressively in several elections.

In Coburg

the Nazis became the majority party as a result of city
20
elections held in June.
In Saxony the Nazis almost
doubled their vote.

Nazi progress in Saxony was taken by

the membership as a barometer of the expansion of the move
ment everywhere.

In 1926 the party received 37,725 votes.

In the Reichstag election of 1928 the Nazis polled 74,343
and in the Landtag election of May 12, 1929, the NSDAP
obtained 133,7 92 votes or 5 percent of the electorate.

21

These results indicate a steady growth in Nazi support.
There is little evidence to suggest that this expansion was
caused by anything other than propaganda.

The Young Plan

was not submitted until after the election to the Saxon
Landtag.
1R

The Socialist-dominated, national coalition
Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, p. 382-83.

19VB, December 5, 1928, p. 1, "Nationalsozialistische Erfolge bei den Gemeindewahlen in Thuringen."
20VB, June 25, 1929, p. 1, "Gewaltiger
Nationalsozialisten bei den Wahlen in Koburg."

Sieg der

^ H . A . Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staatspolizei WUrttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim, 12.6.29,
Aus der NSDAP" and Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents,
pp. 382-83.
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government was demonstrating considerable stability, and the
great depression was not to start for several months.

Eco

nomic conditions were not good in the middle of 19 29, but
the psychological shock produced by the crash of the New
York stock market was not present.

The absence of this

fear is especially important in analyzing Nazi growth, since
the party did not attract a significant number of the unem
ployed from the working class, but instead scored heavily
with middle class voters frightened about the future.

That

the Nazis were able to show steady expansion at this time
was remarkable.

External conditions did not favor them, and

their political machine was by no means fully developed.
Yet, the first effects of massive Nazi propaganda were being
felt in the year after the Reichstag election of 1928.
The first impressive NSDAP victories came in late
1929.

In Baden the party polled 7 percent in the Landtag

election of October.
percent in

In November the Nazis received 8.1

Ltibeck, and in December they obtained 11. 3 percent

in Thuringia.

22

In Baden alone this represented a 250 per-

cent growth in Nazi support from 19 28.23 The rapid expan
sion of National Socialism in late 1929 is more complex than its
slow growth to the middle of the year.

By late 1929 the

Nazis had emerged as major participants in the campaign for
the referendum against the Young Plan.
22

The first effects of

Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, pp. 382-83.

2^VB, October 30, 1929, p. 3, "Unser Wahlsieg in
Baden."
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the great depression were being felt, and the national coa
lition government was showing the first signs of instability
after the death of Stresemann.

The key issue at this time

was the Young Plan, and the Nazi role in opposing the re
parations agreement was the focus of political attention.
The depression and the developing constitutional crisis
were both more important events, but public attention was
captured by the referendum, which was the most visible issue
of the day.
The fight against the Young Plan was the single
most useful campaign for the NSDAP in the late twenties.
The Nazis received some money from their conservative allies
to conduct this campaign, but other factors were far more
important to the party's future growth than monetary consi
derations.

The alliance with the German conservatives was

very helpful to the Nazis, for it freed them "from the
noisome odor of being a crackpot revolutionary and
24
putschist"
party.
It also established links between the
NSDAP and socially prominent and influential German
25
leaders.
Hitler and other Nazi luminaries were given
considerable exposure in magazines and newsreels produced
by Hugenberg’s publishing empire.
spectability.

All of this spelled re

The kind of publicity afforded the Nazis by

Hugenberg helped to convince middle-class Germans that the
24Fest, Hitler, p. 263.
25Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 161.
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NSDAP was a legitimate political party and not a gang of
wild-eyed, crypto-socialist fanatics.

This type of legiti

macy was handed to the NSDAP by its conservative allies.
It would have been extremely difficult for the Nazis to
overcome their reputation as crackpots without this outside
help.
The party made its mark in other ways in the strug
gle over reparations.

The Nazis were only one of a number

of parties and groups united to oppose the Young Plan.
Hugenberg's conservative DNVP was a bigger and a far better
established political party than the NSDAP.

The Pan-

Germans and the Stahlhelm had better reputations in conser
vative, middle-class circles.

Yet, the Nazis emerged from

this alliance as the most important party on the right.
The ascendency of the NSDAP over its rightist rivals was a
result almost entirely of the prowess of the party in pro
paganda.

As Fest concluded,

"None of the other partners

in the nationalist alliance could approach the Nazi party
in stridency, sharpness and psychological cunning."

26

The

campaign established the NSDAP as "the most energetic and
purposeful force on the divided and directionless Right."
Thus, the emergence of the Nazis as the leading German
rightist party was the result of the actions of the Nazi
propaganda apparatus.
26Fest, Hitler, p. 263.
27Ibid., pp. 263-64.
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The Nazi political machine was fast approaching
maturity by late 1929.

The regional schemes that were begun

earlier had been adopted as national programs by the
Reichsleitung during the first half of the year.

Reinhardt's

school was beginning to produce a large number of speakers.
Czarnowski's slide service was an established party office.
Apparently, many Nazi local groups had acquired the neces
sary equipment for the projection of slides and a variety
of shows were available for distribution.

The development

of the film service was slower, but Goebbels' "Kampf um
Berlin" was in circulation along with a movie on the 1927
"Reichsparteitag."

The Muchow street cell organization and

the National Socialist Auto Clubs seem to have been adopted
and in operation in many parts of Germany.

Finally, the

Nazi rally system was fully mature by the time of the vote
on the Young Plan.

This formidable political machine en

abled the NSDAP to overwhelm its conservative allies.
By 19 30 the Nazis had severed their ties with the
German conservatives.

No further aid was forthcoming from

this source, but the fully grown political machine contin28
ued to "dominate public life."
Theodore Abel has aptly
described this process:
"The Nazi propaganda machine was notable
for its shrewd and daring use of modern
advertising psychology and for its mass
effect. Even more remarkable, however,
was the sheer bulk of its effort. Prose28

Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 182.
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lytizing went on unceasingly,
regardless of physical or man-made
obstacles.
Moreover, the Party
'covered' Germany with a thorough
ness that made its doctrines known
in almost every home, in city and
countryside a l i k e . " 2 *
The main themes of Nazi propaganda changed very little from
late 1929 to the Reichstag election of September,

19 30.

The

Nazis continued to emphasize their opposition to the Young
Plan and attempted to link the ever worsening great depres
sion to reparations.

The party also developed an agricul

tural program in early 19 30, but the NSDAP continued to
stress general themes and the Nazi promise to bring about a
rebirth of Germany.

In any case, the contents of Nazi pro

paganda was never as remarkable as its bulk.

Belief in the

mythical Nazi future was based more on the creation of con
crete images than on the rough presentation of Nazi ideology.
It was the party's political machine that enabled the NSDAP
to implant the images which made it possible for them to
exploit the political and economic crises of the Weimar
Republic.
The six million Germans who voted for the NSDAP in
19 30 were casting their lot with a political movement that
seemed to represent strength and decisiveness in a period
of weakness and indecision.

They were voting for a party

that claimed it would renew Germany and was willing to
undergo considerable self-sacrifice to bring about such a
29Abel, Nazi Movement, pp. 175-76
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rebirth.

In the Germany of 1930, the NSDAP was the party

of faith in an era of impotent cynicism.

Above all, the

Nazis offered the public visible goals, such as the
Volksgemeinschaft, and equally visible enemies, such as
the Jews and the Marxists.
destroyed.

Enemies could be defeated and

Ideals could be attained or, at least, one

could strive to reach such goals.

This "fictional world"

was very appealing to those who were frustrated by economic,
diplomatic, and constitutional crises that seemed beyond
understanding much less solution.

In a period of growing

complexity, the very simplicity and clarity of the Nazi
counter-society heightened the party's attractiveness.
Many undoubtedly voted for the Nazis because of their fear
of Communism, or because of the Nazi agricultural program,
or the party's anti-Semitism, or any one of a multitude of
other reasons; but the underlying reason for supporting the
NSDAP was the fact that the Nazis offered hope in a period
of hopelessness.

As Bracher observed, "Long before the

famous parliamentary elections of September,

1930, the

successful course which within three years was to bring the
splinter party to total power had b e g u n . T h e

successful

course for the Nazi party was based upon the efficient use
of a geographically comprehensive propaganda apparatus that
could persuade the public that the NSDAP offered a viable
and attractive alternative to the Weimar Republic.
^°Bracher, German Dictatorship, p. 167.
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such a political machine the Nazis would have been unable
to exploit the opportunities available to the party in the
late twenties.

The National Socialist victory of September,

1930 was a result of the political opportunities offered by
the Young Plan, the great depression and the German consti
tutional crisis, and the skillful exploitation of these
opportunities by the Nazi political machine.

All of these

elements were essential for the Nazi electoral triumph.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF NSDAP SPEAKERS FOR 1928
From Vfflkischer Beobachter, January 26, 1929, p. 3
"20,000 Versammlungen im Jahre 1928."
SPEAKER

NUMBER OF MEETINGS

Albrecht, Dr. Herbert
Allworden, W.v., Altona
Bedenbender, Bergmann, Eisern
Benesch, Theo, Mittelfranken
Bergler, Johann, Ingolstadt
Borchert, Hans, Behra
Bolwim, Leopold, Miinster i. W.
Brix, Emil, Schleswig-Holstein
Bruckner, Helmuth, Gauleiter
Biittmann, Dr.,M.d.L. Munich
Buradt, Willi, Diisseldorf
Czarnowski, Bruno, Aschersleben
Czirniok, Hermann, Stettin
Dauser, Hans, M.d.L. Munich
Dietze, Alfred, Weinbohla
Dorow,
Nordhausen
Dreher, Wilhelm, M.d.R. Stuttgart
Engel, Hans, Berlin
Fiehler, Karl, Munich
Fitzner, L.H., Eichelberg
Forster, Albert, Flirth
Friedrich, H . , Karlsruhe i.B.
Gengler, Ludwig, Niirnberg
Goebbels, Joseph, Gauleiter Berlin
Grass1, Hermann, Rottenberg
Grimm, G.W. Herrsching, Oberbayern
Gronow, Eisner von, Frankfurt a.d. Oder
Haag, Hans, Niirnberg
Haake, Heinz, M.d.L.
Harth, Emil, Haardt
Hellmuth, Dr., Marktbreit
Hinkler, Gauleiter, Halle-Merseburg
Hof fenfelder,
Kolberg
278

117
28
30
128
40
130
46
92
138
20
68
116
43
146
13
52
96
122
51
19
31
85
162
188
27
14
301
37
142
89
17
135
33
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SPEAKER

NUMBER OF MEETINGS

Jacob, Th.,
Pirmasens
Jenke,
Breslau
Jngwersen, Adolf, Berlin
Jordan, Rudolf, Fulda
Kasche, Siegfried, Sorau
Kayser, Wilhelm
Kemper, Friedheim, Mannheim
Klein, Emil, Munich
KiShler, Dr. Hermann
Kleine, Joseph, Elber-Elster
Kramer,
Baden
Krause, Rudolf, Magdeburg
Krell, A., Rheinhessend
Kunz, Erish, Zwickau
Lammel, Wilfried, Schaidt
Liebel, Ludwig, Contwig
Lippert, Major
Loeper, M.d.L., Gauleiter Magdeburg-Anhalt
Ltitt, Wilhelm, Berlin
Mann, Richard, Pirmasens
Matusz, Max, Polsnitz
Mogunia, W., Kfinigsberg
Mflller, Max, Neukirchen
Muller,
Bergmann Obersdorf
Oertel, Carl Albrecht, Frankenberg i.S.
Papenbrook, Paul, Gotha
Pacher, Willy, Annaberg
Preuper, Paul, Weidenau
Piihlmann, Rudolf, Stammbach
Reinecke, Robert, WUrzburg
Roth, Otto, Schornwelsach
Rtihle, Gerd, Frankfurt a. Main
Schmeer, Rudolf, Bad-Aachen
SchiSne, Heinrich, Lockstedter Lager
SchiSnwklder,
Bad Freienwalde
Schreiber,
Waldkirchen
Schreiner, Dr. Walter, Plattling
Schwede,
Koburg
Senboth, Fritz, Neustadt a.d. Aisch
Sperber,
Hersbruck
StShr, Franz, M.d.R., Berlin
Strasser, Gregor, M.d.R., Munich
Studentkowski, Werner, Leipzig
Theuerkauf, Paul, Schleiz
Tiirk, Richard, Schwengfeld, Silesia
Wagner, Robert, Gauleiter Baden
Wangenheim, Artur v . , Berlin
Wege, Ernst, Elsterwerda
Wohlleben, Heinz, Gera
Woweries, Friedrich, Mtlhlhausen i. Thuringia

42
15
44
42
104
106
179
22
32
60
180
19
84
73
25
62
39
80
157
45
28
20
27
15
20
76
24
28
20
26
30
15
63
16 8
30
43
18
60
21
26
102
139
197
25
27
100
27
36
171
82

Additional list from Vfilkischer Beobachter, Febru
ary 3/4, 19 28, p. 3, "Unserer Redner Arbeit im Jahre 192 8
SPEAKER

NUMBER OF MEETINGS

Buttmann, M.d.L., Munich
Florian, Fritz, Bonn
Grimm, M.d.L., Ansbach
Grohfi, Joseph, K61n
Gutterer, Leopold, Frankfurt a. Main
Haack,
Pomerania-West
Heidrich, Georg, KSnigsberg
Heyse,
Hessen-Nassau
Jaene,
Prenzlau
Kobes, Max, Bayreuth
Klostermann,
Bockenroda
Kremser,
Gr. Breslau
Linder, C., Frankfurt a. Main
Lohse, Hinrich, M.d.L. Gauleiter
Schleswig-Holstein
Leuterer, Georg, Weimar
Maierhofer,
Floss
Mangier, Siegfried, Zwickau i. Saxony
Mttnchmeyer, Minister
Pape, Alfred, Osterfeld
Reinhardt, Fritz, Gauleiter Oberbayern
Rentmeister,
Lower Austria
Ringshausen,
Gauleiter Hessen
Rosenburg, Erich, Berlin
Schemm, M.d.L., Gauleiter Bayreuth
Simon, Gustav, Hermeskeil
Sonnleitner, B . , Kassel
Staebe, Gustav, Braunschweig
WSchtler
Zahneissen,
Bamberg

60
93
100
76
77
34
110
20
15
72
20
64
32
135
28
76
22
19 5
19
75
131
60
17
219
36
26
120
50
72

M.d.L. means member of the Landtag or provincial assembly
M.d.R. means member of the Reichstag.

APPENDIX B
THE QUALITY OF REINHARDT SPEAKERS
Dietrich Orlow has drawn some conclusions about the
role of the Reinhardt speakers in Nazi campaigning on the
basis of his assessment of the level of training provided
to the students.
"The series of mass-producred Reinhardt
speakers were the foot soldiers of the
NSDAP's army of agitators.
The party
did not expect them to persuade any
large number of disengaged Germans to
vote for or join the NSDAP, but, hope
fully, they would demonstrate the
party's interest in the village
audience and stir at least some of the
hearers to undertake a more or less
inconvenient journey to a nearby town
to hear a rhetorically far more effec
tive Gau or Reich speaker.
Orlow considered the Reinhardt speakers to be specifically
rural and village orators.

He contended that Reinhardt's

course "offered no political education in any broad sense"
and only provided students with "some knowledge of the
rudiments of public speaking technique, a store of set
speeches and some memorized answers for typical questions
2
from the audience."
Orlow concluded that this training
^Orlow, Nazi Party, pp. 159-60.
^Ibid., p. 159.
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was inadequate for addressing audiences in towns or cities.
Orlow based these conclusions on a single piece of
evidence, the descriptive brochure Rednerschule der NSDAP.^
This document was issued by Reinhardt in mid-1930 primarily
as a lengthy advertisement to attract new participants to
the school.

As an illustration of what the program hoped

to accomplish, the brochure posed a series of rather sim
ple questions that the students would be able to answer
at the end of the course.

On the basis of this evidence

Orlow drew his conclusions, which would lead one to believe
that Reinhardt’s speakers were of only limited value to the
party as propagandists.
It is very difficult to assess the quality of
Reinhardt's products.

We do not know the identity of most

of these orators, and thus we cannot examine a series of
reports on their speeches*

The only specific evidence about

the oratorical ability of the speakers is a report written
by the Prussian Ministry of the Interior in May, 1930,
which stated that they showed considerable "Rhetorical skill
combined with subjects carefully chosen to suit the particu
lar audience" insuring "according to our observation, halls
which are almost invariably overcrowded with enthusiastic
4
listeners."
This description certainly does not support
Orlow’s conclusions about the abilities of Reinhardt's
3H.A. Reel 70, Folder 1529, "Rednerschule der NSDAP."
^Pridham and Noakes (eds.), Documents, p. 101.
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speakers; however, it is an isolated example and does not
deal with the central point of Orlow's judgment, his belief
that the course provided insufficient training to produce
orators able to address audiences in towns and cities suc
cessfully .
The best way to judge the quality of training pro
vided by the Reinhardt school is by examining the contents
of one of the courses.

Unfortunately, no courses from the

1928-30 period have been preserved.
One from 1931-1932,
5
however, is available.
It does not resemble Orlow's
description in any way.

It lasted one year and consisted

of twenty-four lessons covering almost two hundred pages,
not to mention outside reading.

It contained no set

speeches or standard answers for typical questions from
the audience.

Rather, the course was clearly designed to

instruct the prospective orators on a wide variety of sub
jects, so that they could operate independently upon grad
uation.

The lessons were certainly not objective, but they

H.A. Reel 14, Folder 274, "Rednerkurs der GauRednerschule d. Gaues Munchen-Oberbayern," June 8, 1931.
Henceforth referred to as "Rednerkurs." This course was
issued by the Munchen-Oberbayern Gauleitung, but it was not
a specifically regional course.
The authors of the various
lessons were major party specialists, and instructions were
included for campaigning in areas other than OberbayernSchwaben.
In any case, after September, 1930, Reinhardt
was no longer so closely associated with the speakers'
school.
He was elected to the Reichstag at that time and
became the party's expert on finance and taxation.
This
led to greater decentralization in the administration of
the courses than had existed before 1930.
Gau offices that
had since 1929 periodically tested students began to assume
that control of issuing courses and correcting homework. The
central speakers' office retained responsibility for writing
uniform lessons for all students.
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did provide a considerable amount of information useful to
the neophyte speaker.

For as was pointed out in the first

lesson, "it is only possible to convince people of what one
is first convinced of himself."

6

Even Orlow*s contention that one of the major func
tions of the course was to teach "the rudiments of public
7
speaking"
is not supported by the extant course, which
virtually ignored oratorical tricks.

In all the lessons
g

there were only five simple suggestions on speaking style.
Ironically, one of these suggestions was to avoid the set
9
speech and work from a simple outline.
The written lessons
did not even attempt to teach students how to speak; this
skill was to be acquired by practical experience, first in
addressing fellow members at "Speaking Evenings" and— after
the fourth month of training--in actually making speeches.
The formal instruction concentrated upon providing the
students with an adequate supply of arguments, so that they
would have something to say.
Orlow*s contentions aside, the 1931-32 course is
helpful in assessing the level of training provided by the
school.

It contained material on general Nazi theory in£

Ibid., p. 2.
document.

(Pagination is included within the

70rlow, Nazi Par t y , p. 159.
®H.A. Reel 14, Folder 274, "Rednerkurs," pp. 1,2,
4,26 e.g. pronounce all consonants, wear a dark suit.
^Ibid., p. 2.
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eluding the party's views on race, the Volk, the National
Socialist state and Marxism.

Long-term programs on such

matters as finance, interest, foreign policy, and agricul
ture were described in considerable detail.

The policies

of the Bruening government were attacked in a number of
lessons dealing with current events.

Finally, examples of

opposition speeches were dissected and refuted.

Two lessons

were entirely devoted to this, and many others discussed
specific attacks on Nazis made in various parts of Germany.
All of the lessons tended to follow a circular pattern.
General National Socialist contentions opened each lesson,
followed by specific short-term programs to deal with ex
isting problems.

Other parties were then blamed for Ger

many's difficulties with some supporting evidence to prove
their culpability.

Opposition stands on given issues were

always systematically refuted, often both with statistics
and with statements by "objective" analysts.

The lesson

ended with a description of the Nazi program designed to
achieve the originally stated general solution of the pro
blem.

A chain of logic seemed to tie the entire exercise

together adding to the believability of the Nazi program,
in fact, making the Nazi approach to a particular matter
seem both correct and inevitable.
One major topic discussed in the course was the
state of German agriculture.^
1Qlbid., pp. 8-11.

This topic is of special
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interest since Reinhardt's students were speaking on "the
expropriation of the German farmer" as early as February,
1929.^

The lesson followed the pattern described above.
It began with the general statement, "The task of

the National Socialist state is to elevate agriculture to
12
the highest estate."
This statement was justified by the
assertion that the farmer was the embodiment of the ideal
characteristics of the race because of his close connection
with the land.
crete proposals.

Typically broad goals were followed by con
The short-term National Socialist program

to deal with agricultural difficulties including a two-year
moratorium on taxes, to be succeeded by a new tax struc
ture based upon produce and not on gold.

The idea of pay

ing taxes in kind was especially appealing to Germany's
small farmers who had been adversely affected both by the
deflationary policy pursued by the Bruening ministry and by
the declining food prices fostered by the consumer-oriented
Reich governments since 1919.

The final measure would es

tablish protection from foreign competition through in
creased tariff duties; this proposal was explained as part
of the Nazi plan to establish a national economy based on
the principles of autarky.
The lesson went on to blame the plight of German
agriculture in the Weimar Republic on the "Jewish world
^ V B , January 30, 1928, p. 3, "Nationalsozialistische Redner=Fernschule."
12H.A. Reel 14, Folder 274, "Rednerkurs," p. 8.
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stock market" and usurious interest rates.

To support this

assertion, the lesson discussed the "Jewish control of the
13
animal market and the resulting depressed prices."
This
treatment provided the student with solid "evidence" to
support his statements.

The Nazis intended to break the

"Jewish" hold on agriculture by creating a State Farmers'
Credit Bank that would lend money at "reasonable" rates
and by establishing a strict entail on land, which would be
passed on by primogeniture.

Younger sons were to be pro

vided for by a state-supported program of internal coloniza
tion that would be profitable with the protective tariffs
on agriculatural products.

Ultimately, land would be ob

tained by expansion eastward, allowing racially pure German
farm families to grow larger without fear of having to send
surplus sons and daughter to the corrupting cities.
After detailing the Nazi agricultural program,
other solutions to the problems of German farmers were des
cribed and systematically refuted.

Birth control was re

jected as an assault on the best racial elements of the
Volk, an argument designed to appeal both to the pride and
the religious scruples of this group.

Sending farm child

ren to the cities was also attacked as breaking the mystic
tie with the land that made farm children so racially de14
sirable in the first place.
In short, opposition pro
13Ibid.
14Ibid.
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grams were depicted as degrading to the German farmer.
This lesson very cleverly embodies two basic ele
ments of Nazi propaganda.

It appealed to both the pride

and innate conservatism of the German farmer.

It held out

hope that in the National Socialist state not only the
farmer but also his children would find a secure and honored
station.

His arch-enemy, the creditor, was stigmatized not

only as a usurer but also as a "Jew"; and short-term
measures were proposed to deal with this particular menace,
programs, moreover, that seemed both reasonable and easy to
implement.

The ultimate goals of the Nazis in agriculture

were made to appear eminently conservative; but their means
to these ends were openly radical, namely eastward expan
sion.

The combination of conservatism and radicalism made

the Nazi program appealing both to those who desperately
wanted to hang on to what they had and to those who equally
desperately wanted major change.

A similar use of seemingly

antithetical measures was repeated in many subsequent lessons
and was a distinctive feature of Reinhardt's course.
A second lesson provided students with material to
refute the theory that Germany was guilty of starting World
War 1 . ^

Tne Nazis had often dealt with this topic in their

campaigns against the Young Plan in 1929 and 1930, and
students and graduates of Reinhardt's program had staged
two saturation campaigns regarding reparations in Febru^5Ibid., pp. 14-20.
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ary*® and May, 1930.*^
The lesson began by confronting the view that Im
perial Germany was guilty of militarism, imperialism and
chauvinism; statistics were used to demonstrate that the
Kaiser's government was innocent of all charges.

In order

to negate the charge of militarism, detailed comparisons
were made of the percentages of men in uniform in all the
belligerent countries in 1914, while imperialism was dealt
with by pointing out the relative pre-war holdings of the
18
major colonial powers.
In the matter of chauvinism,
Germany's record of "peaceful neutrality" during all of the
crises from Fashoda to the Balkan Wars was cited as conclu
sive proof that Germany harbored no irrational enmity toward her neighbors.

19

Throughout, the lesson mentioned

details useful in argument (for example, the fact that the
German fleet was in home waters as late as July 27, 1914).
These isolated bits of information proved very little, but
they could be used effectively in speeches.
From general points the lesson went on to deal with
specific allegations.

The first was the charge that Germany

^ H . A . Reel 58, Folder 1403, "Berichte der Staatspolizei WUrttemberg zur politische Lage=Geheim, 19.3.30,
Aus der NSDAP."
■*"7H.A. Reel 10, Folder 203, "ReichspropagandaAbteilung II 10 Mai 1930."
^H.A.

Reel 14, Folder 274, "Rednerkurs."

^ I b i d . , p. 15.

had held a cabinet meeting to plan war on July 5, 1914.
According to the course material, a meeting had taken place
but neither the war minister nor representatives of the
general staff were present.

If the cabinet had in fact

plotted war, they would have been in attendance.

Against

the allegation that Germany had hindered peace negotiations
the lesson cited the Kaiser's letters both to the Tsar and
to the King of England soliciting their aid in avoiding
hostilities.

A final charge--that Germany was responsible

for the conflict because she was the first to declare war—
was countered by an explanation that mobilization and not
the declaration of war was the key event precipitating
hostilities.

A detailed time table was provided to prove

that Germany mobilized after Serbia, Austria, Russia and
20

France.

As final proof of Germany's innocence in causing
World War I a number of foreign experts were cited as
opponents of the war guilt clause of the Versailles Treaty.
Such notables as Lord Grey, John Maynard Heynes, Benito
Mussolini and Sidney Fay were all mentioned as supporters
of the Nazi position on this issue.

In order to strengthen

student arguments, short statements by these men were in21
eluded in the lesson.
In turn, prominent supporters of
the Weimar Republic, such as Rudolf Hilferding and Kurt
20Ibid., p. 16.
2*~Ibid., p. 18.
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Rosenfeld, were denounced for defending the war guilt
clause.

The Republican system itself was attacked as a

product of the peace treaty and therefore as the offspring
of a "lie."

22

These two lessons illustrate the level of training
provided by the speakers' school.

Students were clearly

expected to master a considerable body of predigested in
formation.

The purpose was not to educate these new

speakers but to provide them with an extensive supply of
effective arguments designed to impress basically un
tutored audiences.
was enough.

For this purpose a veneer of knowledge

What was remarkable about Reinhardt's course

was that so much detailed material was presented.

It is

clear that Reinhardt expected his graduates to be suffi
ciently well trained to make and to hold converts even against determined and relatively competent opposition.
There is no way of determining how successful graduates
were in practice.

Nevertheless, the Prussian Ministry of

the Interior report indicates that they were able to
23
attract and to impress sizable audiences in 1930.
The
weight of the existing--though inconclusive— evidence seems
to indicate that these speakers were well prepared agita
tors able to operate independently to further National
Socialism.

In any case, it seems clear that Reinhardt school

graduates were capable of far more than delivering a few
22Ibid., p. 17.
^ P r i d h a m and Noakes (eds.), Documents, p. 101.

set speeches to groups of "shy, sullen farmers"

24

and

answering some typical questions from the audience.

^Orlow, Nazi Party , p. 159.

APPENDIX C
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS OF THE STORM TROOPERS
AND AN SA TABLE OF RANKS
The ten commandments of the SA as presented to the
Stuttgart storm troopers by SturmfUhrer Max Bucherl.
1.

The brown shirt is a dress of honor.
The wearer must
above all represent the National Socialist world view
and conduct himself appropriately.
It is especially
important that when the SA man appears at the place of
assembly for setting out on a march that he not have
his hands in his pockets or a cigarette in his mouth.

2.

Punctuality must always be observed.
appear on time to do his duty.

3.

You are in the service, so do your duty. We do not
need dead carcasses. Support your leader by following
his orders, dilatory comrades can demoralize everyone,
so be fast in carrying out orders.

4.

It is a duty to respect your leader.
Should you have
a question or want to make an announcement, say your
piece in a short and snappy manner.
The leader by
virtue of his position deserves to be called Herr.
Omit unnecessary questions.

5.

Can you discuss matters amongst yourselves'
Yes, but
you must keep it quiet and do not let everyone in on
the discussion.
Do not give anything away to the
enemy rabble.

The SA man must

6 . The SA does not represent any class.
Workers of both
the head and the hands find themselves together in this
fighting society.
Personal animosities have no place
in our organization.
Through this fighting society
we will build a true vOlkisch community.
7.

Amongst your friends be careful what you say.
It is
not good to wear your heart on your tongue, when
293
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everyone within hearing distance is not with us.
8.

There are no politics within the SA. Each knows the
politics of the others because he and they are SA men.
Politics is for the professional leaders of the move
ment .

9.

Cultivate the company and companionship of your
fellow members, but let such meetings be orderly.
Do not let them degenerate into drunken brawls.

10.

Be diligent in your private life for you work for the
great ideas of Adolf Hitler.
Source:

H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401 (1928)

"Berichte

der Staatspolizei Wtirttemberg zur politischen Lage, Aus der
NSDAP; Geheim 12.12.28."
The ranks and responsibilities of SA leaders were
not the same at all times, but the following will give the
reader some idea of how the organization was structured and
a key to SA abbreviations.
UNIT

COMMANDER

ABBREVIATION

Gruppe
(10-13 men)

Gruppenf tihrer

Gruf

Truppe
(3 Gruppen)

Truppenf llhrer

Truf

Sturm
(2 Truppen)

Sturmf lihrer

Stuf

Standarte
(varies)

Standartenf tihrer

Staf

Gausturmf lihrer
Gausturm
(2 Standarten, in
one Gau there could
more than one Gausturm)

Gaustuf

Brigade
(2 Gausturmen)

Brigaf

Brigadef lihrer
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UNIT
SA

COMMANDER
Oberst Sturm
Abteilung FUhrer
(for 1928-30
Franz von Pfeffer)

ABBREVIATION
OSAF

The SA also had special Gau ambulance sections and marching
bands.
Source:

H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1401 (1928),

"Berichte der Staatspolizei Wiirttemberg zur politischen
Lage, Aus der NSDAP; Geheim, 12.12*28."

APPENDIX D
FINANCING NAZI REGIONAL ACTIVITIES
One of the major criticisms of Gauleiter Murr was
that he was a poor business manager who had gotten his Gau
deeply in debt.

In the late twenties the Nazis expected

their activities to pay for themselves.

Most party pro

grams were organized with the understanding that they would
be economically self-sufficient.

Reinhardt’s school,

Czarnowski's slide service and the Muchow system were all
examples of this.

Regionally and even locally the same

principle applied.

The following is a balance sheet for

Nazi rallies held in the Volksbildungsheim Hall in Frankfurtam-Main.
"Cost of the Rally
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Rent, lights, heating
Signs 84 cm. x 120 cm.
Advertising for two days
3,000 handbills
Banners
Other expenses, speaker's
fee, etc.

RM 200
RM 80
RM 100
RM 4 0
RM 30
RM 25
RM 475

Income from the Rally
a.
b.

600 tickets at 50 pf.
300 tickets at 30 pf.

The remainder of the expenses to be
296

RM 300
RM 90
RM 390
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made up out of voluntary contributions."^
The above provides a good ideas of how the party financed
its activities.

Handbills, newspaper promotion, and large

signs were used to advertise events.

Halls were selected

on the basis of the party's ability to fill them.

In

Frankfurt the NSDAP held most of its rallies in the
Volksbildungsheim in 1928.

With the expansion of 1929 the

Nazis began to rent the larger and more expensive
Zoologische Garten.

The Nazi attempt to make rallies pay

for themselves was also useful to the party in terms of
the effectiveness of propaganda drives-

This method in

volved all party members in propaganda actions.

Handbills

were distributed and tickets were sold by rank-and-file
Nazis.

Since only those who were willing to pay the price

of admission were allowed to attend, the Nazis were assured
of audiences that were interested in the movement.

Even

the party’s opponents had to pay for the privilege of
attempting to break up one of these meetings.
In cases where income was insufficient to defray
expenses, the activity's organizer had to make up the dif
ference out of his own pocket.

Kreisleiter Adalbert Gimbel

of the Frankfurt area once had to go without food for a few
days, because more SA men showed up at the provisioning
2
center in his charge than he had made allowances for.
The
1H.A. Reel 28, Folder 534, Adalbert Gimbel, "So
kaempften wir."
2Ibid.
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self-financing aspects of Nazi campaigning allowed the
party to operate with few big contributors.

3

The amount of

self-sacrifice and hard work demanded of party members to
conduct this kind of campaigning was beneficial to the
NSDAP.

It served to heighten the sense of positive partici

pation so vital for mobilizing the energies of ordinary
party men, and it eliminated the danger of the party being
identified with any big contributors who might be thought
to be in secret control of the movement.
A minor source of supplemental income to the
Gauleiters was the National Socialist Hilfbunde.

These or

ganizations developed by the Gauleiters collected contribu
tions from those who favored the NSDAP but did not want to
become openly associated with the Nazis for business or
personal reasons.

4

As a source of income the HilfbQnde were

only of minor importance.

Most party activities did pay

for themselves especially after 1929.

The HilfbUnde, how

ever, did provide the Gauleiters with a small discretionary
income that they were free to use when necessary.

These

funds were helpful in defraying extraordinary expenses, such
as those incurred in an election campaign or in efforts to
open up new territory.

The availability of this extra

money made it possible for the Nazis to be more flexible in
their planning, and helped the Gauleiters keep their
^Turner, Nazism, pp. 89-108.
.A. Reel 9, Folder 188, "Anordnung 7."
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organizations financially sound, if not wealthy.

Under

this system heavy debts usually implied abuse of Nazi
techniques of campaigning.

It was for this reason that

Gauleiter Murr was so scathingly criticized for allowing
his command to fall 2,000 RM in debt.

5

"*H.A. Reel 58, Folder 1402, "Berichte der Staatspolizei Wurttemberg zur politischen Lage, Geheim 23.1.29,
Aus der NSDAP."
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